

# LINCOLN ABRAHAM

THE PAPERS AND  
WRITINGS OF ABRAHAM  
LINCOLN – VOLUME 6:  
1862-1863

Abraham Lincoln

**The Papers And Writings  
Of Abraham Lincoln  
— Volume 6: 1862-1863**

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**Lincoln A.**

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## Содержание

RECOMMENDATION OF NAVAL OFFICERS	8
TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:	9
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN	10
SPEECH TO THE 12TH INDIANA REGIMENT, MAY [15?] 1862	11
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL	12
MEMORANDUM OF PROPOSED ADDITIONS TO INSTRUCTIONS OF ABOVE DATE	13
MILITARY EMANCIPATION	14
FROM SECRETARY STANTON TO GENERAL McCLELLAN	15
PROCLAMATION REVOKING GENERAL HUNTER'S ORDER OF MILITARY EMANCIPATION,	16
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. E. McCLELLAN	18
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN	19
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL McCLELLAN	20
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL McCLELLAN	21
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL RUFUS SAXTON	22
TELEGRAM TO COLONEL D. S. MILES	23
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. C. FREMONT	24
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. C. FREMONT	25
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK	26
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL McDOWELL	27
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. W. GEARY	28
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN	29
ORDER TAKING MILITARY POSSESSION OF RAILROADS	30
TELEGRAM TO SECRETARY CHASE	31
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL R. SAXTON	32
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL R. SAXTON	33
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL R. SAXTON	34
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN	35
HISTORY OF CONSPIRACY OF REBELLION	36
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN	38
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL	39
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL McCLELLAN	40
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. C. FREMONT	41
TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY STANTON TO GOVERNOR ANDREW	42
TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY STANTON TO GENERAL J. C. FREMONT,	43
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL	44
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN	45
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL	46
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL	47
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN	48
TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY STANTON TO GENERAL FREMONT	49
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL MARCY	50

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN	51
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL N. P. BANKS	52
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL FREMONT	53
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL	54
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL MARCY	55
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL	56
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL N. P. BANKS	57
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL	58
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL FREMONT	59
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL	60
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN	61
TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY STANTON	62
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN	63
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN	64
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL	65
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK	66
TELEGRAM TO GOVERNOR JOHNSON	67
TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN	68
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK	69
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL N. P. BANKS	70
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. C. FREMONT	71
TELEGRAM TO GOVERNOR JOHNSON	72
TO GENERAL J. C. FREMONT. WASHINGTON, June 12, 1862	73
MESSAGE TO CONGRESS	74
TO GENERAL J. C. FREMONT	75
TO GENERAL J. C. FREMONT	77
TO GENERAL C. SCHURZ	78
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK	79
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN	80
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN	81
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN	82
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN	83
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN	84
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL N. P. BANKS	85
TREATY WITH MEXICO	86
VETO OF A CURRENCY BILL	87
SPEECH AT JERSEY CITY, JUNE 24, 1862	88
TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN	89
ORDER CONSTITUTING THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA	90
TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY STANTON TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK	91
TELEGRAMS TO GENERAL A. E. BURNSIDE	92
WAR DEPARTMENT, June, 28, 1862	93
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN	94
TO SECRETARY SEWARD	95
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. A. DIX	96
TELEGRAM TO FLAG-OFFICER L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH	97
To GOVERNOR MORTON	98
TELEGRAM TO SECRETARY SEWARD	99

TELEGRAM TO SECRETARY SEWARD. WAR DEPARTMENT, June 30, 1862	100
CALL FOR TROOPS. NEW YORK, June 30, 1862	101
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. A. DIX	102
TELEGRAMS TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK	103
WASHINGTON, D.C., June 30, 1862	104
CALL FOR 300,000 VOLUNTEERS, JULY 1, 1862	105
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, July 1, 1862	106
PROCLAMATION CONCERNING TAXES IN REBELLIOUS STATES, JULY 1, 1862	107
MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, JULY 1, 1862	108
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL McCLELLAN	109
TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN	110
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK	111
MESSAGE TO THE SENATE	112
CIRCULAR LETTER TO THE GOVERNORS	113
TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN	114
TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN	115
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK	116
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. A. DIX	117
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN	118
TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK	119
MEMORANDUM OF AN INTERVIEW BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL McCLELLAN	120
ORDER MAKING HALLECK GENERAL-IN-CHIEF	122
ORDER CONCERNING THE SOUTHWEST BRANCH OF THE PACIFIC RAILROAD	123
MESSAGE TO CONGRESS	124
TELEGRAM TO GOVERNOR JOHNSON. WAR DEPARTMENT, July 11, 1862	125
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK. WAR DEPARTMENT, July 11, 1862	126
APPEAL TO BORDER-STATES IN FAVOR OF COMPENSATED EMANCIPATION	127
TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN	129
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK	130
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. T. BOYLE	131
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. T. BOYLE	132
ACT OF COMPENSATED EMANCIPATION	133
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK	134
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN	135
TO SOLOMON FOOT	136
MESSAGE TO CONGRESS. July 17, 1862	137
MESSAGE TO CONGRESS. July 17, 1862	138
FELLOW-CITIZENS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:	139
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN	141
ORDER IN REGARD TO BEHAVIOR OF ALIENS	142
ORDER AUTHORIZING EMPLOYMENT OF "CONTRABANDS."	143
WARNING TO REBEL SYMPATHIZERS	144

HOLD MY HAND WHILST THE ENEMY STABS ME	145
TO CUTHBERT BULLITT	146
TO LOYAL GOVERNORS	148
BROKEN EGGS CANNOT BE MENDED	149
Конец ознакомительного фрагмента.	150

# **Abraham Lincoln**

## **The Papers And Writings Of Abraham Lincoln — Volume 6: 1862-1863**

### **RECOMMENDATION OF NAVAL OFFICERS**

#### **MESSAGE TO CONGRESS**

WASHINGTON, D.C., May 14, 1862.

TO SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

The third section of the "Act further to promote the efficiency of the Navy," approved 21st of December, 1861, provides:

"That the President of the United States by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall have the authority to detail from the retired list of the navy for the command of squadrons and single ships such officers as he may believe that the good of the service requires to be thus placed in command; and such officers may, if upon the recommendation of the President of the United States they shall receive a vote of thanks of Congress for their services and gallantry in action against an enemy, be restored to the active list, and not otherwise."

In conformity with this law, Captain David G. Farragut was nominated to the Senate for continuance as the flag-officer in command of the squadron which recently rendered such important service to the Union by his successful operations on the lower Mississippi and capture of New Orleans.

Believing that no occasion could arise which would more fully correspond with the intention of the law or be more pregnant with happy influence as an example, I cordially recommend that Captain D. G. Farragut receive a vote of thanks of Congress for his services and gallantry displayed in the capture since 21st December, 1861, of Forts Jackson and St. Philip, city of New Orleans, and the destruction of various rebel gunboats, rams, etc...

## TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

I submit herewith a list of naval officers who commanded vessels engaged in the recent brilliant operations of the squadron commanded by Flag-officer Farragut which led to the capture of Forts Jackson and St. Philip, city of New Orleans, and the destruction of rebel gunboats, rams, etc., in April 1862. For their services and gallantry on those occasions I cordially recommend that they should, by name, receive a vote of thanks of Congress:

LIST:

Captain Theodorus Bailey.  
Captain Henry W. Morris.  
Captain Thomas T. Craven.  
Commander Henry H. Bell.  
Commander Samuel Phillips Lee.  
Commander Samuel Swartwout.  
Commander Melancton Smith.  
Commander Charles Stewart Boggs  
Commander John De Camp  
Commander James Alden.  
Commander David D. Porter.  
Commander Richard Wainwright.  
Commander William B. Renshaw.  
Lieutenant Commanding Abram D. Harrell.  
Lieutenant Commanding Edward Donaldson.  
Lieutenant Commanding George H. Preble.  
Lieutenant Commanding Edward T. Nichols.  
Lieutenant Commanding Jonathan M. Wainwright.  
Lieutenant Commanding John Guest.  
Lieutenant Commanding Charles H. B. Caldwell.  
Lieutenant Commanding Napoleon B. Harrison.  
Lieutenant Commanding Albert N. Smith.  
Lieutenant Commanding Pierce Crosby.  
Lieutenant Commanding George M. Ransom.  
Lieutenant Commanding Watson Smith.  
Lieutenant Commanding John H. Russell.  
Lieutenant Commanding Walter W. Queen.  
Lieutenant Commanding K. Randolph Breese.  
Acting Lieutenant Commanding Sellin E. Woolworth.  
Acting Lieutenant Commanding Charles H. Baldwin.

A. LINCOLN.

WASHINGTON, D.C., May 14, 1862

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN**

**WASHINGTON CITY, May 15, 1862**

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN, Cumberland, Virginia:

Your long despatch of yesterday is just received. I will answer more fully soon. Will say now that all your despatches to the Secretary of War have been promptly shown to me. Have done and shall do all I could and can to sustain you. Hoped that the opening of James River and putting Wool and Burnside in communication, with an open road to Richmond, or to you, had effected something in that direction. I am still unwilling to take all our force off the direct line between Richmond and here.

A. LINCOLN.

## **SPEECH TO THE 12TH INDIANA REGIMENT, MAY [15?] 1862**

### **SOLDIERS, OF THE TWELFTH INDIANA REGIMENT:**

It has not been customary heretofore, nor will it be hereafter, for me to say something to every regiment passing in review. It occurs too frequently for me to have speeches ready on all occasions. As you have paid such a mark of respect to the chief magistrate, it appears that I should say a word or two in reply. Your colonel has thought fit, on his own account and in your name, to say that you are satisfied with the manner in which I have performed my part in the difficulties which have surrounded the nation. For your kind expressions I am extremely grateful, but on the other hand I assure you that the nation is more indebted to you, and such as you, than to me. It is upon the brave hearts and strong arms of the people of the country that our reliance has been placed in support of free government and free institutions.

For the part which you and the brave army of which you are a part have, under Providence, performed in this great struggle, I tender more thanks especially to this regiment, which has been the subject of good report. The thanks of the nation will follow you, and may God's blessing rest upon you now and forever. I hope that upon your return to your homes you will find your friends and loved ones well and happy. I bid you farewell.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL**

**WASHINGTON, May 16, 1862**

MAJOR-GENERAL McDOWELL:

What is the strength of your force now actually with you?

A. LINCOLN.

## **MEMORANDUM OF PROPOSED ADDITIONS TO INSTRUCTIONS OF ABOVE DATE**

### **TO GENERAL McDOWELL, AND GENERAL MEIGS'S INDORSEMENT THEREON**

May 17, 1862. You will retain the separate command of the forces taken with you; but while co-operating with General McClellan you will obey his orders, except that you are to judge, and are not to allow your force to be disposed otherwise than so as to give the greatest protection to this capital which may be possible from that distance.

[Indorsement.]

TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

The President having shown this to me, I suggested that it is dangerous to direct a subordinate not to obey the orders of his superior in any case, and that to give instructions to General McClellan to this same end and furnish General McDowell with a copy thereof would effect the object desired by the President. He desired me to say that the sketch of instructions to General McClellan herewith he thought made this addition unnecessary.

Respectfully, M. C. M.

## **MILITARY EMANCIPATION**

INDORSEMENT RELATING TO GENERAL DAVID HUNTER'S ORDER OF  
MILITARY EMANCIPATION,

MAY 17, 1862

No commanding general shall do such a thing upon my responsibility without consulting me.

A. LINCOLN.

## **FROM SECRETARY STANTON TO GENERAL McCLELLAN**

**WASHINGTON, May 18, 1862**

GENERAL: Your despatch to the President, asking reinforcements, has been received and carefully considered.

The President is not willing to uncover the capital entirely; and it is believed that, even if this were prudent, it would require more time to effect a junction between your army and that of the Rappahannock by the way of the Potomac and York rivers than by a land march. In order, therefore, to increase the strength of the attack upon Richmond at the earliest moment, General McDowell has been ordered to march upon that city by the shortest route. He is ordered, keeping himself always in position to save the capital from all possible attack, so to operate as to put his left wing in communication with your right wing, and you are instructed to co-operate so as to establish this communication as soon as possible by extending your right-wing to the north of Richmond.

It is believed that this communication can be safely established either north or south of the Pamunkey River.

In any event, you will be able to prevent the main body of the enemy's forces from leaving Richmond and falling in overwhelming force upon General McDowell. He will move with between thirty-five and forty thousand men.

A copy of the instructions to General McDowell are with this. The specific task assigned to his command has been to provide against any danger to the capital of the nation.

At your earnest call for reinforcements, he is sent forward to co-operate in the reduction of Richmond, but charged, in attempting this, not to uncover the city of Washington; and you will give no order, either before or after your junction, which can put him out of position to cover this city. You and he will communicate with each other by telegraph or otherwise as frequently as may be necessary for efficient cooperation. When General McDowell is in position on your right, his supplies must be drawn from West Point, and you will instruct your staff-officers to be prepared to supply him by that route.

The President desires that General McDowell retain the command of the Department of the Rappahannock and of the forces with which he moves forward.

By order of the President: EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, Commanding Army of the Potomac, before Richmond.

# PROCLAMATION REVOKING GENERAL HUNTER'S ORDER OF MILITARY EMANCIPATION,

MAY 19, 1862

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

A Proclamation

Whereas there appears in the public prints what purports to be a proclamation of Major general Hunter, in the words and figures following, to wit:

(General Orders No. 11) HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH, HILTON HEAD, PORT ROYAL, S. C., May 9, 1862.

"The three States of Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina, comprising the military department of the South, having deliberately declared themselves no longer under the protection of the United States of America, and having taken up arms against the said United States, it became a military necessity to declare martial law. This was accordingly done on the 25th day of April, 1862. Slavery and martial law in a free country are altogether incompatible. The persons in these three States: Georgia Florida, and South Carolina — heretofore held as slaves are therefore declared forever free.

"By command of Major-General D. Hunter: "(Official.)ED. W. SMITH, "Acting Assistant Adjutant-General."

And whereas the same is producing some excitement and misunderstanding: therefore,

I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, proclaim and declare that the Government of the United States, had no knowledge, information, or belief of an intention on the part of General Hunter to issue such a proclamation; nor has it yet any authentic information that the document is genuine. And further, that neither General Hunter nor any other commander or person has been authorized by the Government of the United States to make a proclamation declaring the slaves of any State free; and that the supposed proclamation now in question, whether genuine or false, is altogether void so far as respects such a declaration.

I further make known that whether it be competent for me, as commander-in-chief of the army and navy, to declare the slaves of any State or States free, and whether, at any time, in any case, it shall have become a necessity indispensable to the maintenance of the government to exercise such supposed power, are questions which under my responsibility I reserve to myself, and which I cannot feel justified in leaving to the decision of commanders in the field.

These are totally different questions from those of police regulations in armies and camps.

On the sixth day of March last, by special message, I recommended to Congress the adoption of a joint resolution, to be substantially as follows:

Resolved, That the United States ought to co-operate with any State which may adopt gradual abolishment of slavery, giving to such State pecuniary aid, to be used by such State, in its discretion, to compensate for the inconvenience, public and private, produced by such change of system.

The resolution in the language above quoted was adopted by large majorities in both branches of Congress, and now stands an authentic, definite, and solemn proposal of the nation to the States and people most immediately interested in the subject-matter. To the people of those States I now earnestly appeal. I do not argue — I beseech you to make arguments for yourselves. You cannot, if you would, be blind to the signs of the times. I beg of you a calm and enlarged consideration of them, ranging, if it may be, far above personal and partisan politics. This proposal makes common cause for a common object, casting no reproaches upon any. It acts not the Pharisee. The change it contemplates would come gently as the dews of heaven, not rending or wrecking anything. Will you not embrace

it? So much good has not been done, by one effort, in all past time, as in the providence of God it is now your high privilege to do. May the vast future not have to lament that you have neglected it.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington, this nineteenth day of May, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, and of the independence of the United States the eighty-sixth.

A. LINCOLN.

By the President: WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. E. McCLELLAN**

**WASHINGTON, May 21, 1862**

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

I have just been waited on by a large committee who present a petition signed by twenty-three senators and eighty-four representatives asking me to restore General Hamilton to his division. I wish to do this, and yet I do not wish to be understood as rebuking you. Please answer at once.

A. LINCOLN.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN**

**WASHINGTON CITY, May 22, 1862**

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

Your long despatch of yesterday just received. You will have just such control of General McDowell and his forces as you therein indicate. McDowell can reach you by land sooner than he could get aboard of boats, if the boats were ready at Fredericksburg, unless his march shall be resisted, in which case the force resisting him will certainly not be confronting you at Richmond. By land he can reach you in five days after starting, whereas by water he would not reach you in two weeks, judging by past experience. Franklin's single division did not reach you in ten days after I ordered it.

A. LINCOLN,  
President United States.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL McCLELLAN**

**WASHINGTON, May 24, 1862. 4 PM**

MAJOR-GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN:

In consequence of General Banks's critical position, I have been compelled to suspend General McDowell's movements to join you. The enemy are making a desperate push upon Harper's Ferry, and we are trying to throw General Fremont's force and part of General McDowell's in their rear.

A. LINCOLN, President.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL McCLELLAN

WASHINGTON May 24, 1862

MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:

I left General McDowell's camp at dark last evening. Shields's command is there, but it is so worn that he cannot move before Monday morning, the 26th. We have so thinned our line to get troops for other places that it was broken yesterday at Front Royal, with a probable loss to us of one regiment infantry, two Companies cavalry, putting General Banks in some peril.

The enemy's forces under General Anderson now opposing General McDowell's advance have as their line of supply and retreat the road to Richmond.

If, in conjunction with McDowell's movement against Anderson, you could send a force from your right to cut off the enemy's supplies from Richmond, preserve the railroad bridges across the two forks of the Pamunkey, and intercept the enemy's retreat, you will prevent the army now opposed to you from receiving an accession of numbers of nearly 15,000 men; and if you succeed in saving the bridges you will secure a line of railroad for supplies in addition to the one you now have. Can you not do this almost as well as not while you are building the Chickahominy bridges? McDowell and Shields both say they can, and positively will, move Monday morning. I wish you to move cautiously and safely.

You will have command of McDowell, after he joins you, precisely as you indicated in your long despatch to us of the 21st.

A. LINCOLN.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL RUFUS SAXTON**

**WAR DEPARTMENT, May, 24 1862. 2 P.M**

GENERAL SAXTON:

Geary reports Jackson with 20,000 moving from Ashby's Gap by the Little River turnpike, through Aldie, toward Centreville. This he says is reliable. He is also informed of large forces south of him. We know a force of some 15,000 broke up Saturday night from in front of Fredericksburg and went we know not where. Please inform us, if possible, what has become of the force which pursued Banks yesterday; also any other information you have.

A. LINCOLN

## **TELEGRAM TO COLONEL D. S. MILES**

**WAR DEPARTMENT, May 24, 1862. 1.30 P.M**

COLONEL MILES, Harper's Ferry, Virginia

Could you not send scouts from Winchester who would tell whether enemy are north of Banks, moving on Winchester? What is the latest you have?

A. LINCOLN.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. C. FREMONT**

**WAR DEPARTMENT, May 24, 1862. 4 P.M**

MAJOR-GENERAL FREMONT, Franklin:

You are authorized to purchase the 400 horses, or take them wherever or however you can get them. The exposed condition of General Banks makes his immediate relief a point of paramount importance. You are therefore directed by the President to move against Jackson at Harrisonburg and operate against the enemy in such way as to relieve Banks. This movement must be made immediately. You will acknowledge the receipt of this order, and specify the hour it is received by you.

A. LINCOLN.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. C. FREMONT**

**WAR DEPARTMENT, May 24, 1862. 7.15 P.M**

MAJOR-GENERAL FREMONT, Franklin, Virginia:

Many thanks for the promptness with which you have answered that you will execute the order. Much — perhaps all — depends upon the celerity with which you can execute it. Put the utmost speed into it. Do not lose a minute.

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 24, 1862

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, near Corinth, Mississippi:

Several despatches from Assistant Secretary Scott and one from Governor Morton asking reinforcements for you have been received. I beg you to be assured we do the best we can. I mean to cast no blame where I tell you each of our commanders along our line from Richmond to Corinth supposes himself to be confronted by numbers superior to his own. Under this pressure We thinned the line on the upper Potomac, until yesterday it was broken with heavy loss to us, and General Banks put in great peril, out of which he is not yet extricated, and may be actually captured. We need men to repair this breach, and have them not at hand. My dear General, I feel justified to rely very much on you. I believe you and the brave officers and men with you can and will get the victory at Corinth.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 24, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL McDOWELL, Fredricksburg:

General Fremont has been ordered by telegraph to move from Franklin on Harrisonburg to relieve General Banks, and capture or destroy Jackson's and Ewell's forces. You are instructed, laying aside for the present the movement on Richmond, to put 20,000 men in motion at once for the Shenandoah, moving on the line or in advance of the line of the Manassas Gap railroad. Your object will be to capture the forces of Jackson and Ewell, either in co-operation with General Fremont, or, in case want of supplies or of transportation, interferes with his movements, it is believed that the force which you move will be sufficient to accomplish this object alone. The information thus far received here makes it probable that if the enemy operate actively against General Banks, you will not be able to count upon much assistance from him, but may even have to release him. Reports received this moment are that Banks is fighting with Ewell eight miles from Winchester.

A. LINCOLN.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL McDOWELL**

**WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, D.C., May 24, 1862**

MAJOR-GENERAL I. McDOWELL:

I am highly gratified by your alacrity in obeying my order. The change was as painful to me as it can possibly be to you or to any one. Everything now depends upon the celerity and vigor of your movement.

A. LINCOLN

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. W. GEARY**

**WAR DEPARTMENT, May 25, 1862 1.45 P.M**

GENERAL GEARY, White Plains:

Please give us your best present impression as to the number of the enemy's forces north of Strasburg and Front Royal. Are the forces still moving north through the gap at Front Royal and between you and there?

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN

WASHINGTON, May 25, 1862. 2 P.M

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

The enemy is moving north in sufficient force to drive General Banks before him — precisely in what force we cannot tell. He is also threatening Leesburg and Geary, on the Manassas Gap railroad, from both north and south — in precisely what force we cannot tell. I think the movement is a general and concerted one, such as would not be if he was acting upon the purpose of a very desperate defense of Richmond. I think the time is near when you must either attack Richmond or give up the job and come to the defense of Washington. Let me hear from you instantly.

A. LINCOLN, President.

## **ORDER TAKING MILITARY POSSESSION OF RAILROADS**

**WAR DEPARTMENT, May 25, 1862**

Ordered: By virtue of the authority vested by act of Congress, the President takes military possession of all the railroads in the United States from and after this date until further order, and directs that the respective railroad companies, their officers and servants, shall hold themselves in readiness for the transportation of such troops and munitions of war as may be ordered by the military authorities, to the exclusion of all other business.

By order of the Secretary of War.

M. C. MEIGS

## **TELEGRAM TO SECRETARY CHASE**

**WAR DEPARTMENT, May 25, 1862**

SECRETARY CHASE, Fredericksburg, Virginia:

It now appears that Banks got safely into Winchester last night, and is this morning retreating on Harper's Ferry. This justifies the inference that he is pressed by numbers superior to his own. I think it not improbable that Ewell, Jackson, and Johnson are pouring through the gap they made day before yesterday at Front Royal, making a dash northward. It will be a very valuable and very honorable service for General McDowell to cut them off. I hope he will put all possible energy and speed into the effort.

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL R. SAXTON

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 25, 1862

GENERAL SAXTON, Harper's Ferry:

If Banks reaches Martinsburg, is he any the better for it? Will not the enemy cut him from thence to Harper's Ferry? Have you sent anything to meet him and assist him at Martinsburg? This is an inquiry, not an order.

A. LINCOLN.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL R. SAXTON**

**WAR DEPARTMENT, May 25, 1862. 6.30 P.M**

GENERAL SAXTON, Harper's Ferry:

One good six-gun battery, complete in its men and appointments, is now on its way to you from Baltimore. Eleven other guns, of different sorts, are on their way to you from here. Hope they will all reach you before morning. As you have but 2500 men at Harper's Ferry, where are the rest which were in that vicinity and which we have sent forward? Have any of them been cut off?

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL R. SAXTON

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 25, 1862

GENERAL SAXTON, Harper's Ferry:

I fear you have mistaken me. I did not mean to question the correctness of your conduct; on the contrary! I approve what you have done. As the 2500 reported by you seemed small to me, I feared some had got to Banks and been cut off with him. Please tell me the exact number you now have in hand.

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN

[Sent in cipher.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, D. C., May 25, 1862. 8.30 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

Your despatch received. General Banks was at Strasburg, with about 6,000 men, Shields having been taken from him to swell a column for McDowell to aid you at Richmond, and the rest of his force scattered at various places. On the 23d a rebel force of 7000 to 10,000 fell upon one regiment and two companies guarding the bridge at Front Royal, destroying it entirely; crossed the Shenandoah, and on the 24th (yesterday) pushed to get north of Banks, on the road to Winchester. Banks ran a race with them, beating them into Winchester yesterday evening. This morning a battle ensued between the two forces, in which Banks was beaten back into full retreat toward Martinsburg, and probably is broken up into a total rout. Geary, on the Manassas Gap railroad, just now reports that Jackson is now near Front Royal, With 10,000, following up and supporting, as I understand, the forces now pursuing Banks, also that another force of 10,000 is near Orleans, following on in the same direction. Stripped here, as we are here, it will be all we can do to prevent them crossing the Potomac at Harper's Ferry or above. We have about 20,000 of McDowell's force moving back to the vicinity of Front Royal, and General Fremont, who was at Franklin, is moving to Harrisonburg; both these movements intended to get in the enemy's rear.

One more of McDowell's brigades is ordered through here to Harper's Ferry; the rest of his force remains for the present at Fredericksburg. We are sending such regiments and dribs from here and Baltimore as we can spare to Harper's Ferry, supplying their places in some sort by calling in militia from the adjacent States. We also have eighteen cannon on the road to Harper's Ferry, of which arm there is not a single one yet at that point. This is now our situation.

If McDowell's force was now beyond our reach, we should be utterly helpless. Apprehension of something like this, and no unwillingness to sustain you, has always been my reason for withholding McDowell's force from you. Please understand this, and do the best you can with the force you have.

A. LINCOLN.

# HISTORY OF CONSPIRACY OF REBELLION

## MESSAGE TO CONGRESS

MAY 16, 1862 TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

The insurrection which is yet existing in the United States and aims at the overthrow of the Federal Constitution and the Union, was clandestinely prepared during the Winter of 1860 and 1861, and assumed an open organization in the form of a treasonable provisional government at Montgomery, in Alabama on the 18th day of February, 1861. On the 12th day of April, 1861, the insurgents committed the flagrant act of civil war by the bombardment and the capture of Fort Sumter, Which cut off the hope of immediate conciliation. Immediately afterward all the roads and avenues to this city were obstructed, and the capital was put into the condition of a siege. The mails in every direction were stopped and the lines of telegraph cut off by the insurgents, and military and naval forces which had been called out by the government for the defense of Washington were prevented from reaching the city by organized and combined treasonable resistance in the State of Maryland. There was no adequate and effective organization for the public defense. Congress had indefinitely adjourned. There was no time to convene them. It became necessary for me to choose whether, using only the existing means, agencies, and processes which Congress had provided, I should let the government fall at once into ruin or whether, availing myself of the broader powers conferred by the Constitution in cases of insurrection, I would make an effort to save it, with all its blessings, for the present age and for posterity.

I thereupon summoned my constitutional advisers, the heads of all the departments, to meet on Sunday, the 20th day of April, 1861, at the office of the Navy Department, and then and there, with their unanimous concurrence, I directed that an armed revenue cutter should proceed to sea to afford protection to the commercial marine, and especially the California treasure ships then on their way to this coast. I also directed the commandant of the navy-yard at Boston to purchase or charter and arm as quickly as possible five steamships for purposes of public defense. I directed the commandant of the navy-yard at Philadelphia to purchase or charter and arm an equal number for the same purpose. I directed the commandant at New York to purchase or charter and arm an equal number. I directed Commander Gillis to purchase or charter and arm and put to sea two other vessels. Similar directions were given to Commodore Dupont, with a view to the opening of passages by water to and from the capital. I directed the several officers to take the advice and obtain the aid and efficient services, in the matter, of his Excellency Edwin D. Morgan, the Governor of New York, or in his absence George D. Morgan, William M. Evarts, R. M. Blatchford, and Moses H. Grinnell, who were by my directions especially empowered by the Secretary of the Navy to act for his department in that crisis in matters pertaining to the forwarding of troops and supplies for the public defense.

The several departments of the government at that time contained so large a number of disloyal persons that it would have been impossible to provide safely through official agents only for the performance of the duties thus confided to citizens favorably known for their ability, loyalty, and patriotism.

The several orders issued upon these occurrences were transmitted by private messengers, who pursued a circuitous way to the seaboard cities, inland across the States of Pennsylvania and Ohio and the northern lakes. I believe by these and other similar measures taken in that crisis, some of which were without any authority of law, the government was saved from overthrow. I am not aware that a dollar of the public funds thus confided without authority of law to unofficial persons was either

lost or wasted, although apprehensions of such misdirection occurred to me as objections to those extraordinary proceedings, and were necessarily overruled.

I recall these transactions now because my attention has been directed to a resolution which was passed by the House of Representatives on the 30th day of last month, which is in these words:

"Resolved, That Simon Cameron, late Secretary of War by investing Alexander Cummings with the control of large sums of the public money and authority to purchase military supplies without restriction, without requiring from him any guaranty for the faithful performance of his duties, when the services of competent public officers were available, and by involving the government in a vast number of contracts with persons not legitimately engaged in the business pertaining to the subject-matter of such contracts, especially in the purchase of arms for future delivery, has adopted a policy highly injurious to the public service, and deserves the censure of the House."

Congress will see that I should be wanting equally in candor and in justice if I should leave the censure expressed in this resolution to rest exclusively or chiefly upon Mr. Cameron. The same sentiment is unanimously entertained by the heads of department who participated in the proceedings which the House of Representatives have censured. It is due to Mr. Cameron to say that although he fully approved the proceedings they were not moved nor suggested by himself, and that not only the President, but all the other heads of departments, were at least equally responsible with him for whatever error, wrong, or fault was committed in the premises.

A. LINCOLN.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN**

**WASHINGTON, May 26, 1862. 12.40**

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

We have General Banks's official report. He has saved his army and baggage, and has made a safe retreat to the river, and is probably safe at Williamsport. He reports the attacking force at 15,000.

A. LINCOLN, President.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL**

**WAR DEPARTMENT, May 26, 1862. 1 P.M**

MAJOR-GENERAL McDOWELL, Falmouth, Virginia:

Despatches from Geary just received have been sent you. Should not the remainder of your forces, except sufficient to hold the point at Fredericksburg, move this way — to Manassas Junction or Alexandria? As commander of this department, should you not be here? I ask these questions.

A. LINCOLN.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL McCLELLAN**

**WASHINGTON, May 26, 1862**

MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:

Can you not cut the Alula Creek railroad? Also, what impression have you as to intrenched works for you to contend with in front of Richmond? Can you get near enough to throw shells into the city?

A. LINCOLN, President.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. C. FREMONT**

**May 27.1862. 9.58 P.M**

MAJOR-GENERAL FREMONT:

I see that you are at Moorefield. You were expressly ordered to march to Harrisonburg. What does this mean?

A. LINCOLN.

## **TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY STANTON TO GOVERNOR ANDREW**

**WASHINGTON, May 27, 1862**

GOVERNOR ANDREW, Boston:

The President directs that the militia be relieved, and the enlistments made for three years, or during the war. This, I think, will practically not be longer than for a year. The latest intelligence from General Banks states that he has saved nearly his whole command with small loss.

Concentrations of our force have been made, which it is hoped will capture the enemy.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

**TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY  
STANTON TO GENERAL J. C. FREMONT,**

**WASHINGTON, May 28, 1862**

MAJOR-GENERAL FREMONT, Moorefield

The President directs you to halt at Moorefield and await orders, unless you hear of the enemy being in the general direction of Rodney, in which case you will move upon him. Acknowledge the receipt of this order, and the hour it is received.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1862

GENERAL McDOWELL, Manassas Junction:

General McClellan at 6.30 P.M. yesterday telegraphed that Fitz-John Porter's division had fought and driven 13,000 of the enemy, under General Branch, from Hanover Court-House, and was driving them from a stand they had made on the railroad at the time the messenger left. Two hours later he telegraphed that Stoneman had captured an engine and six cars on the Virginia Central, which he at once sent to communicate with Porter. Nothing further from McClellan.

If Porter effects a lodgment on both railroads near Hanover Court-House, consider whether your forces in front of Fredericksburg should not push through and join him.

A. LINCOLN.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN**

**WASHINGTON, May 28, 1862**

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

What of F.J. Porter's expedition? Please answer.

A. LINCOLN.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL**

**WASHINGTON. May 28, 1862. 4 P.M**

GENERAL McDOWELL, Manassas Junction:

You say General Geary's scouts report that they find no enemy this side of the Blue Ridge. Neither do I. Have they been to the Blue Ridge looking for them.

A. LINCOLN.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL**

**WASHINGTON, May 28, 1862. 5.40 P.M**

GENERAL McDOWELL, Manassas Junction:

I think the evidence now preponderates that Ewell and Jackson are still about Winchester. Assuming this, it is for you a question of legs. Put in all the speed you can. I have told Fremont as much, and directed him to drive at them as fast as possible. By the way, I suppose you know Fremont has got up to Moorefield, instead of going into Harrisonburg.

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN

WASHINGTON May 28, 1862. 8.40 P.M

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

I am very glad of General F. J. Porter's victory. Still, if it was a total rout of the enemy, I am puzzled to know why the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad was not seized again, as you say you have all the railroads but the Richmond and Fredericksburg. I am puzzled to see how, lacking that, you can have any, except the scrap from Richmond to West Point. The scrap of the Virginia Central from Richmond to Hanover Junction, without more, is simply nothing. That the whole of the enemy is concentrating on Richmond, I think cannot be certainly known to you or me. Saxton, at Harper's Ferry informs us that large forces, supposed to be Jackson's and Ewells, forced his advance from Charlestown today. General King telegraphs us from Fredericksburg that contrabands give certain information that 15,000 left Hanover Junction Monday morning to reinforce Jackson. I am painfully impressed with the importance of the struggle before you, and shall aid you all I can consistently with my view of due regard to all points.

A. LINCOLN.

## **TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY STANTON TO GENERAL FREMONT**

**WASHINGTON, May 28, 1862**

MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN C. FREMONT, Moorefield:

The order to remain at Moorefield was based on the supposition that it would find you there.

Upon subsequent information that the enemy were still operating in the vicinity of Winchester and Martinsburg, you were directed to move against the enemy.

The President now again directs you to move against the enemy without delay. Please acknowledge the receipt of this, and the time received.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL MARCY**

**WASHINGTON, May 29, 1862. 10 A.M**

GENERAL R. B. MARCY, McClellan's Headquarters:

Yours just received. I think it cannot be certainly known whether the force which fought General Porter is the same which recently confronted McDowell. Another item of evidence bearing on it is that General Branch commanded against Porter, while it was General Anderson who was in front of McDowell. He and McDowell were in correspondence about prisoners.

A. LINCOLN.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN**

**WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, D. C., May 29, 1862. 10.30 A.M**

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

I think we shall be able within three days to tell you certainly whether any considerable force of the enemy — Jackson or any one else — is moving on to Harper's Ferry or vicinity. Take this expected development into your calculations.

A. LINCOLN.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL N. P. BANKS**

**WASHINGTON, May 29, 1862**

MAJOR-GENERAL BANKS, Williamsport, Maryland:

General McDowell's advance should, and probably will, be at or near Front Royal at twelve (noon) tomorrow. General Fremont will be at or near Strasburg as soon. Please watch the enemy closely, and follow and harass and detain him if he attempts to retire. I mean this for General Saxton's force as well as that immediately with you.

A. LINCOLN.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL FREMONT**

**WASHINGTON, May 29, 1862. 12 M**

MAJOR-GENERAL FREMONT, Moorefield, Virginia:

General McDowell's advance, if not checked by the enemy, should, and probably will, be at Front Royal by twelve (noon) to-morrow. His force, when up, will be about 20,000. Please have your force at Strasburg, or, if the route you are moving on does not lead to that point, as near Strasburg as the enemy may be by the same time. Your despatch No.30 received and satisfactory.

A. LINCOLN.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL**

**WASHINGTON, May 29, 1862**

MAJOR-GENERAL McDOWELL, Manassas Junction:

General Fremont's force should, and probably will, be at or near Strasburg by twelve (noon) tomorrow. Try to have your force, or the advance of it, at Front Royal as soon.

A. LINCOLN.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL MARCY**

**WASHINGTON, May 29, 1862. 1.20 P.M**

**GENERAL R. B. MARCY:**

Your despatch as to the South Anna and Ashland being seized by our forces this morning is received. Understanding these points to be on the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad, I heartily congratulate the country, and thank General McClellan and his army for their seizure.

**A. LINCOLN.**

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL**

**WASHINGTON, May 30, 1862. 10 A.M**

MAJOR-GENERAL McDOWELL, Manassas Junction:

I somewhat apprehend that Fremont's force, in its present condition, may not be quite strong enough in case it comes in collision with the enemy. For this additional reason I wish you to push forward your column as rapidly as possible. Tell me what number your force reaching Front Royal will amount to.

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL N. P. BANKS

WASHINGTON, May 30, 1862. 10.15 A.M

MAJOR-GENERAL BANKS,  
Williamsport, Maryland, via Harper's Ferry:

If the enemy in force is in or about Martinsburg, Charlestown, and Winchester, Or any or all of them, he may come in collision with Fremont, in which case I am anxious that your force, with you and at Harper's Ferry, should so operate as to assist Fremont if possible; the same if the enemy should engage McDowell. This was the meaning of my despatch yesterday.

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL

WASHINGTON, May 30, 1862. 12.40

MAJOR-GENERAL McDOWELL, Rectortown:

Your despatch of to-day received and is satisfactory. Fremont has nominally 22,000, really about 17,000. Blenker's division is part of it. I have a despatch from Fremont this morning, not telling me where he is; but he says:

"Scouts and men from Winchester represent Jackson's force variously at 30,000 to 60,000. With him Generals Ewell and Longstreet."

The high figures erroneous, of course. Do you know where Longstreet is? Corinth is evacuated and occupied by us.

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL FREMONT

WASHINGTON, May 30, 1862. 2.30 P.M

MAJOR-GENERAL FREMONT, Moorefield, Virginia:

Yours, saying you will reach Strasburg or vicinity at 5 P.M. Saturday, has been received and sent to General McDowell, and he directed to act in view of it. You must be up to the time you promised, if possible.

Corinth was evacuated last night, and is occupied by our troops to-day; the enemy gone south to Okolotia, on the railroad to Mobile.

A. LINCOLN.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL**

**WAR DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON CITY, May 30, 1862.9.30 P.M**

MAJOR-GENERAL McDOWELL, Rectortown, Va.:

I send you a despatch just received from Saxton at Harper's Ferry: "The rebels are in line of battle in front of our lines. They have nine pieces of artillery, and in position, and cavalry. I shelled the woods in which they were, and they in return threw a large number of shells into the lines and tents from which I moved last night to take up a stronger position. I expect a great deal from the battery on the mountain, having three 9 inch Dahlgren bearing directly on the enemy's approaches. The enemy appeared this morning and then retired, with the intention of drawing us on. I shall act on the defensive, as my position is a strong one. In a skirmish which took place this afternoon I lost one horse, The enemy lost two men killed and seven wounded.

"R. SAXTON, Brigadier General."

It seems the game is before you. Have sent a copy to General Fremont.

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN

WASHINGTON, May 31, 1862. 10.20 PM

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

A circle whose circumference shall pass through Harper's Ferry, Front Royal, and Strasburg, and whose center shall be a little northeast of Winchester, almost certainly has within it this morning the forces of Jackson, Ewell, and Edward Johnson. Quite certainly they were within it two days ago. Some part of their forces attacked Harper's Ferry at dark last evening, and are still in sight this morning. Shields, with McDowell's advance, retook Front Royal at 11 A.M. yesterday, with a dozen of our own prisoners taken there a week ago, 150 of the enemy, two locomotives, and eleven cars, some other property and stores, and saved the bridge.

General Fremont, from the direction of Moorefield, promises to be at or near Strasburg at 5 P.M. to-day. General Banks at Williamsport, with his old force and his new force at Harper's Ferry, is directed to co-operate. Shields at Front Royal reports a rumor of still an additional force of the enemy, supposed to be Anderson's, having entered the valley of Virginia. This last may or may not be true. Corinth is certainly in the hands of General Halleck.

A. LINCOLN.

## **TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY STANTON**

**TO GENERAL G. A. McCALL, WASHINGTON, May 31, 1862**

GENERAL McCALL:

The President directs me to say to you that there can be nothing to justify a panic at Fredericksburg. He expects you to maintain your position there as becomes a soldier and a general.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN**

**WASHINGTON CITY, D.C., June 1, 1862. 9.30**

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

You are probably engaged with the enemy. I suppose he made the attack. Stand well on your guard, hold all your ground, or yield any only inch by inch and in good order. This morning we merge General Wool's department into yours, giving you command of the whole, and sending General Dix to Port Monroe and General Wool to Fort McHenry. We also send General Sigel to report to you for duty.

A. LINCOLN.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN**

**WASHINGTON, June 3, 1862**

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

With these continuous rains I am very anxious about the Chickahominy so close in your rear and crossing your line of communication. Please look to it.

A. LINCOLN, President.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL**

**WASHINGTON, June 3, 1862. 6.15 P.M**

MAJOR-GENERAL McDOWELL, Front Royal, Virginia:

Anxious to know whether Shields can head or flank Jackson. Please tell about where Shields and Jackson, respectively, are at the time this reaches you.

A. LINCOLN.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK**

**WASHINGTON, June 4, 1862**

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Corinth:

Your despatch of to-day to Secretary of War received. Thanks for the good news it brings. Have you anything from Memphis or other parts of the Mississippi River? Please answer.  
A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GOVERNOR JOHNSON

[cipher.]

WASHINGTON, June 4, 1862.

HON. ANDREW JOHNSON, Nashville, Tennessee:

Do you really wish to have control of the question of releasing rebel prisoners so far as they may be Tennesseans? If you do, please tell us so. Your answer not to be made public.

A. LINCOLN.

## TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN

[Cipher.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C., June 7, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

Your despatch about Chattanooga and Dalton was duly received and sent to General Halleck.

I have just received the following answer from him:

We have Fort Pillow, Randolph, and Memphis.

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK

WASHINGTON, June 8, 1862

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Corinth, Mississippi:

We are changing one of the departmental lines, so as to give you all of Kentucky and Tennessee. In your movement upon Chattanooga I think it probable that you include some combination of the force near Cumberland Gap under General Morgan.

Do you?

A. LINCOLN.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL N. P. BANKS**

**WASHINGTON, June 9, 1862**

MAJOR-GENERAL BANKS, Winchester:

We are arranging a general plan for the valley of the Shenandoah, and in accordance with this you will move your main force to the Shenandoah at or opposite Front Royal as soon as possible.

A. LINCOLN.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. C. FREMONT**

**WASHINGTON, June 9, 1862**

MAJOR-GENERAL FREMONT:

Halt at Harrisonburg, pursuing Jackson no farther. Get your force well in hand and stand on the defensive, guarding against a movement of the enemy either back toward Strasburg or toward Franklin, and await further orders, which will soon be sent you.

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GOVERNOR JOHNSON

[Cipher.]

WASHINGTON, June 9, 1862.

HON. ANDREW JOHNSON, Nashville, Tennessee:

Your despatch about seizing seventy rebels to exchange for a like number of Union men was duly received. I certainly do not disapprove the proposition.

A. LINCOLN.

**TO GENERAL J. C. FREMONT.  
WASHINGTON, June 12, 1862**

**MAJOR-GENERAL FREMONT:**

Accounts, which we do not credit, represent that Jackson is largely reinforced and turning upon you. Get your forces well in hand and keep us well and frequently advised; and if you find yourself really pressed by a superior force of the enemy, fall back cautiously toward or to Winchester, and we will have in due time Banks in position to sustain you. Do not fall back upon Harrisonburg unless upon tolerably clear necessity. We understand Jackson is on the other side of the Shenandoah from you, and hence cannot in any event press you into any necessity of a precipitate withdrawal.

A. LINCOLN.

P.S. — Yours, preferring Mount Jackson to Harrisonburg, is just received. On this point use your discretion, remembering that our object is to give such protection as you can to western Virginia. Many thanks to yourself, officers, and men for the gallant battle of last Sunday. A. L.

## MESSAGE TO CONGRESS

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON,

June 13, 1862.

FELLOW-CITIZENS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: I herewith transmit a memorial addressed and presented to me in behalf of the State of New York in favor of enlarging the locks of the Erie and Oswego Canal. While I have not given nor have leisure to give the subject a careful examination, its great importance is obvious and unquestionable. The large amount of valuable statistical information which is collated and presented in the memorial will greatly facilitate the mature consideration of the subject, which I respectfully ask for it at your hands.

A. LINCOLN.

## TO GENERAL J. C. FREMONT

WASHINGTON; June 13. 1862

MAJOR-GENERAL FREMONT:

We cannot afford to keep your force and Banks's and McDowell's engaged in keeping Jackson south of Strasburg and Front Royal. You fought Jackson alone and worsted him. He can have no substantial reinforcements so long as a battle is pending at Richmond. Surely you and Banks in supporting distance are capable of keeping him from returning to Winchester. But if Sigel be sent forward to you, and McDowell (as he must) be put to other work, Jackson will break through at Front Royal again. He is already on the right side of the Shenandoah to do it, and on the wrong side of it to attack you. The orders already sent you and Banks place you and him in the proper positions for the work assigned you. Jackson cannot move his whole force on either of you before the other can learn of it and go to his assistance. He cannot divide his force, sending part against each of you, because he will be too weak for either. Please do as I directed in the order of the 8th and my despatch of yesterday, the 12th, and neither you nor Banks will be overwhelmed by Jackson. By proper scout lookouts, and beacons of smoke by day and fires by night you can always have timely notice of the enemy's approach. I know not as to you, but by some this has been too much neglected.

A. LINCOLN. TO GENERAL J. C. FREMONT

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, D. C., June 15, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL FREMONT:

MY DEAR SIR: — Your letter of the 12th by Colonel Zagonyi is just received. In answer to the principal part of it, I repeat the substance of an order of the 8th and one or two telegraphic despatches sent you since.

We have no definite power of sending reinforcements; so that we are compelled rather to consider the proper disposal of the forces we have than of those we could wish to have. We may be able to send you some dribs by degrees, but I do not believe we can do more. As you alone beat Jackson last Sunday, I argue that you are stronger than he is to-day, unless he has been reinforced; and that he cannot have been materially reinforced, because such reinforcement could only have come from Richmond, and he is much more likely to go to Richmond than Richmond is to come to him. Neither is very likely. I think Jackson's game — his assigned work — now is to magnify the accounts of his numbers and reports of his movements, and thus by constant alarms keep three or four times as many of our troops away from Richmond as his own force amounts to. Thus he helps his friends at Richmond three or four times as much as if he were there. Our game is not to allow this. Accordingly, by the order of the 8th, I directed you to halt at Harrisonburg, rest your force, and get it well in hand, the objects being to guard against Jackson's returning by the same route to the upper Potomac over which you have just driven him out, and at the same time give some protection against a raid into West Virginia.

Already I have given you discretion to occupy Mount Jackson instead, if, on full consideration, you think best. I do not believe Jackson will attack you, but certainly he cannot attack you by surprise; and if he comes upon you in superior force, you have but to notify us, fall back cautiously, and Banks will join you in due time. But while we know not whether Jackson will move at all, or by what route, we cannot safely put you and Banks both on the Strasburg line, and leave no force on the Front Royal line — the very line upon which he prosecuted his late raid. The true policy is to place one of you on one line and the other on the other in such positions that you can unite once you actually find Jackson moving upon it. And this is precisely what we are doing. This protects that part of our frontier, so

to speak, and liberates McDowell to go to the assistance of McClellan. I have arranged this, and am very unwilling to have it deranged. While you have only asked for Sigel, I have spoken only of Banks, and this because Sigel's force is now the principal part of Bank's force.

About transferring General Schenck's commands, the purchase of supplies, and the promotion and appointment of officers, mentioned in your letter, I will consult with the Secretary of War tomorrow.

Yours truly,  
A. LINCOLN.

## TO GENERAL J. C. FREMONT

WASHINGTON, June 16, 1862

MAJOR-GENERAL FREMONT, Mount Jackson, Virginia:

Your despatch of yesterday, reminding me of a supposed understanding that I would furnish you a corps of 35,000 men, and asking of me the "fulfilment of this understanding," is received. I am ready to come to a fair settlement of accounts with you on the fulfilment of understandings.

Early in March last, when I assigned you to the command of the Mountain Department, I did tell you I would give you all the force I could, and that I hoped to make it reach 35,000. You at the same time told me that within a reasonable time you would seize the railroad at or east of Knoxville, Tenn., if you could. There was then in the department a force supposed to be 25,000, the exact number as well known to you as to me. After looking about two or three days, you called and distinctly told me that if I would add the Blenker division to the force already in the department, you would undertake the job. The Blenker division contained 10,000, and at the expense of great dissatisfaction to General McClellan I took it from his army and gave it to you. My promise was literally fulfilled. I have given you all I could, and I have given you very nearly, if not quite, 35,000.

Now for yours. On the 23d of May, largely over two months afterward, you were at Franklin, Va., not within 300 miles of Knoxville, nor within 80 miles of any part of the railroad east of it, and not moving forward, but telegraphing here that you could not move for lack of everything. Now, do not misunderstand me. I do not say you have not done all you could. I presume you met unexpected difficulties; and I beg you to believe that as surely as you have done your best, so have I. I have not the power now to fill up your Corps to 35,000. I am not demanding of you to do the work of 35,000. I am only asking of you to stand cautiously on the defensive, get your force in order, and give such protection as you can to the valley of the Shenandoah and to western Virginia.

Have you received the orders, and will you act upon them?

A. LINCOLN.

## **TO GENERAL C. SCHURZ**

**WASHINGTON, June 16, 1862**

**BRIGADIER-GENERAL SCHURZ, Mount Jackson, Virginia:**

Your long letter is received. The information you give is valuable. You say it is fortunate that Fremont did not intercept Jackson; that Jackson had the superior force, and would have overwhelmed him. If this is so, how happened it that Fremont fairly fought and routed him on the 8th? Or is the account that he did fight and rout him false and fabricated? Both General Fremont and you speak of Jackson having beaten Shields. By our accounts he did not beat Shields. He had no engagement with Shields. He did meet and drive back with disaster about 2000 of Shields's advance till they were met by an additional brigade of Shields's, when Jackson himself turned and retreated. Shields himself and more than half his force were not nearer than twenty miles to any of it.

A. LINCOLN.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK**

**WASHINGTON, June 18, 1862**

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Corinth, Mississippi:

It would be of both interest and value to us here to know how the expedition toward East Tennessee is progressing, if in your judgment you can give us the information with safety.

A. LINCOLN.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN**

**WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C., June 18, 1862**

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

Yours of to-day, making it probable that Jackson has been reinforced by about 10,000 from Richmond, is corroborated by a despatch from General King at Fredericksburg, saying a Frenchman, just arrived from Richmond by way of Gordonsville, met 10,000 to 15,000 passing through the latter place to join Jackson.

If this is true, it is as good as a reinforcement to you of an equal force. I could better dispose of things if I could know about what day you can attack Richmond, and would be glad to be informed, if you think you can inform me with safety.

A. LINCOLN.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN**

**WASHINGTON, JUNE 19, 1862**

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

Yours of last night just received, and for which I thank you.

If large reinforcements are going from Richmond to Jackson, it proves one of two things: either they are very strong at Richmond, or do not mean to defend the place desperately.

On reflection, I do not see how reinforcements from Richmond to Jackson could be in Gordonsville, as reported by the Frenchman and your deserters. Have not all been sent to deceive?

A. LINCOLN.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN**

**WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, June 20, 1862**

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

In regard to the contemplated execution of Captains Spriggs and Triplett the government has no information whatever, but will inquire and advise you.

A. LINCOLN.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN**

**WASHINGTON CITY, June 20, 1862**

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

We have this morning sent you a despatch of General Sigel corroborative of the proposition that Jackson is being reinforced from Richmond. This may be reality, and yet may only be contrivance for deception, and to determine which is perplexing. If we knew it was not true, we could send you some more force; but as the case stands we do not think we safely can. Still, we will watch the signs and do so if possible.

In regard to a contemplated execution of Captains Spriggs and Triplett the government has no information whatever, but will inquire and advise you.

A. LINCOLN.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN**

**WASHINGTON, June 21 1862 6 PM**

MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:

Your despatch of yesterday (2 P. M.) was received this morning. If it would not divert too much of your time and attention from the army under your immediate command, I would be glad to have your views as to the present state of military affairs throughout the whole country, as you say you would be glad to give them. I would rather it should be by letter than by telegraph, because of the better chance of secrecy. As to the numbers and positions of the troops not under your command in Virginia and elsewhere, even if I could do it with accuracy, which I cannot, I would rather not transmit either by telegraph or by letter, because of the chances of its reaching the enemy. I would be very glad to talk with you, but you cannot leave your camp, and I cannot well leave here.

A. LINCOLN, President

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL N. P. BANKS

WAR DEPARTMENT, June 22, 1862

MAJOR-GENERAL BANKS, Middletown:

I am very glad you are looking well to the west for a movement of the enemy in that direction. You know my anxiety on that point.

All was quiet at General McClellan's headquarters at two o'clock to-day.

A. LINCOLN.

# TREATY WITH MEXICO

## MESSAGE TO THE SENATE

WASHINGTON, June 23, 1862.

TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES:

On the 7th day of December, 1861, I submitted to the Senate the project of a treaty between the United States and Mexico which had been proposed to me by Mr. Corwin, our minister to Mexico, and respectfully requested the advice of the Senate thereupon.

On the 25th day of February last a resolution was adopted by the Senate to the effect:

"That it is not advisable to negotiate a treaty that will require the United States to assume any portion of the principal or interest of the debt of Mexico, or that will require the concurrence of European powers."

This resolution having been duly communicated to me, notice thereof was immediately given by the Secretary of State to Mr. Corwin, and he was informed that he was to consider his instructions upon the subject referred to modified by this resolution and would govern his course accordingly. That despatch failed to reach Mr. Corwin, by reason of the disturbed condition of Mexico, until a very recent date, Mr. Corwin being without instructions, or thus practically left without instructions, to negotiate further with Mexico.

In view of the very important events Occurring there, he has thought that the interests of the United States would be promoted by the conclusion of two treaties which should provide for a loan to that republic. He has therefore signed such treaties, and they having been duly ratified by the Government of Mexico, he has transmitted them to me for my consideration. The action of the Senate is of course conclusive against an acceptance of the treaties On my part. I have, nevertheless, thought it just to our excellent minister in Mexico and respectful to the Government of that republic to lay the treaties before the Senate, together with the correspondence which has occurred in relation to them. In performing this duty I have only to add that the importance of the subject thus submitted to the Senate, can not be over estimated, and I shall cheerfully receive and consider with the highest respect any further advice the Senate may think proper to give upon the subject.

A. LINCOLN.

## VETO OF A CURRENCY BILL

MESSAGE TO THE SENATE, JUNE 23, 1862

TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES:

The bill which has passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, entitled "An act to repeal that part of an act of Congress which prohibits the circulation of bank-notes of a less denomination than five dollars in the District of Columbia," has received my attentive consideration, and I now return it to the Senate, in which it originated, with the following objections:

1. The bill proposes to repeal the existing legislation prohibiting the circulation of bank-notes of a less denomination than five dollars within the District of Columbia, without permitting the issuing of such bills by banks not now legally authorized to issue them. In my judgment, it will be found impracticable, in the present condition of the currency, to make such a discrimination. The banks have generally suspended specie payments, and a legal sanction given to the circulation of the irredeemable notes of one class of them will almost certainly be so extended, in practical operation, as to include those of all classes, whether authorized or unauthorized. If this view be correct, the currency of the District, should this act become a law, will certainly and greatly deteriorate, to the serious injury of honest trade and honest labor.

2. This bill seems to contemplate no end which cannot be otherwise more certainly and beneficially attained. During the existing war it is peculiarly the duty of the National Government to secure to the people a sound circulating medium. This duty has been, under existing circumstances, satisfactorily performed, in part at least, by authorizing the issue of United States notes, receivable for all government dues except customs, and made a legal tender for all debts, public and private, except interest on public debt. The object of the bill submitted to me — namely, that of providing a small note currency during the present suspension — can be fully accomplished by authorizing the issue, as part of any new emission of United States notes made necessary by the circumstances of the country, of notes of a similar character, but of less denomination than five dollars. Such an issue would answer all the beneficial purposes of the bill, would save a considerable amount to the treasury in interest, would greatly facilitate payments to soldiers and other creditors of small sums, and would furnish; to the people a currency as safe as their own government.

Entertaining these objections to the bill, I feel myself constrained to withhold from it my approval and return it for the further consideration and action of Congress.

A. LINCOLN

## **SPEECH AT JERSEY CITY, JUNE 24, 1862**

When birds and animals are looked at through a fog, they are seen to disadvantage, and so it might be with you if I were to attempt to tell you why I went to see General Scott. I can only say that my visit to West Point did not have the importance which has been attached to it; but it concerned matters that you understand quite as well as if I were to tell you all about them. Now, I can only remark that it had nothing whatever to do with making or unmaking any general in the country. The Secretary of War, you know, holds a pretty tight rein on the press, so that they shall not tell more than they ought to; and I 'm afraid that if I blab too much, he might draw a tight rein on me.

## **TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN**

**WASHINGTON, June 26, 1862**

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

Your three despatches of yesterday in relation to the affair, ending with the statement that you completely succeeded in making your point, are very gratifying.

The later one of 6.15 P.M., suggesting the probability of your being overwhelmed by two hundred thousand, and talking of where the responsibility will belong, pains me very much. I give you all I can, and act on the presumption that you will do the best you can with what you have, while you continue, ungenerously I think, to assume that I could give you more if I would. I have omitted, and shall omit, no opportunity to send you reinforcements whenever I possibly can.

A. LINCOLN.

P. S. General Pope thinks if you fall back it would be much better towards York River than towards the James. As Pope now has charge of the capital, please confer with him through the telegraph.

## **ORDER CONSTITUTING THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA**

**EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, D. C., June 26, 1862**

Ordered: 1st. The forces under Major-Generals Fremont, Banks, and McDowell, including the troops now under Brigadier-General Sturgis at Washington, shall be consolidated and form one army, to be called the Army of Virginia.

2d. The command of the Army of Virginia is specially assigned to Major-General John Pope, as commanding general. The troops of the Mountain Department, heretofore under command of General Fremont, shall constitute the First Army Corps, under the command of General Fremont; the troops of the Shenandoah Department, now under General Banks, shall constitute the Second Army Corps, and be commanded by him; the troops under the command of General McDowell, except those within the fortifications and city of Washington, shall form the Third Army Corps, and be under his command.

3d. The Army of Virginia shall operate in such manner as, while protecting western Virginia and the national capital from danger or insult, it shall in the speediest manner attack and overcome the rebel forces under Jackson and Ewell, threaten the enemy in the direction of Charlottesville, and render the most effective aid to relieve General McClellan and capture Richmond.

4th. When the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Virginia shall be in position to communicate and directly co-operate at or before Richmond, the chief command, while so operating together, shall be governed, as in like cases, by the Rules and Articles of War.

A. LINCOLN.

## **TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY STANTON TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK**

**WAR DEPARTMENT, June 28, 1862**

**MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK:**

The enemy have concentrated in such force at Richmond as to render it absolutely necessary, in the opinion of the President, for you immediately to detach 25,000 of your force and forward it by the nearest and quickest route by way of Baltimore and Washington to Richmond. It is believed that the quickest route would be by way of Columbus, Ky., and up the Ohio River. But in detaching your force the President directs that it be done in such a way as to enable you to hold your ground and not interfere with the movement against Chattanooga and East Tennessee. This condition being observed, the forces to be detached and the routes they are to be sent are left to your own judgment.

The direction to send these forces immediately is rendered imperative by a serious reverse suffered by General McClellan before Richmond yesterday, the full extent of which is not yet known.

You will acknowledge the receipt of this despatch, stating the day and hour it is received, and inform me what your action will be, so that we may take measures to aid in river and railroad transportation.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

## **TELEGRAMS TO GENERAL A. E. BURNSIDE**

**WASHINGTON, June 28, 1862**

**GENERAL BURNSIDE:**

I think you had better go, with any reinforcements you can spare, to General McClellan.

**A. LINCOLN.**

## **WAR DEPARTMENT, June, 28, 1862**

### **MAJOR-GENERAL BURNSIDE, Newbern:**

We have intelligence that General McClellan has been attacked in large force and compelled to fall back toward the James River. We are not advised of his exact condition, but the President directs that you shall send him all the reinforcements from your command to the James River that you can safely do without abandoning your own position. Let it be infantry entirely, as he said yesterday that he had cavalry enough.

EDWIN M. STANTON,  
Secretary of War.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN**

**WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, June 28, 1862**

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

Save your army, at all events. Will send reinforcements as fast as we can. Of course they cannot reach you to-day, to-morrow, or next day. I have not said you were ungenerous for saying you needed reinforcements. I thought you were ungenerous in assuming that I did not send them as fast as I could. I feel any misfortune to you and your army quite as keenly as you feel it yourself. If you have had a drawn battle, or a repulse, it is the price we pay for the enemy not being in Washington. We protected Washington, and the enemy concentrated on you. Had we stripped Washington, he would have been upon us before the troops could have gotten to you. Less than a week ago you notified us that reinforcements were leaving Richmond to come in front of us. It is the nature of the case, and neither you nor the government is to blame. Please tell at once the present condition and aspect of things.

A. LINCOLN

## TO SECRETARY SEWARD

EXECUTIVE MANSION, June 28, 1862

HON. W. H. SEWARD.

MY DEAR SIR: — My view of the present condition of the war is about as follows:

The evacuation of Corinth and our delay by the flood in the Chickahominy have enabled the enemy to concentrate too much force in Richmond for McClellan to successfully attack. In fact there soon will be no substantial rebel force anywhere else. But if we send all the force from here to McClellan, the enemy will, before we can know of it, send a force from Richmond and take Washington. Or if a large part of the western army be brought here to McClellan, they will let us have Richmond, and retake Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, etc. What should be done is to hold what we have in the West, open the Mississippi, and take Chattanooga and East Tennessee without more. A reasonable force should in every event be kept about Washington for its protection. Then let the country give us a hundred thousand new troops in the shortest possible time, which, added to McClellan directly or indirectly, will take Richmond without endangering any other place which we now hold, and will substantially end the war. I expect to maintain this contest until successful, or till I die, or am conquered, or my term expires, or Congress or the country forsake me; and I would publicly appeal to the country for this new force were it not that I fear a general panic and stampede would follow, so hard it is to have a thing understood as it really is. I think the new force should be all, or nearly all, infantry, principally because such can be raised most cheaply and quickly.

Yours very truly,

A. LINCOLN.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. A. DIX**

**WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C., June 28,1862**

GENERAL DIX:

Communication with McClellan by White House is cut off. Strain every nerve to open communication with him by James River, or any other way you can. Report to me.

A. LINCOLN.

## **TELEGRAM TO FLAG-OFFICER L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH**

**WASHINGTON, D.C., June 28, 1862**

FLAG-OFFICER GOLDS BOROUGH, Fort Monroe:

Enemy has cut McClellan's communication with White House, and is driving Stoneman back on that point. Do what you can for him with gunboats at or near that place. McClellan's main force is between the Chickahominy and the James. Also do what you can to communicate with him and support him there.

A. LINCOLN

## To GOVERNOR MORTON

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C. June 28, 1862

GOVERNOR O. P. MORTON, Indianapolis, Ind:

Your despatch of to-day is just received. I have no recollection of either John R. Cravens or Cyrus M. Allen having been named to me for appointment under the tax law. The latter particularly has been my friend, and I am sorry to learn that he is not yours. No appointment has been or will be made by me for the purpose of stabbing you.

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO SECRETARY SEWARD

WAR DEPARTMENT, June 29, 1862.6 P.M

HON. WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Astor House, New York:

Not much more than when you left. Fulton of Baltimore American is now with us. He left White House at 11 A.M. yesterday. He conversed fully with a paymaster who was with Porter's force during the fight of Friday and fell back to nearer McClellan's quarters just a little sooner than Porter did, seeing the whole of it; stayed on the Richmond side of the Chickahominy over night, and left for White House at 5 A.M. Saturday. He says Porter retired in perfect order under protection of the guns arranged for the purpose, under orders and not from necessity; and with all other of our forces, except what was left on purpose to go to White House, was safely in pontoons over the Chickahominy before morning, and that there was heavy firing on the Richmond side, begun at 5 and ceased at 7 A.M. Saturday. On the whole, I think we have had the better of it up to that point of time. What has happened since we still know not, as we have no communication with General McClellan. A despatch from Colonel Ingalls shows that he thinks McClellan is fighting with the enemy at Richmond to-day, and will be to-morrow. We have no means of knowing upon what Colonel Ingalls founds his opinion. Confirmed about saving all property. Not a single unwounded straggler came back to White House from the field, and the number of wounded reaching there up to 11 A.M. Saturday was not large.

A. LINCOLN.

To what the President has above stated I will only add one or two points that may be satisfactory for you to know.

First. All the sick and wounded were safely removed

Second. A despatch from Burnside shows that he is from White House; not a man left behind in condition to afford efficient support, and is probably doing so.

Third. The despatch from Colonel Ingalls impresses me with the conviction that the movement was made by General McClellan to concentrate on Richmond, and was successful to the latest point of which we have any information.

Fourth. Mr. Fulton says that on Friday night, between twelve and one o'clock, General McClellan telegraphed Commodore Goldsborough that the result of the movement was satisfactory to him.

Fifth. From these and the facts stated by the President, my inference is that General McClellan will probably be in Richmond within two days.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

[Unfortunately McClellan did not do any of the things he was ordered, and that it was very likely possible to do. It is still some mystery what he was doing all these days other than hiding in the woods and staying out of communication so he would not receive any more uncomfortable orders. This was another place where the North was close to wining the war and did not. D.W.]

**TELEGRAM TO SECRETARY SEWARD.  
WAR DEPARTMENT, June 30, 1862**

**HON. WM. H. SEWARD, New York:**

We are yet without communication with General McClellan, and this absence of news is our point of anxiety. Up to the latest point to which we are posted he effected everything in such exact accordance with his plan, contingently announced to us before the battle began, that we feel justified to hope that he has not failed since. He had a severe engagement in getting the part of his army on this side of the Chickahominy over to the other side, in which the enemy lost certainly as much as we did. We are not dissatisfied with this, only that the loss of enemies does not compensate for the loss of friends. The enemy cannot come below White House; certainly is not there now, and probably has abandoned the whole line. Dix's pickets are at New Kent Court-House.

A. LINCOLN.

## **CALL FOR TROOPS. NEW YORK, June 30, 1862**

### **TO THE GOVERNORS OF THE SEVERAL STATES:**

The capture of New Orleans, Norfolk, and Corinth by the national forces has enabled the insurgents to concentrate a large force at and about Richmond, which place we must take with the least possible delay; in fact, there will soon be no formidable insurgent force except at Richmond. With so large an army there, the enemy can threaten us on the Potomac and elsewhere. Until we have re-established the national authority, all these places must be held, and we must keep a respectable force in front of WASHINGTON. But this, from the diminished strength of our army by sickness and casualties, renders an addition to it necessary in order to close the struggle which has been prosecuted for the last three months with energy and success. Rather than hazard the misapprehension of our military condition and of groundless alarm by a call for troops by proclamation, I have deemed it best to address you in this form. To accomplish the object stated we require without delay 150,000 men, including those recently called for by the Secretary of War. Thus reinforced our gallant army will be enabled to realize the hopes and expectations of the government and the people.

A. LINCOLN.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. A. DIX**

**WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, June 30, 1862**

MAJOR-GENERAL Dix, Fort Monroe:

Is it not probable that the enemy has abandoned the line between White House and McClellan's rear? He could have but little object to maintain it, and nothing to subsist upon. Would not Stoneman better move up and see about it? I think a telegraphic communication can at once be opened to White House from Williamsburg. The wires must be up still.

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAMS TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK

WAR DEPARTMENT, JUNE 30, 1862. 3 P. M

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Corinth:

Your telegram of this date just received. The Chattanooga expedition must not on any account be given up. The President regards that and the movement against East Tennessee as one of the most important movements of the war, and its occupation nearly as important as the capture of Richmond. He is not pleased with the tardiness of the movement toward Chattanooga, and directs that no force be sent here if you cannot do it without breaking up the operations against that point and East Tennessee. Infantry only are needed; our cavalry and artillery are strong enough. The first reports from Richmond were more discouraging than the truth warranted. If the advantage is not on our side, it is balanced. General McClellan has moved his whole force on the line of the James River, and is supported there by our gunboats; but he must be largely strengthened before advancing, and hence the call on you, which I am glad you answered so promptly. Let me know to what point on the river you will send your forces, so as to provide immediately for transportation.

EDWIN M. STANTON,  
Secretary of War.

## **WASHINGTON, D.C., June 30, 1862**

### **MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Corinth, Mississippi:**

Would be very glad of 25,000 infantry; no artillery or cavalry; but please do not send a man if it endangers any place you deem important to hold, or if it forces you to give up or weaken or delay the expedition against Chattanooga. To take and hold the railroad at or east of Cleveland, in East Tennessee, I think fully as important as the taking and holding of Richmond.

A. LINCOLN.

## CALL FOR 300,000 VOLUNTEERS, JULY 1, 1862

June 28, 1861

The undersigned, governors of States of the Union, impressed with the belief that the citizens of the States which they respectively represent are of one accord in the hearty desire that the recent successes of the Federal arms may be followed up by measures which must insure the speedy restoration of the Union, and believing that, in view of the present state of the important military movements now in progress, and the reduced condition of our effective forces in the field, resulting from the usual and unavoidable casualties in the service, the time has arrived for prompt and vigorous measures to be adopted by the people in support of the great interests committed to your charge, respectfully request, if it meets with your entire approval, that you at once call upon the several States for such number of men as may be required to fill up all military organizations now in the field, and add to the armies heretofore organized such additional number of men as may, in your judgment, be necessary to garrison and hold all the numerous cities and military positions that have been captured by our armies, and to speedily crush the rebellion that still exists in several of the Southern States, thus practically restoring to the civilized world our great and good government. All believe that the decisive moment is near at hand, and to that end the people of the United States are desirous to aid promptly in furnishing all reinforcements that you may deem needful to sustain our government.

ISRAEL WASHBURN, JR., Governor of Maine.  
H. S. BERRY, Governor of New Hampshire.  
FREDERICK HOLBROOK, Governor of Vermont.  
WILLIAM A. BUCKINGHAM, Governor of Connecticut.  
E. D. MORGAN, Governor of New York.  
CHARLES S. OLDEN, Governor of New Jersey.  
A. G. CURTIN, Governor of Pennsylvania.  
A. W. BRADFORD, Governor of Maryland.  
F. H. PIERPOINT, Governor of Virginia.  
AUSTIN BLAIR, Governor of Michigan.  
J. B. TEMPLE, President Military Board of Kentucky.  
ANDREW JOHNSON, Governor of Tennessee.  
H. R. GAMBLE, Governor of Missouri.  
O. P. MORTON, Governor of Indiana.  
DAVID TODD, Governor of Ohio.  
ALEXANDER RAMSEY, Governor of Minnesota.  
RICHARD YATES, Governor of Illinois.  
EDWARD SALOMON, Governor of Wisconsin.

THE PRESIDENT

## **EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, July 1, 1862**

GENTLEMEN: — Fully concurring in the wisdom of the views expressed to me in so patriotic a manner by you, in the communication of the twenty-eighth day of June, I have decided to call into the service an additional force of 300,000 men. I suggest and recommend that the troops should be chiefly of infantry. The quota of your State would be — . I trust that they may be enrolled without delay, so as to bring this unnecessary and injurious civil war to a speedy and satisfactory conclusion. An order fixing the quotas of the respective States will be issued by the War Department to-morrow.

A. LINCOLN.

## **PROCLAMATION CONCERNING TAXES IN REBELLIOUS STATES, JULY 1, 1862**

**BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:**

A Proclamation.

Whereas in and by the second section of an act of Congress passed on the 7th day of June, A. D. 1862, entitled "An act for the collection of direct taxes in insurrectionary districts within the United States, and for other purposes," it is made the duty of the President to declare, on or before the first day of July then next following, by his proclamation, in what States and parts of States insurrection exists:

Now, therefore, be it known that I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States of America, do hereby declare and proclaim that the States of South Carolina, Florida, Georgia, Alabama, Louisiana, Texas, Mississippi, Arkansas, Tennessee, North Carolina, and the State of Virginia except the following counties-Hancock, Brooke, Ohio, Marshall, Wetzell, Marion, Monongalia, Preston, Taylor, Pleasants, Tyler, Ritchie, Doddridge, Harrison, Wood, Jackson, Wirt, Roane, Calhoun, Gilmer, Barbour, Tucker, Lewis, Braxton, Upsbur, Randolph, Mason, Putnam, Kanawha, Clay, Nicholas, Cabell, Wayne, Boone, Logan, Wyoming, Webster, Fayette, and Raleigh—are now in insurrection and rebellion, and by reason thereof the civil authority of the United States is obstructed so that the provisions of the "Act to provide increased revenue from imports, to pay the interest on the public debt, and for other purposes," approved August 5, 1861, can not be peaceably executed; and that the taxes legally chargeable upon real estate under the act last aforesaid lying within the States and parts of States as aforesaid, together with a penalty of 50 per centum of said taxes, shall be a lien upon the tracts or lots of the same, severally charged, till paid.

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.....

A. LINCOLN.

By the President: F. W. SEWARD, Acting Secretary of State.

## **MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, JULY 1, 1862**

### **TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

I most cordially recommend that Captain Andrew H. Foote, of the United States Navy, receive a vote of thanks of Congress for his eminent services in Organizing the flotilla on the western Waters, and for his gallantry at Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, Island Number Ten, and at various other places, whilst in command of the naval forces, embracing a period of nearly ten months.

A. LINCOLN.

WASHINGTON, D. C. July 1, 1862

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL McCLELLAN**

**WASHINGTON, JULY 1,1862. 3.30 P.M**

**MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:**

It is impossible to reinforce you for your present emergency. If we had a million of men, We could not get them to you in time. We have not the men to send. If you are not strong enough to face the enemy, you must find a place of security, and wait, rest, and repair. Maintain your ground if you can, but save the army at all events, even if you fall back to Fort Monroe. We still have strength enough in the country, and will bring it out.

**A. LINCOLN.**

## **TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN**

**WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C., July 2, 1862**

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

Your despatch of Tuesday morning induces me to hope your army is having some rest. In this hope allow me to reason with you a moment. When you ask for 50,000 men to be promptly sent you, you surely labor under some gross mistake of fact. Recently you sent papers showing your disposal of forces made last spring for the defense of WASHINGTON, and advising a return to that plan. I find it included in and about WASHINGTON 75,000 men. Now, please be assured I have not men enough to fill that very plan by 15,000. All of Fremont's in the valley, all of Banks's, all of McDowell's not with you, and all in WASHINGTON, taken together, do not exceed, if they reach, 60,000. With Wool and Dix added to those mentioned, I have not, outside of your army, 75,000 men east of the mountains. Thus the idea of sending you 50,000, or any other considerable force, promptly, is simply absurd. If, in your frequent mention of responsibility, you have the impression that I blame you for not doing more than you can, please be relieved of such impression. I only beg that in like manner you will not ask impossibilities of me. If you think you are not strong enough to take Richmond just now, I do not ask you to try just now. Save the army, material and personal, and I will strengthen it for the offensive again as fast as I can. The governors of eighteen States offer me a new levy of 300,000, which I accept.

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK

WASHINGTON, D.C. July 2, 1862

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Corinth, Mississippi:

Your several despatches of yesterday to Secretary of War and myself received. I did say, and now repeat, I would be exceedingly glad for some reinforcements from you. Still do not send a man if in your judgment it will endanger any point you deem important to hold, or will force you to give up or weaken or delay the Chattanooga expedition.

Please tell me could you not make me a flying visit for consultation without endangering the Service in your department.

A. LINCOLN.

## **MESSAGE TO THE SENATE**

**EXECUTIVE MANSION, July 2, 1862**

TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES:

I herewith return to your honorable body, in which it originated, an act entitled "An act to provide for additional medical officers of the volunteer service," without my approval.

My reason for so doing is that I have approved an act of the same title passed by Congress after the passage of the one first mentioned for the express purpose of correcting errors in and superseding the same, as I am informed.

A. LINCOLN.

## CIRCULAR LETTER TO THE GOVERNORS

**(Private and Confidential.)**

WAR DEPARTMENT, July 3, 1862.10.30 A.M.

GOVERNOR WASHBURN, Maine [and other governors] I should not want the half of 300,000 new troops if I could have them now. If I had 50,000 additional troops here now, I believe I could substantially close the war in two weeks. But time is everything, and if I get 50,000 new men in a month, I shall have lost 20,000 old ones during the same month, having gained only 30,000, with the difference between old and new troops still against me. The quicker you send, the fewer you will have to send. Time is everything. Please act in view of this. The enemy having given up Corinth, it is not wonderful that he is thereby enabled to check us for a time at Richmond.

Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.

## **TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN**

**WAR DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON, D.C., JULY 3, 1862**

MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:

Yours of 5.30 yesterday is just received. I am satisfied that yourself, officers, and men have done the best you could. All accounts say better fighting was never done. Ten thousand thanks for it.

On the 28th we sent General Burnside an order to send all the force he could spare to you. We then learned that you had requested him to go to Goldsborough; upon which we said to him our order was intended for your benefit, and we did not wish to be in conflict with your views.

We hope you will have help from him soon. Today we have ordered General Hunter to send you all he can spare. At last advices General Halleck thinks he cannot send reinforcements without endangering all he has gained.

A. LINCOLN, President

## TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, D.C., July 4, 1862

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

I understand your position as stated in your letter and by General Marcy. To reinforce you so as to enable you to resume the offensive within a month, or even six weeks, is impossible. In addition to that arrived and now arriving from the Potomac (about 10,000 men, I suppose), and about 10,000 I hope you will have from Burnside very soon, and about 5000 from Hunter a little later, I do not see how I can send you another man within a month. Under these circumstances the defensive for the present must be your only care. Save the army first, where you are, if you can; secondly, by removal, if you must. You, on the ground, must be the judge as to which you will attempt, and of the means for effecting it. I but give it as my opinion that with the aid of the gunboats and the reinforcements mentioned above you can hold your present position — provided, and so long as, you can keep the James River open below you. If you are not tolerably confident you can keep the James River open, you had better remove as soon as possible. I do not remember that you have expressed any apprehension as to the danger of having your communication cut on the river below you, yet I do not suppose it can have escaped your attention.

Yours very truly,

A. LINCOLN.

P.S. — If at any time you feel able to take the offensive, you are not restrained from doing so. A.L.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK**

**WAR DEPARTMENT, July 4, 1862**

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Corinth, Mississippi:

You do not know how much you would oblige us if, without abandoning any of your positions or plans, you could promptly send us even 10,000 infantry. Can you not? Some part of the Corinth army is certainly fighting McClellan in front of Richmond. Prisoners are in our hands from the late Corinth army.

A. LINCOLN.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. A. DIX**

**WASHINGTON CITY, July 4,1862**

MAJOR-GENERAL Dix, Fort Monroe:

Send forward the despatch to Colonel Hawkins and this also. Our order and General McClellan's to General Burnside being the same, of course we wish it executed as promptly as possible.

A. LINCOLN.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN**

**WASHINGTON, July 5, 1862. 9 A.M**

MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:

A thousand thanks for the relief your two despatches of 12 and 1 P.M. yesterday gave me. Be assured the heroism and skill of yourself and officers and men is, and forever will be, appreciated.

If you can hold your present position, we shall have the enemy yet.

A. LINCOLN

## TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, D.C., July 6, 1862

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Corinth, Mississippi.

MY DEAR SIR: — This introduces Governor William Sprague, of Rhode Island. He is now Governor for the third time, and senator-elect of the United States.

I know the object of his visit to you. He has my cheerful consent to go, but not my direction. He wishes to get you and part of your force, one or both, to come here. You already know I should be exceedingly glad of this if, in your judgment, it could be without endangering positions and operations in the southwest; and I now repeat what I have more than once said by telegraph: "Do not come or send a man if, in your judgment, it will endanger any point you deem important to hold, or endangers or delays the Chattanooga expedition."

Still, please give my friend, Governor Sprague, a full and fair hearing.

Yours very truly,

A. LINCOLN.

## MEMORANDUM OF AN INTERVIEW BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL McCLELLAN

AND OTHER OFFICERS DURING A VISIT TO THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC AT  
HARRISON'S LANDING, VIRGINIA.

July 9, 1862.

THE PRESIDENT: What amount of force have you now?

GENERAL McCLELLAN: About 80,000, can't vary much, certainly 75,000.

THE PRESIDENT: [to the corps commanders] What is the whole amount of your corps with  
you now.

GENERAL SUMNER: About 15,000.

GENERAL HEINTZELMAN: 15,000 for duty.

GENERAL KEYES: About 12,500.

GENERAL PORTER: About 23,000 — fully 20,000 fit for duty.

GENERAL FRANKLIN: About 15,000.

THE PRESIDENT: What is likely to be your condition as to health in this camp?

GENERAL McCLELLAN: Better than in any encampment since landing at Fortress Monroe.

PRESIDENT LINCOLN: [to the corps commanders] In your present encampment what is the  
present and prospective condition as to health?

GENERAL SUMNER: As good as any part of Western Virginia.

GENERAL HEINTZELMAN: Excellent for health, and present health improving.

GENERAL KEYES: A little improved, but think camp is getting worse.

GENERAL PORTER: Very good.

GENERAL FRANKLIN: Not good.

THE PRESIDENT: Where is the enemy now?

GENERAL McCLELLAN: From four to five miles from us on all the roads — I think nearly  
the whole army — both Hills, Longstreet, Jackson, Magruder, Huger.

THE PRESIDENT: [to the corps commanders] Where and in what condition do you believe  
the enemy to be now?

GENERAL SUMNER: I think they have retired from our front; were very much damaged,  
especially in their best troops, in the late actions, from superiority of arms.

GENERAL HEINTZELMAN: Don't think they are in force in our vicinity.

GENERAL KEYES: Think he has withdrawn, and think preparing to go to WASHINGTON.

GENERAL PORTER: Believe he is mainly near Richmond. He feels he dare not attack us here.

GENERAL FRANKLIN: I learn he has withdrawn from our front and think that is probable.

THE PRESIDENT: [to the corps commanders] What is the aggregate of your killed, wounded,  
and missing from the attack on the 26th ultimo till now?

GENERAL SUMNER: 1175.

GENERAL HEINTZELMAN: Not large 745.

GENERAL KEYES: Less than 500.

GENERAL PORTER: Over 5000.

GENERAL FRANKLIN: Not over 3000.

THE PRESIDENT: If you desired could you remove the army safely?

GENERAL McCLELLAN: It would be a delicate and very difficult matter.

THE PRESIDENT: [to the corps commanders] If it were desired to get the army away, could  
it be safely effected?

GENERAL SUMNER: I think we could, but I think we give up the cause if we do.

GENERAL HEINTZELMAN: Perhaps we could, but I think it would be ruinous to the country.

GENERAL KEYES: I think it could if done quickly.

GENERAL PORTER: Impossible — move the army and ruin the country.

GENERAL FRANKLIN: I think we could, and that we had better — think Rappahannock the true line.

THE PRESIDENT: [to the corps commanders] Is the army secure in its present position?

GENERAL SUMNER: Perfectly so, in my judgment.

GENERAL HEINTZELMAN: I think it is safe.

GENERAL KEYES: With help of General B. [Burnside] can hold position.

GENERAL PORTER: Perfectly so. Not only, but we are ready to begin moving forward.

GENERAL FRANKLIN: Unless river can be closed it is.

## **ORDER MAKING HALLECK GENERAL-IN-CHIEF**

**EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, July 11,1862**

Ordered, That Major-General Henry W. Halleck be assigned to command the whole land forces of the United States, as general-in-chief, and that he repair to this capital so soon as he can with safety to the positions and operations within the department now under his charge.

A. LINCOLN

## **ORDER CONCERNING THE SOUTHWEST BRANCH OF THE PACIFIC RAILROAD**

Whereas, in the judgment of the President, the public safety does require that the railroad line called and known as the Southwest Branch of the Pacific Railroad in the State of Missouri be repaired, extended, and completed from Rolla to Lebanon, in the direction to Springfield, in the said State, the same being necessary to the successful and economical conduct of the war and to the maintenance of the authority of the government in the Southwest:

Therefore, under and in virtue of the act of Congress entitled "An act to authorize the President of the United States in certain cases to take possession of railroad and telegraph lines, and for other purposes," approved January 31, 1862, it is ordered, That the portion of the said railroad line which reaches from Rolla to Lebanon be repaired, extended, and completed, so as to be made available for the military uses of the government, as speedily as may be. And, inasmuch as upon the part of the said line from Rolla to the stream called Little Piney a considerable portion of the necessary work has already been done by the railroad company, and the road to this extent may be completed at comparatively small cost, it is ordered that the said line from Rolla to and across Little Piney be first completed, and as soon as possible.

The Secretary of War is charged with the execution of this order. And to facilitate the speedy execution of the work, he is directed, at his discretion, to take possession and control of the whole or such part of the said railroad line, and the whole or such part of the rolling stock, offices, shops, buildings, and all their appendages and appurtenances, as he may judge necessary or convenient for the early completion of the road from Rolla to Lebanon.

Done at the city of WASHINGTON, July 11, 1862.

A. LINCOLN.

## MESSAGE TO CONGRESS

WASHINGTON, D C., July 11, 1862

TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

I recommend that the thanks of Congress be given to the following officers of the United States Navy:

Captain James L. Lardner, for meritorious conduct at the battle of Port Royal and distinguished services on the coast of the United States against the enemy.

Captain Charles Henry Davis, for distinguished services in conflict with the enemy at Fort Pillow, at Memphis, and for successful operations at other points in the waters of the Mississippi River.

Commander John A. Dahlgren, for distinguished services in the line of his profession, improvements in ordnance, and zealous and efficient labors in the ordnance branch of the service.

Commander Stephen C. Rowan, for distinguished services in the waters of North Carolina, and particularly in the capture of Newbern, being in chief command of the naval forces.

Commander David D. Porter, for distinguished services in the conception and preparation of the means used for the capture of the forts below New Orleans, and for highly meritorious conduct in the management of the mortar flotilla during the bombardment of Forts Jackson and St. Philip.

Captain Silas H. Stringham, now on the retired list, for distinguished services in the capture of Forts Hatteras and Clark.

A. LINCOLN.

**TELEGRAM TO GOVERNOR JOHNSON.  
WAR DEPARTMENT, July 11, 1862**

**HON. ANDREW JOHNSON**

MY DEAR SIR: — Yours of yesterday is received. Do you not, my good friend, perceive that what you ask is simply to put you in command in the West? I do not suppose you desire this. You only wish to control in your own localities; but this you must know may derange all other posts. Can you not, and will you not, have a full conference with General Halleck? Telegraph him, and meet him at such place as he and you can agree upon. I telegraph him to meet you and confer fully with you.

A. LINCOLN.

**TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK.  
WAR DEPARTMENT, July 11, 1862**

**MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Corinth:**

Governor Johnson, at Nashville, is in great trouble and anxiety about a raid into Kentucky. The governor is a true and valuable man — indispensable to us in Tennessee. Will you please get in communication with him, and have a full conference with him before you leave for here? I have telegraphed him on the subject.

A. LINCOLN.

## APPEAL TO BORDER-STATES IN FAVOR OF COMPENSATED EMANCIPATION

July 12, 1862

GENTLEMEN: — After the adjournment of Congress now very near, I shall have no opportunity of seeing you for several months. Believing that you of the border States hold more power for good than any other equal number of members, I feel it a duty which I cannot justifiably waive to make this appeal to you. I intend no reproach or complaint when I assure you that, in my opinion, if you all had voted for the resolution in the gradual-emancipation message of last March, the war would now be substantially ended. And the plan therein proposed is yet one of the most potent and swift means of ending it. Let the States which are in rebellion see definitely and certainly that in no event will the States you represent ever join their proposed confederacy, and they cannot much longer maintain the contest. But you cannot divest them of their hope to ultimately have you with them so long as you show a determination to perpetuate the institution within your own States. Beat them at elections, as you have overwhelmingly done, and, nothing daunted, they still claim you as their own. You and I know what the lever of their power is. Break that lever before their faces, and they can shake you no more forever. Most of you have treated me with kindness and consideration and I trust you will not now think I improperly touch what is exclusively your own, when, for the sake of the whole country, I ask, Can you, for your States, do better than to take the course I urge? Discarding punctilio and maxims adapted to more manageable times, and looking only to the unprecedentedly stern facts of our case, can you do better in any possible event? You prefer that the constitutional relation of the States to the nation shall be practically restored without disturbance of the institution; and if this were done, my whole duty in this respect, under the Constitution and my oath of office, would be performed. But it is not done, and we are trying to accomplish it by war. The incidents of the war cannot be avoided. If the war continues long, as it must if the object be not sooner attained, the institution in your States will be extinguished by mere friction and abrasion — by the mere incidents of the war. It will be gone, and you will have nothing valuable in lieu of it. Much of its value is gone already. How much better for you and for your people to take the step which at once shortens the war and secures substantial compensation for that which is sure to be wholly lost in any other event! How much better to thus save the money which else we sink forever in war! How much better to do it while we can, lest the war ere long render us pecuniarily unable to do it! How much better for you as seller, and the nation as buyer, to sell out and buy out that without which the war could never have been, than to sink both the thing to be sold and the price of it in cutting one another's throats! I do not speak of emancipation at once, but of a decision at once to emancipate gradually. Room in South America for colonization can be obtained cheaply and in abundance, and when numbers shall be large enough to be company and encouragement for one another, the freed people will not be so reluctant to go.

I am pressed with a difficulty not yet mentioned — one which threatens division among those who, united, are none too strong. An instance of it is known to you. General Hunter is an honest man. He was, and I hope still is, my friend. I valued him none the less for his agreeing with me in the general wish that all men everywhere could be free. He proclaimed all men free within certain States, and I repudiated the proclamation. He expected more good and less harm from the measure than I could believe would follow. Yet, in repudiating it, I gave dissatisfaction, if not offence, to many whose support the country cannot afford to lose. And this is not the end of it. The pressure in this direction is still upon me, and is increasing. By conceding what I now ask you can relieve me, and, much more, can relieve the country in this important point.

Upon these considerations, I have again begged your attention to the message of March last. Before leaving the Capital, consider and discuss it among yourselves. You are patriots and statesmen, and as such I pray you consider this proposition; and, at the least, commend it to the consideration of your States and people. As you would perpetuate popular government for the best people in the world, I beseech you that you do in nowise omit this. Our common country is in great peril, demanding the loftiest views and boldest action to bring a speedy relief. Once relieved, its form of government is saved to the world; its beloved history and cherished memories are vindicated, and its happy future fully assured and rendered inconceivably grand. To you, more than to any others, the privilege is given to assure that happiness and swell that grandeur, and to link your own names therewith forever.

## **TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN**

**EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, July 13, 1862**

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

MY DEAR SIR: — I am told that over 160,000 men have gone into your army on the Peninsula. When I was with you the other day we made out 86,500 remaining, leaving 73,500 to be accounted for. I believe 23,500 will cover all the killed, wounded, and missing in all your battles and skirmishes, leaving 50,000 who have left otherwise. No more than 5000 of these have died, leaving 45,000 of your army still alive and not with it. I believe half or two-thirds of them are fit for duty to-day. Have you any more perfect knowledge of this than I have? If I am right, and you had these men with you, you could go into Richmond in the next three days. How can they be got to you, and how can they be prevented from getting away in such numbers for the future?

A. LINCOLN.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK**

**WAR DEPARTMENT, July 13, 1862**

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Corinth, Mississippi:  
They are having a stampede in Kentucky. Please look to it.  
A. LINCOLN.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. T. BOYLE**

**WASHINGTON, July 13, 1862**

GENERAL J. T. BOYLE, Louisville, Kentucky:

Your several despatches received. You should call on General Halleck. Telegraph him at once.  
I have telegraphed him that you are in trouble.

A. LINCOLN.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. T. BOYLE**

**WAR DEPARTMENT, July 13, 1862**

GENERAL J. T. BOYLE, Louisville, Kentucky:

We cannot venture to order troops from General Buell. We know not what condition he is in. He maybe attacked himself. You must call on General Halleck, who commands, and whose business it is to understand and care for the whole field If you cannot telegraph to him, send a messenger to him. A dispatch has this moment come from Halleck at Tuscombia, Alabama.

A. LINCOLN.

# ACT OF COMPENSATED EMANCIPATION

## MESSAGE TO CONGRESS

July 4, 1862.

FELLOW-CITIZENS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

Herewith is the draft of the bill to compensate any State which may abolish slavery within its limits, the passage of which, substantially as presented, I respectfully and earnestly recommend.

A. LINCOLN.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled: — That whenever the President of the United States shall be satisfied that any State shall have lawfully abolished slavery within and through-out such State, either immediately or gradually, it shall be the duty of the President, assisted by the Secretary of the Treasury, to prepare and deliver to each State an amount of six per cent. interest-bearing bonds of the United States equal to the aggregate value at — dollars per head of all the slaves within such State, as reported by the census of 1860; the whole amount for any one State to be delivered at once if the abolishment be immediate, or in equal annual instalments if it be gradual, interest to begin running on each bond at the time of delivery, and not before.

And be it further enacted, That if any State, having so received any such bonds, shall at any time afterwards by law reintroduce or tolerate slavery within its limits, contrary to the act of abolishment upon which such bonds shall have been received, said bonds so received by said State shall at once be null and void, in whosoever hands they may be, and such State shall refund to the United States all interest which may have been paid on such bonds.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK**

**WAR DEPARTMENT, July 14, 1862**

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Corinth, Mississippi:

I am very anxious — almost impatient — to have you here. Have due regard to what you leave behind. When can you reach here?

A. LINCOLN.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN**

**WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, July 14, 1862**

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

General Burnside's force is at Newport News, ready to move, on short notice, one way or the other, when ordered.

A. LINCOLN.

## **TO SOLOMON FOOT**

**EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, July 15, 1862**

HON. SOLOMON FOOT, President pro tempore of the Senate.

SIR: — Please inform the Senate that I shall be obliged if they will postpone the adjournment at least one day beyond the time which I understand to be now fixed for it.

Your obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN.

[The same message was addressed to Hon. Galusha A. Grow Speaker of the House of Representatives.]

## **MESSAGE TO CONGRESS. July 17, 1862**

### **FELLOW-CITIZENS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:**

I have inadvertently omitted so long to inform you that in March last Mr. Cornelius Vanderbilt, of New York, gratuitously presented to the United States the ocean steamer Vanderbilt, by many esteemed the finest merchant ship in the world. She has ever since been and still is doing valuable service to the government. For the patriotic act of making this magnificent and valuable present to the country I recommend that some suitable acknowledgment be made.

A. LINCOLN.

## **MESSAGE TO CONGRESS. July 17, 1862**

### **FELLOW-CITIZENS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:**

Considering the bill for "An act to suppress insurrection, to punish treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property of rebels, and for other purposes," and the joint resolution explanatory of said act as being substantially one, I have approved and signed both.

Before I was informed of the passage of the resolution I had prepared the draft of a message stating objections to the bill becoming a law, a copy of which draft is herewith transmitted.

A. LINCOLN.

## FELLOW-CITIZENS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

I herewith return to your honorable body, in which it originated, the bill for an act entitled "An act to suppress treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property of rebels, and for other purposes," together with my objections to its becoming a law.

There is much in the bill to which I perceive no objection. It is wholly prospective, and touches neither person nor property of any loyal citizen, in which particulars it is just and proper. The first and second sections provide for the conviction and punishment of persons Who shall be guilty of treason and persons who shall "incite, set on foot, assist, or engage in any rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States or the laws thereof, or shall give aid and comfort thereto, or shall engage in or give aid and comfort to any such existing rebellion or insurrection." By fair construction persons within these sections are not to be punished without regular trials in duly constituted courts, under the forms and all the substantial provisions of law and of the Constitution applicable to their several cases. To this I perceive no objection, especially as such persons would be within the general pardoning power and also the special provision for pardon and amnesty contained in this act.

It is also provided that the slaves of persons convicted under these sections shall be free. I think there is an unfortunate form of expression rather than a substantial objection in this. It is startling to say that Congress can free a slave within a State, and yet if it were said the ownership of the slave had first been transferred to the nation and that Congress had then liberated him the difficulty would at once vanish. And this is the real case. The traitor against the General Government forfeits his slave at least as justly as he does any other property, and he forfeits both to the government against which he offends. The government, so far as there can be ownership, thus owns the forfeited slaves, and the question for Congress in regard to them is, "Shall they be made free or be sold to new masters?" I perceive no objection to Congress deciding in advance that they shall be free. To the high honor of Kentucky, as I am informed, she is the owner of some slaves by escheat, and has sold none, but liberated all. I hope the same is true of some other States. Indeed, I do not believe it will be physically possible for the General Government to return persons so circumstanced to actual slavery. I believe there would be physical resistance to it which could neither be turned aside by argument nor driven away by force. In this view I have no objection to this feature of the bill. Another matter involved in these two sections, and running through other parts of the act, will be noticed hereafter.

I perceive no objection to the third or fourth sections.

So far as I wish to notice the fifth and sixth sections, they may be considered together. That the enforcement of these sections would do no injustice to the persons embraced within them, is clear. That those who make a causeless war should be compelled to pay the cost of it, is too obviously just to be called in question. To give governmental protection to the property of persons who have abandoned it, and gone on a crusade to overthrow the same government, is absurd, if considered in the mere light of justice. The severest justice may not always be the best policy. The principle of seizing and appropriating the property of the persons embraced within these sections is certainly not very objectionable, but a justly discriminating application of it would be very difficult and, to a great extent, impossible. And would it not be wise to place a power of remission somewhere, so that these persons may know they have something to lose by persisting and something to gain by desisting?

[A man without hope is a most dangerous man — he has nothing to lose!]

I am not sure whether such power of remission is or is not in section thirteen. Without any special act of Congress, I think our military commanders, when — in military phrase, "they are within the enemy's country," should, in an orderly manner, seize and use whatever of real or personal

property may be necessary or convenient for their commands; at the same time preserving, in some way, the evidence of what they do.

What I have said in regard to slaves, while commenting on the first and second sections, is applicable to the ninth, with the difference that no provision is made in the whole act for determining whether a particular individual slave does or does not fall within the classes defined in that section. He is to be free upon certain conditions but whether those conditions do or do not pertain to him no mode of ascertaining is provided. This could be easily supplied.

To the tenth section I make no objection. The oath therein required seems to be proper, and the remainder of the section is substantially identical with a law already existing.

The eleventh section simply assumes to confer discretionary power upon the executive. Without the law, I have no hesitation to go as far in the direction indicated as I may at any time deem expedient. And I am ready to say now — I think it is proper for our military commanders to employ, as laborers, as many persons of African descent as can be used to advantage.

The twelfth and thirteenth sections are something better than unobjectionable; and the fourteenth is entirely proper, if all other parts of the act shall stand.

That to which I chiefly object pervades most parts of the act, but more distinctly appears in the first, second, seventh, and eighth sections. It is the sum of those provisions which results in the divesting of title forever.

For the causes of treason and ingredients of treason, not amounting to the full crime, it declares forfeiture extending beyond the lives of the guilty parties; whereas the Constitution of the United States declares that "no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture except during the life of the person attainted." True, there is to be no formal attainder in this case; still, I think the greater punishment cannot be constitutionally inflicted, in a different form, for the same offence.

With great respect I am constrained to say I think this feature of the act is unconstitutional. It would not be difficult to modify it.

I may remark that the provision of the Constitution, put in language borrowed from Great Britain, applies only in this country, as I understand, to real or landed estate.

Again, this act in rem forfeits property for the ingredients of treason without a conviction of the supposed criminal, or a personal hearing given him in any proceeding. That we may not touch property lying within our reach, because we cannot give personal notice to an owner who is absent endeavoring to destroy the government, is certainly not satisfactory. Still, the owner may not be thus engaged; and I think a reasonable time should be provided for such parties to appear and have personal hearings. Similar provisions are not uncommon in connection with proceedings in rem.

For the reasons stated, I return the bill to the House in which it originated.

## **TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN**

**WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, D.C., July 21, 1862**

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

This is Monday. I hope to be able to tell you on Thursday what is to be done with Burnside.

A. LINCOLN.

## **ORDER IN REGARD TO BEHAVIOR OF ALIENS**

### **WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,**

WASHINGTON, July 21, 1862.

The following order has been received from the President of the United States:

Representations have been made to the President by the ministers of various foreign powers in amity with the United States that subjects of such powers have during the present insurrection been obliged or required by military authorities to take an oath of general or qualified allegiance to this government. It is the duty of all aliens residing in the United States to submit to and obey the laws and respect the authority of the government. For any proceeding or conduct inconsistent with this obligation and subversive of that authority they may rightfully be subjected to military restraints when this may be necessary. But they cannot be required to take an oath of allegiance to this government, because it conflicts with the duty they owe to their own sovereigns. All such obligations heretofore taken are therefore remitted and annulled. Military commanders will abstain from imposing similar obligations in future, and will in lieu thereof adopt such other restraints of the character indicated as they shall find necessary, convenient, and effectual for the public safety. It is further directed that whenever any order shall be made affecting the personal liberty of an alien reports of the same and of the causes thereof shall be made to the War Department for the consideration of the Department of State.

By order of the Secretary of War:

L. THOMAS, Adjutant-General.

## **ORDER AUTHORIZING EMPLOYMENT OF "CONTRABANDS."**

**WAR DEPARTMENT, July 22, 1862**

Ordered:

1. That military commanders within the States of Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas in an orderly manner seize and use any property, real or personal, which may be necessary or convenient for their several commands as supplies or for other military purposes; and that while property may be destroyed for proper military objects, none shall be destroyed in wantonness or malice.

2. That military and naval commanders shall employ as laborers within and from said States so many persons of African descent as can be advantageously used for military or naval purposes, giving them reasonable wages for their labor.

3. That as to both property and persons of African descent accounts shall be kept sufficiently accurate and in detail to show quantities and amounts and from whom both property and such persons shall have come, as a basis upon which compensation can be made in proper cases; and the several departments of this government shall attend to and perform their appropriate parts toward the execution of these orders.

By order of the President: EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

## **WARNING TO REBEL SYMPATHIZERS**

**PROCLAMATION, JULY 25, 1862**

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

A Proclamation.

In pursuance of the sixth section of the act of Congress entitled "An act to suppress insurrection and to punish treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate property of rebels, and for other purposes," approved July 17, 1862, and which act and the joint resolution explanatory thereof are herewith published, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, do hereby proclaim to and warn all persons within the contemplation of said sixth section to cease participating in, aiding, countenancing, or abetting the existing rebellion or any rebellion against the Government of the United States and to return to their proper allegiance to the United States, on pain of the forfeitures and seizures as within and by said sixth section provided.

In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington, this twenty-fifth day of July, A.D. 1862, and of the independence of the United States the eighty-seventh.

A. LINCOLN.

By the President: WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.

## **HOLD MY HAND WHILST THE ENEMY STABS ME**

### **TO REVERDY JOHNSON**

(Private.)

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, July 26, 1862.

HON. REVERDY JOHNSON.

MY DEAR SIR: — Yours of the 16th is received.....

You are ready to say I apply to friends what is due only to enemies. I distrust the wisdom if not the sincerity of friends who would hold my hands while my enemies stab me. This appeal of professed friends has paralyzed me more in this struggle than any other one thing. You remember telling me, the day after the Baltimore mob in April, 1861, that it would crush all Union feeling in Maryland for me to attempt bringing troops over Maryland soil to Washington. I brought the troops notwithstanding, and yet there was Union feeling enough left to elect a Legislature the next autumn, which in turn elected a very excellent Union United States senator! I am a patient man — always willing to forgive on the Christian terms of repentance, and also to give ample time for repentance. Still, I must save this government, if possible. What I cannot do, of course, I will not do; but it may as well be understood, once for all, that I shall not surrender this game leaving any available card unplayed.

Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.

## TO CUTHBERT BULLITT

(Private.)

WASHINGTON, D. C., July 28, 1862.

CUTHBERT BULLITT, Esq., New Orleans, Louisiana.

SIR: — The copy of a letter addressed to yourself by Mr. Thomas J. Durant has been shown to me. The writer appears to be an able, a dispassionate, and an entirely sincere man. The first part of the letter is devoted to an effort to show that the secession ordinance of Louisiana was adopted against the will of a majority of the people. This is probably true, and in that fact may be found some instruction. Why did they allow the ordinance to go into effect? Why did they not assert themselves? Why stand passive and allow themselves to be trodden down by minority? Why did they not hold popular meetings and have a convention of their own to express and enforce the true sentiment of the State? If preorganization was against them then, why not do this now that the United States army is present to protect them? The paralysis — the dead palsy — of the government in this whole struggle is that this class of men will do nothing for the government, nothing for themselves, except demanding that the government shall not strike its open enemies, lest they be struck by accident!

Mr. Durant complains that in various ways the relation of master and slave is disturbed by the presence of our army, and he considers it particularly vexatious that this, in part, is done under cover of an act of Congress, while constitutional guaranties are suspended on the plea of military necessity. The truth is, that what is done and omitted about slaves is done and omitted on the same military necessity. It is a military necessity to have men and money; and we can get neither in sufficient numbers or amounts if we keep from or drive from our lines slaves coming to them. Mr. Durant cannot be ignorant of the pressure in this direction, nor of my efforts to hold it within bounds till he and such as he shall have time to help themselves.

I am not posted to speak understandingly on all the police regulations of which Mr. Durant complains. If experience shows any one of them to be wrong, let them be set right. I think I can perceive in the freedom of trade which Mr. Durant urges that he would relieve both friends and enemies from the pressure of the blockade. By this he would serve the enemy more effectively than the enemy is able to serve himself. I do not say or believe that to serve the enemy is the purpose, of Mr. Durant, or that he is conscious of any purpose other than national and patriotic ones. Still, if there were a class of men who, having no choice of sides in the contest, were anxious only to have quiet and comfort for themselves while it rages, and to fall in with the victorious side at the end of it without loss to themselves, their advice as to the mode of conducting the contest would be precisely such as his is. He speaks of no duty — apparently thinks of none — resting upon Union men. He even thinks it injurious to the Union cause that they should be restrained in trade and passage without taking sides. They are to touch neither a sail nor a pump, but to be merely passengers — deadheads at that — to be carried snug and dry throughout the storm, and safely landed right side up. Nay, more: even a mutineer is to go untouched, lest these sacred passengers receive an accidental wound. Of course the rebellion will never be suppressed in Louisiana if the professed Union men there will neither help to do it nor permit the government to do it without their help. Now, I think the true remedy is very different from what is suggested by Mr. Durant. It does not lie in rounding the rough angles of the war, but in removing the necessity for the war. The people of Louisiana who wish protection to person and property have but to reach forth their hands and take it. Let them in good faith inaugurate the national authority, and set up a State government conforming thereto under the Constitution. They know how to do it and can have the protection of the army while doing it. The army will be withdrawn

so soon as such State government can dispense with its presence; and the people of the State can then, upon the old constitutional terms, govern themselves to their own liking. This is very simple and easy.

If they will not do this — if they prefer to hazard all for the sake of destroying the government — it is for them to consider whether it is probable I will surrender the government to save them from losing all. If they decline what I suggest, you scarcely need to ask what I will do. What would you do in my position? Would you drop the war where it is? Or would you prosecute it in future with elder-stalk squirts charged with rose water? Would you deal lighter blows rather than heavier ones? Would you give up the contest, leaving any available means unapplied? I am in no boastful mood. I shall not do more than I can, and I shall do all I can, to save the government, which is my sworn duty as well as my personal inclination. I shall do nothing in malice. What I deal with is too vast for malicious dealing.

Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.

## **TO LOYAL GOVERNORS**

**WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C.,**

July 28, 1862.

**GOVERNORS OF ALL LOYAL STATES:**

It would be of great service here for us to know, as fully as you can tell, what progress is made and making in recruiting for old regiments in your State. Also about what day the first regiments can move with you, what the second, what the third, and so on. This information is important to us in making calculations. Please give it as promptly and accurately as you call.

A. LINCOLN.

## **BROKEN EGGS CANNOT BE MENDED**

### **EXTRACT FROM LETTER TO AUGUST BELMONT**

July 31, 1862.

Broken eggs cannot be mended; but Louisiana has nothing to do now but to take her place in the Union as it was, barring the already broken eggs. The sooner she does so, the smaller will be the amount of that which will be past mending. This government cannot much longer play a game in which it stakes all, and its enemies stake nothing. Those enemies must understand that they cannot experiment for ten years trying to destroy the government, and if they fail, still come back into the Union unhurt. If they expect in any contingency to ever have the Union as it was, I join with the writer in saying, "Now is the time."

How much better it would have been for the writer to have gone at this, under the protection of the army at New Orleans, than to have sat down in a closet writing complaining letters northward!

Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.

## **Конец ознакомительного фрагмента.**

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