

**GEORGE
ANSON**

A VOYAGE
ROUND THE
WORLD

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INTRODUCTION

The men-of-war in which Anson went to sea were built mostly of oak. They were painted externally yellow, with a blue stripe round the upper works. Internally, they were painted red. They carried cannon on one, two, or three decks according to their size. The biggest ships carried a hundred cannon and nearly a thousand men. The ship in which this famous voyage was made was of the middle size, then called the fourth-rate. She carried sixty cannon, and a crew of four hundred men. Her lower gun deck, a little above the level of the water, was about 140 feet long. She was of about a thousand tons burthen.

Though this seems small to us, it is not small for a wooden ship. It is not possible to build a long wooden ship. The *Centurion*, though short, was broad, bulky, and deep. She was fit for the sea. As she was built more to carry cannon than to sail, she was a slow sailer. She became slower as the barnacles gathered on her

planks under the water. She carried three wooden masts, each fitted with two or three square sails, extended by wooden yards. Both yards and masts were frequently injured in bad weather.

The cannon were arranged in rows along her decks. On the lower gun deck, a little above the level of the water, she carried twenty-six twenty-four-pounders, thirteen on a side. These guns were muzzle-loading cannon which flung twenty-four-pound balls for a distance of about a mile. On the deck above this chief battery, she carried a lighter battery of twenty-six nine- or twelve-pounder guns, thirteen on a side. These guns were also muzzle-loading. They flung their balls for a distance of a little more than a mile.

On the quarter-deck, the poop, the fore-castle, and aloft in the tops (the strong platforms on the masts), were lighter guns, throwing balls of from a half to six pounds' weight. Some of the lightest guns were mounted on swivels, so that they could be easily pointed in any direction. All the guns were clumsy weapons. They could not be aimed with any nicety. The iron round shot fired from them did not fit the bores of the pieces. The gun-carriages were clumsy, and difficult to move. Even when the carriage had been so moved that the gun was accurately trained, and when the gun itself had been raised or depressed till it was accurately pointed, the gunner could not tell how much the ball would wobble in the bore before it left the muzzle. For these reasons all the effective sea-fights were fought at close range, from within a quarter of a mile of the target to close alongside.

At a close range, the muskets and small-arms could be used with effect.

The broadside cannon pointed through square portholes cut in the ship's sides. The ports were fitted with heavy wooden lids which could be tightly closed when necessary. In bad weather, the lower-deck gun ports could not be opened without danger of swamping the ship. Sometimes, when the lower-deck guns were fought in a gale, the men stood knee deep in water.

In action the guns were "run out" till their muzzles were well outside the port, so that the flashes might not set the ship's side on fire. The shock of the discharge made them recoil into a position in which they could be reloaded. The guns were run out by means of side tackles. They were kept from recoiling too far by strong ropes called breechings. When not in use, and not likely to be used, they were "housed," or so arranged that their muzzles could be lashed firmly to the ship's side. In a sea way, when the ship rolled very badly, there was danger of the guns breaking loose and rolling this way and that till they had knocked the ship's side out. To prevent this happening, clamps of wood were screwed behind the wheels of the gun-carriages, and extra breechings were rove, whenever bad weather threatened.

The great weight of the rows of cannon put a severe strain upon the upper works of the ship. In bad weather, during excessive rolling, this strain was often great enough to open the seams in the ship's sides. To prevent this, and other costly damage, it was the custom to keep the big men-of-war in harbour

from October until the Spring. In the smaller vessels the strain was made less by striking down some of the guns into the hold.

The guns were fired by the application of a slow-match to the priming powder in the touch-holes. The slow-matches were twisted round wooden forks called linstocks. After firing, when the guns had recoiled, their bores were scraped with scrapers called "worms" to remove scraps of burning wad or cartridge. They were then sponged out with a wet sponge, and charged by the ramming home of fresh cartridges, wads, and balls. A gun's crew numbered from four to twelve men, according to the size of the piece. When a gun was trained aft or forward, to bear on an object before or abaft the beam, the gun's crew hove it about with crows and handspikes.

As this, and the other exercise of sponging, loading, and running out the guns in the heat, stench, and fury of a sea-fight was excessively hard labour, the men went into action stripped to the waist. The decks on those occasions were thickly sanded, lest the blood upon them should make them too slippery for the survivors' feet. Tubs of water were placed between the guns for the wetting of the sponges and the extinguishing of chance fires. The ship's boys carried the cartridges to the guns from the magazines below the water-line. The round-shot were placed close to hand in rope rings called garlands. Nets were spread under the masts to catch wreck from aloft. The decks were "cleared for action." All loose articles about the decks, and all movable wooden articles such as bulkheads (the partitions

between cabins), mess-tables, chests, casks, etc., were flung into the hold or overboard, lest shot striking them should splinter them. Splinters were far more dangerous than shot. In this book it may be noticed that the officers hoped to have no fighting while the gun decks of the ships in the squadron were cumbered with provision casks.

The ships of war carried enormous crews. The *Centurion* carried four hundred seamen and one hundred soldiers. At sea, most of this complement was divided into two watches. Both watches were subdivided into several divisions, to each of which was allotted some special duty, as the working of the main-mast, the keeping of the main deck clean, etc., etc. Many members of the crew stood no watch, but worked at special crafts and occupations about the ship. A wooden ship of war employed and kept busy a carpenter and carpenter's mates, a sailmaker and sailmaker's mates, a cooper and a gunner, each with his mates, and many other specially skilled craftsmen and their assistants. She was a little world, carrying within herself all that she needed. Her daily business required men to sail her and steer her, men to fight her guns, men to rule her, men to drill, men to play the spy, men to teach, preach, and decorate, men to clean her, caulk her, paint her and keep her sweet, men to serve out food, water, and intoxicants, men to tinker, repair, and cook and forge, to doctor and operate, to bury and flog, to pump, fumigate and scrape, and to load and unload. She called for so many skilled craftsmen, and provided so much special employment out of the way of

seamanship, that the big crew was never big enough. The special employments took away now one man, now another, till there were few left to work the ship. The soldiers and marines acted as a military guard for the prevention of mutiny. They worked about the ship, hauling ropes, etc., when not engaged in military duty.

The hundreds of men in the ship's crew lived below decks. Most of them lived on the lower gun deck in the narrow spaces (known as berths) between the guns. Here they kept their chests, mess-tables, crockery, and other gear. Here they ate and drank, made merry, danced, got drunk, and, in port, entertained their female acquaintance. Many more, including the midshipmen, surgeon, and gunner, lived below the lower gun deck, in the orlop or cable tier, where sunlight could never come and fresh air never came willingly. At night the men slept in hammocks, which they slung from the beams. They were packed together very tightly, man to man, hammock touching hammock. In the morning, the hammocks were lashed up and stowed in racks till the evening.

There was no "regulation" naval uniform until some years after the *Centurion's* return to England. The officers and men seem to have worn what clothes they pleased. The ships carried stores of clothes which were issued to the men as they needed them. The store clothes, being (perhaps) of similar patterns, may have given a sort of uniformity to the appearance of the crews after some months at sea. In some of the prints of the time the men are drawn wearing rough, buckled shoes, coarse stockings, aprons or short skirts of frieze, baize, or tarred canvas, and short

jackets worn open. Anson, like most captains, took care that the men in his boat's crew all dressed alike. The marines wore their regimental uniforms.

Life at sea has always been, and may always be, a harder life than the hardest of shore lives.

Life ashore in the early and middle eighteenth century was, in the main, both hard and brutal. Society ashore was made up of a little, brilliant, artificial class, a great, dull, honest, and hardworking mass, and a brutal, dirty, and debased rabble. Society at sea was like society ashore, except that, being composed of men, and confronted with the elements, and based on a grand ceremonial tradition, it was never brilliant, and never artificial. It was, in the main, an honest and hardworking society. Much in it was brutal, dirty, and debased; but it had always behind it an order and a ceremony grand, impressive, and unfaltering. That life in that society was often barbarous and disgusting cannot be doubted. The best men in the ships were taken by force from the merchant service. The others were gathered by press-gangs and gaol-deliveries. They were knocked into shape by brutal methods and kept in hand by brutal punishments. The officers were not always gentlemen; and when they were, they were frequently incompetent. The administration was scandalously corrupt. The ships were unhealthy, the food foul, the pay small, and the treatment cruel. The attractions of the service seem to have been these: the chance of making a large sum of prize-money, and the possibility of getting drunk once a

day on the enormous daily ration of intoxicating liquor. The men were crammed together into a dark, stinking, confined space, in which privacy was impossible, peace a dream, and cleanliness a memory. Here they were fed on rotten food, till they died by the score, as this book testifies.

"We sent," says Mr. Walter, chaplain in the *Centurion*, "about eighty sick from the *Centurion*; and the other ships, I believe, sent nearly as many, in proportion... As soon as we had performed this necessary duty, we scraped our decks, and gave our ship a thorough cleaning; then smoked it between decks, and after all washed every part well with vinegar. These operations were extremely necessary for correcting the noisome stench on board, and destroying the vermin; for ... both these nuisances had increased upon us to a very loathsome degree."

"The Biscuit," says Mr. Thomas, the teacher of mathematics in the *Centurion*, "(was) so worm-eaten it was scarce anything but dust, and a little blow would reduce it to that immediately; our Beef and Pork was likewise very rusty and rotten, and the surgeon endeavoured to hinder us from eating any of it, alledging it was, tho' a slow, yet a sure Poison."

That tradition and force of will could keep life efficient, and direct it to great ends, in such circumstances, deserves our admiration and our reverence.

The traditions and unpleasantness of the sea service are suggested vividly in many pages of this book. A few glimpses of both may be obtained from the following extracts from some of

the logs and papers which deal with this voyage and with Anson's entry into the Navy. The marine chapters in Smollett's *Roderick Random* give a fair picture of the way of life below decks during the years of which this book treats.

George Anson was born at Shugborough, in Staffordshire, on April 23, 1697. His first ship was the *Ruby*, Captain Peter Chamberlen, a 54-gun ship, with a scratch crew of 185 men. George Anson's name appears in her pay book between the names of John Baker, ordinary seaman, and George Hirgate, captain's servant. He joined her on February 2, 1712. The ship had lain cleaning and fitting "at Chatham and in the River Medway" since the 4th of the preceding month. Two days after the boy came aboard she weighed her anchor "at 1 afternoon," fresh gales and cloudy, and ran out to the Nore where she anchored in seven fathoms and moored.

It is not known what duties the boy performed during his first days of service. The ship fired twenty-one guns in honour of the queen's birthday on February 7. The weather was hazy, foggy, and cold, with snow and rain; lighters came off with dry provisions, and the ship's boats brought off water. On February 9, the *Centurion*, an earlier, smaller *Centurion* than the ship afterwards made famous by him, anchored close to them. On the 16th, two Dutch men-of-war, with a convoy, anchored close to them. Yards and topmasts were struck and again got up on the 17th. On the 24th, three shot were fired at a brigantine to bring her to.

On the 27th, Sir John Norris and Sir Charles Wager hoisted their flags aboard the *Cambridge* and the *Ruby* respectively, and signal was made for a court-martial. Six men of the *Dover* were tried for mutiny, theft, disorderly conduct, and desertion of their ship after she had gone ashore "near Alborough Haven." Being all found guilty they were whipped from ship to ship next morning. Each received six lashes on the bare back at the side of each ship then riding at the Nore. A week later, the *Ruby* and the *Centurion* sailed leisurely to Spithead, chasing a Danish ship on the way. On March 11, the *Ruby* anchored at Spithead and struck her topmasts. On March 18, Captain Chamberlen removed "into ye *Monmouth*" with all his "followers," Anson among them. The *Monmouth* sailed on April 13, with three other men-of-war, as a guard to the West Indian fleet, bound for Port Royal. Her master says that on June 7, in lat. $21^{\circ} 36' N.$, long. $18^{\circ} 9' W.$, "we duckt those men that want willing to pay for crossing the tropick." In August, off the Jamaican coast, a man fell overboard and was drowned. Later in the month, a hurricane very nearly put an end to Anson and *Monmouth* together. Both pumps were kept going, there was four feet of water on the ballast and the same between decks, the foretopmast went, the main and mizen masts were cut away, and men with buckets worked for their lives "bealing at each hatchway." Port Royal was reached on September 1. The *Monmouth* made a cruise after pirates in Blewfields Bay, and returned to Spithead in June 1713.

Anson is next heard of as a second lieutenant aboard the

Hampshire. He was in the *Montague*, 60-gun ship, in Sir George Byng's action off Cape Passaro, in March 1718. In 1722, he commanded the *Weasel* sloop in some obscure services in the North Sea against the Dutch smugglers and French Jacobites. During this command he made several captures of brandy. From 1724 till 1735 he was employed in various commands, mostly in the American colonies, against the pirates. From 1735 till 1737 he was not employed at sea.

In 1737, he took command of the *Centurion*, and sailed in her to the Guinea Coast, to protect our gum merchants from the French. His gunner was disordered in his head during the cruise; and Sierra Leone was so unhealthy that "the merchant ships had scarce a well man on board." A man going mad and others dying were the only adventures of the voyage. He was back in the Downs to prepare for this more eventful voyage by July 21, 1739.

In November he wrote to the Admiralty that in hot climates "the Pease and Oatmeal put on board his Maj'y Ships have generally decayed and become not fitt to issue, before they have all been expended." He proposed taking instead of peas and oatmeal a proportion of "Stockfish, Grotts, Grout, and Rice." The Admiralty sanctioned the change; but the purser seems to have failed to procure the substitutes. Whether, as was the way of the pursers of that time, he pocketed money on the occasion, cannot be known. He died at sea long before the lack was discovered.

A more tragical matter took place in this November. A Mr. McKie, a naval mate, was attacked on Gosport Beach by twenty or thirty of the *Centurion's* crew, under one William Cheney, a boatswain's mate; and the said William Cheney "with a stick did cutt and bruse" the said McKie, and tore his shirt and conveyed away his "Murning ring," which was flat burglary in the said Cheney. "Mr. Cheney aledges no other reason for beating and Abusing Mr. McKie but the said McKie having got drunk at Sea, did then beat and abuse him." As Hamlet says, this was hire and salary, not revenge.

Months went by, doubtfully enlivened thus, till June 1740, when the pressing of men began. The *Centurion's* men went pressing, and got seventy-three men, a fair catch, but not enough. She despatched a tender to the Downs to press men from homeward bound merchant ships. This method of getting a crew was the best then in use, because the men obtained by it were trained seamen, which those obtained from the gaols, the gin-shops, and the slums seldom were. It was an extremely cruel method. A man within sight of his home, after a voyage of perhaps two years, might be dragged from his ship (before his wages were paid) to serve willy-nilly in the Navy, at a third of the pay, for the next half-dozen years. An impartial conscription seems noble beside such a method. Knowing how the ships were manned, it cannot seem strange that the Navy was not then a loved nor an honoured service. Nineteen of the *Centurion's* catch loved and honoured it so little that they contrived to desert

(risking death at the yard-arm by doing so) during the weeks of waiting at Portsmouth.

Before the tender sailed for the Downs, Anson discovered that the dockyard men had scamped their work in the *Centurion*. They had supplied her with a defective foremast "Not fitt for Sarves." High up on the mast was "a rotten Nott eleven inches deep," a danger to spar and ship together. The dockyard officials, who had probably pocketed the money for a good spar, swore that the Nott only "wants a Plugg drove in" to be perfection. Dockyard men at this time and for many years afterwards deserved to be suspended both from their duties and by their necks. Soon after the wrangle over the spar, there was a wrangle about the *Gloucester's* beef. Forty-two out of her seventy-two puncheons of beef were found to be stinking. With some doubts as to what would happen in the leaf if such things happened in the bud, Anson got his squadron to sea. Early in the voyage his master "shoved" his boatswain while he was knotting a cable, and the boatswain complained. "The Boatswain," says the letter, "is very often Drunk and incapable of his Duty." Later in the voyage, when many hundreds had died, Mr. Cheney, who hit Mr. McKie, became boatswain in his stead.

The squadron sailed from England on September 18, 1740, with six ships of war manned by 1872 seamen and marines, twenty-four of whom were sick. At Madeira, on November 4, after less than seven weeks at sea, there were 122 sick, and fourteen had been buried. Less than eleven weeks later, at St.

Catherine's in Brazil, there were 450 sick, and 160 had been buried. From this time until what was left of the squadron reached Juan Fernandez, sickness and death took continual toll. It is shocking to see the *Centurion's* muster lists slowly decreasing, by one or two a week, till she was up to the Horn, then dropping six, ten, twenty, or twenty-four a week, as the scurvy and the frost took hold. Few but the young survived. What that passage of the Horn was like may be read here at length; but perhaps nothing in this book is so eloquent of human misery as the following entries from Anson's private record: —

"1741. 8 May. – Heavy Flaws and dangerous Gusts, expecting every Moment to have my masts Carry'd away, having very little succor, from the standing rigging, every Shroud knotted, and not men able to keep the deck sufficient to take in a Topsail, all being violently afflicted with the Scurvy, and every day lessening our Number by six eight and Ten.

"1741. 1st Sept. – I mustered my Ship's Company, the number of Men I brought out of England, being Five hundred, are now reduced by Mortality to Two hundred and Thirteen, and many of them in a weak and Low condition."

Nothing in any of the records is so eloquent as the remark in Pascoe Thomas's account of the voyage: —

"I have seen 4 or 5 dead Bodies at a time, some sown up in their Hammocks and others not, washing about the Decks, for Want of Help to bury them in the Sea."

On December 7, 1741, the 1872 men had dwindled down to

201. Of the six ships of war only one, the *Centurion*, still held her course. She was leaking an inch an hour, but she showed bright to the world under a new coat of paint. On this day Anson sent home a letter to the Admiralty (from Canton in China). The letter was delivered 173 days later.

In spite of the miseries of the service, there were compensations. The entry off Payta —

"1741. 12 Nov. — I kept Possession of the Town three days and employed my Boats in plundering" —

must have been pleasant to write; and the entries for Tuesday, June 21, 1743, and following days, become almost incoherent: —

"reced 112 baggs and 6 Chests of Silver.

"11 Baggs of Virgin silver 72 Chests of Dollers and baggs of Dollers 114 Chests and 100 baggs of Dollers 4 baggs of wrought Plate and Virgin Silver."

The arrival at Portsmouth is thus described: —

"1744. Friday, 15 June. — Came to with the S Bower in 10 fath water and at 9 began to Moor."

Later interesting entries are: —

"Monday, 2nd July. — Fresh gales and Cloudy sent away the Treasure in 32 Waggons to London with 139 Officers and Seamen to guard it.

"Thursday, 19 July. — Mod and fair, found in the Fish Room three Chests of Treasure" (which had been overlooked).

The last entry of all is for: —

"Friday, 20 July. — Hard Gales with rain at 4 p.m. all the men

on the spot were paid and the Pendant was Struck."

An old print represents an officer of the *Centurion* dropping booty into the apron of a lady friend. Behind him the waggons and their guard proceed, with a great display of flags. The passing of the treasure was acclaimed with much enthusiasm both upon the road and in London. It was no doubt the biggest prize ever brought to England by a single ship. Anson's share made him a rich man. The rest of the survivors profited according to their rank.

Anson's subsequent career may be told in a few words. He was created Lord Anson on June 13, 1747. From 1751 to 1756 and from 1757 till his death he was a very competent and energetic First Lord of the Admiralty. He became Admiral of the Fleet in 1761. He died on June 6, 1762. The figurehead of the *Centurion*, the lion which "was very loose" in the Cape Horn storms of 1741, was preserved at the family seat at Shugborough till it fell to pieces. A portrait of Anson, which has been frequently copied and engraved, still exists there. The face is that of a man placidly and agreeably contented. It is the face of the polite and even spirit who "always kept up his usual composure and steadiness," and only once allowed joy to "break through" "the equable and unvaried character which he had hitherto preserved." Something of that character is in this placid and agreeable story told by Mr. Walter, chaplain, from Anson's private records.

The book is one of the most popular of the English books of voyages. It is a pleasantly written work. The story is told

with a grace and quietness "very grateful and refreshing." The story itself is remarkable. It bears witness to the often illustrated contrast between the excellence of Englishmen and the stupidity of their governors. The management of the squadron before it sailed gave continuous evidence of imbecility. Something fine in a couple of hundred "emaciated ship-mates" drove them on to triumph through every possible disadvantage. In the general joy over their triumph, the imbecility was forgotten. There is something pathetic in the mismanagement of the squadron. The ships were sent to sea on the longest and most dangerous of voyages with no anti-scorbutics. When scurvy broke out the only medicines available were "the pill and drop of Dr. Ward" (very violent emetic purgatives), which came not from the government, but from Anson's own stores. In the absence of proper medicines, Anson produced these things, "and first try'd them on himself." This spirit in our captains and in our common men has borne us (so far) fairly triumphantly out of the bogs into which our stupidity so often drives us.

JOHN MASEFIELD.

January 30, 1911.

AUTHOR'S INTRODUCTION

Notwithstanding the great improvement of navigation within the last two centuries, a voyage round the world is still considered as an enterprize of so very singular a nature, that the public

have never failed to be extremely inquisitive about the various accidents and turns of fortune with which this uncommon attempt is generally attended. And though the amusement expected in these narrations is doubtless one great source of that curiosity with the bulk of readers, yet the more intelligent part of mankind have always agreed that from accounts of this nature, if faithfully executed, the more important purposes of navigation, commerce, and national interest may be greatly promoted: for every authentic description of foreign coasts and countries will contribute to one or more of these great ends, in proportion to the wealth, wants, or commodities of those countries, and our ignorance of those coasts; and therefore a voyage round the world promises a species of information of all others the most desirable and interesting, since great part of it is performed in seas with which we are as yet but very imperfectly acquainted, and in the neighbourhood of a country renowned for the abundance of its wealth, though it is at the same time stigmatised for its poverty in the necessaries and conveniences of a civilized life.

These considerations have occasioned the compiling the ensuing work; which, in gratifying the inquisitive disposition of mankind, and contributing to the safety and success of future navigators, and to the extension of our commerce and power, may doubtless vie with any narration of this kind hitherto made public: since as to the first of these heads it may well be supposed that the general curiosity hath been strongly excited by the circumstances of this undertaking already known to the world;

for whether we consider the force of the squadron sent on this service, or the diversified distresses that each single ship was separately involved in, or the uncommon instances of varying fortune which attended the whole enterprize, each of these articles, I conceive, must, from its rude, well-known outlines, appear worthy of a compleater and more finished delineation.

Besides these descriptions and directions relating thereto, there is inserted in the ensuing work an ample account of a particular navigation of which hitherto little more than the name has been known, except to those immediately employed in it: I mean the track described by the Manila ship, in her passage to Acapulco, through the northern part of the Pacific Ocean. This material article is collected from the draughts and journals met with on board the Manila galeon, founded on the experience of more than a hundred and fifty years' practice, and corroborated in its principal circumstances by the concurrent evidence of all the Spanish prisoners taken in that vessel. And as many of their journals, which I have examined, appear to have been not ill kept, I presume the particulars of their route may be very safely relied on by future navigators. The advantages which may be drawn from an exact knowledge of this navigation, and the beneficial projects that may be formed thereon, both in war and peace, are by no means proper to be discussed in this place, but they will easily offer themselves to the skillful in maritime affairs. However, as the Manila ships are the only ones which have ever traversed this vast ocean, except a French straggler or

two which have been afterwards seized on the coast of Mexico, and as, during near two ages in which this trade has been carried on, the Spaniards have, with the greatest care, secreted all accounts of their voyages from the rest of the world, these reasons alone would authorize the insertion of those papers, and would recommend them to the inquisitive as a very great improvement in geography, and worthy of attention from the singularity of many circumstances therein recited.

Thus much it has been thought necessary to premise with regard to the ensuing work, which it is hoped the reader will, on perusal, find much ampler and more important than this slight sketch can well explain. But as there are hereafter occasionally interspersed some accounts of Spanish transactions, and many observations relating to the disposition of the American Spaniards, and to the condition of the countries bordering on the South Seas, and as herein I may appear to differ greatly from the opinions generally established, I think it behoves me particularly to recite the authorities I have been guided by in these matters, that I may not be censured as having given way either to a thoughtless credulity on one hand, or, what would be a much more criminal imputation, to a willful and deliberate misrepresentation on the other.

Mr. Anson, before he set sail upon this expedition, besides the printed journals to those parts, took care to furnish himself with the best manuscript accounts he could procure of all the Spanish settlements upon the coasts of Chili, Peru, and Mexico: these

he carefully compared with the examinations of his prisoners, and the informations of several intelligent persons who fell into his hands in the South Seas. He had likewise the good fortune, in some of his captures, to possess himself of a great number of letters and papers of a public nature, many of them written by the Viceroy of Peru to the Viceroy of Santa Fee, to the Presidents of Panama and Chili, to Don Blass de Lezo, admiral of the galeons, and to divers other persons in considerable employments; and in these letters there was usually inserted a recital of those they were intended to answer; so that they contained no small part of the correspondence between those officers for some time previous to our arrival on that coast. We took, besides, many letters sent from persons entrusted by the Spanish Government to their friends and correspondents, which were frequently filled with narrations of public business, and sometimes contained undisguised animadversions on the views and conduct of their superiors. From these materials those accounts of the Spanish affairs are drawn which may at first sight appear the most exceptionable. In particular, the history of the various casualties which befel Pizarro's squadron is for the most part composed from intercepted letters. Though indeed the relation of the insurrection of Orellana and his followers is founded on rather a less disputable authority: for it was taken from the mouth of an English gentleman then on board Pizarro, who often conversed with Orellana; and it was upon inquiry confirmed in its principal circumstances by others who were in

the ship at the same time: so that the fact, however extraordinary, is, I conceive, not to be contested.

And on this occasion I cannot but mention, that though I have endeavoured with my utmost care to adhere strictly to truth in every article of the ensuing narration, yet I am apprehensive that in so complicated a work some oversights must have been committed by the inattention to which at times all mankind are liable. However, I am as yet conscious of none but literal and insignificant mistakes; and if there are others more considerable which have escaped me, I flatter myself they are not of moment enough to affect any material transaction, and therefore I hope they may justly claim the reader's indulgence.

After this general account of the ensuing work, it might be expected, perhaps, that I should proceed to the work itself, but I cannot finish this Introduction without adding a few reflections on a matter very nearly connected with the present subject, and, as I conceive, neither destitute of utility nor unworthy the attention of the public; I mean the animating my countrymen, both in their public and private stations, to the encouragement and pursuit of all kinds of geographical and nautical observations, and of every species of mechanical and commercial information. It is by a settled attachment to these seemingly minute particulars that our ambitious neighbours have established some part of that power with which we are now struggling: and as we have the means in our hands of pursuing these subjects more effectually than they can, it would

be a dishonour to us longer to neglect so easy and beneficial a practice. For, as we have a navy much more numerous than theirs, great part of which is always employed in very distant nations, either in the protection of our colonies and commerce, or in assisting our allies against the common enemy, this gives us frequent opportunities of furnishing ourselves with such kind of materials as are here recommended, and such as might turn greatly to our advantage either in war or peace. Since, not to mention what might be expected from the officers of the navy, if their application to these subjects was properly encouraged, it would create no new expence to the government to establish a particular regulation for this purpose, as all that would be requisite would be constantly to embark on board some of our men-of-war which are sent on these distant cruises a person who, with the character of an engineer and the skill and talents necessary to that profession, should be employed in drawing such coasts and planning such harbours as the ship should touch at, and in making such other observations of all kinds as might either prove of advantage to future navigators, or might any ways tend to promote the public service. Persons habituated to these operations (which could not fail at the same time of improving them in their proper business) would be extremely useful in many other lights besides those already mentioned, and might tend to secure our fleets from those disgraces with which their attempts against places on shore have been often attended; and in a nation like ours, where all sciences are more eagerly and universally

pursued and better understood than in any other part of the world, proper subjects for these employments could not long be wanting if due encouragement were given to them. This method here recommended is known to have been frequently practised by the French, particularly in the instance of Mons. Frazier, an engineer, who has published a celebrated voyage to the South Seas; for this person, in the year 1711, was purposely sent by the French king into that country on board a merchantman, that he might examine and describe the coast, and take plans of all the fortified places, the better to enable the French to prosecute their illicit trade, or, on a rupture between them and the court of Spain, to form their enterprizes in those seas with more readiness and certainty. Should we pursue this method, we might hope that the emulation amongst those who are commissioned for these undertakings, and the experience which even in the most peaceable intervals they would hereby acquire, might at length procure us a proper number of able engineers, and might efface the national scandal which our deficiency in that species of men has sometimes exposed us to: and surely every step to encourage and improve them is of great moment to the publick, as no persons, when they are properly instructed, make better returns in war for the distinctions and emoluments bestowed on them in time of peace. Of which the advantages the French have reaped from their dexterity (too numerous and recent to be soon forgot) are an ample confirmation.

And having mentioned engineers, or such as are skilled in

drawing and the other usual practices of that profession, as the properest persons to be employed in these foreign enquiries, I cannot (as it offers itself so naturally to the subject in hand) but lament how very imperfect many of our accounts of distant countries are rendered by the relators being unskilled in drawing, and in the general principles of surveying, even where other abilities have not been wanting. Had more of our travellers been initiated in these acquirements, and had there been added thereto some little skill in the common astronomical observations (all which a person of ordinary talents might attain with a very moderate share of application), we should by this time have seen the geography of the globe much correcter than we now find it: the dangers of navigation would have been considerably lessened, and the manners, arts, and produce of foreign countries would have been better known to us than they are. Indeed, when I consider the strong incitements that all travellers have to pursue some part at least of these qualifications, especially drawing; when I consider how much it will facilitate their observations, assist and strengthen their memories, and of how tedious, and often unintelligible, a load of description it would rid them, I cannot but wonder that any person who intends to visit distant countries with a view of informing either himself or others, should be wanting in so necessary a piece of skill. And to enforce this argument still further, I must add that besides the uses of drawing, already mentioned, there is one which, tho' not so obvious, is yet perhaps of more consequence than all that

has been hitherto urged; I mean the strength and distinguishing power it adds to some of our faculties. This appears from hence, that those who are used to draw objects observe them with more accuracy than others who are not habituated to that practice. For we may easily find by a little experience, that when we view any object, however simple, our attention or memory is scarcely at any time so strong as to enable us, when we have turned our eyes away from it, to recollect exactly every part it consisted of, and to recall all the circumstances of its appearance; since on examination it will be discovered that in some we were mistaken and others we had totally overlooked: but he that is accustomed to draw what he sees is at the same time accustomed to rectify this inattention; for by confronting his ideas copied on the paper with the object he intends to represent, he finds out what circumstances have deceived him in its appearance, and hence he at length acquires the habit of observing much more at one view, and retains what he sees with more correctness than he could ever have done without his practice and proficiency in drawing.

If what has been said merits the attention of travellers of all sorts, it is, I think, more particularly applicable to the gentlemen of the navy; since, without drawing and planning, neither charts nor views of land can be taken, and without these it is sufficiently evident that navigation is at a full stand. It is doubtless from a persuasion of the utility of these qualifications that his Majesty has established a drawing master at Portsmouth

for the instruction of those who are presumed to be hereafter intrusted with the command of his royal navy: and tho' some have been so far misled as to suppose that the perfection of sea-officers consisted in a turn of mind and temper resembling the boisterous element they had to deal with, and have condemned all literature and science as effeminate and derogatory to that ferocity which, they would falsely persuade us, was the most unerring characteristic of courage: yet it is to be hoped that such absurdities as these have at no time been authorised by the public opinion, and that the belief of them daily diminishes. If those who adhere to these mischievous positions were capable of being influenced by reason or swayed by example, I should think it sufficient for their conviction to observe that the most valuable drawings made in the following voyage, though done with such a degree of skill that even professed artists could with difficulty imitate them, were taken by Mr. Piercy Brett, one of Mr. Anson's lieutenants, and since captain of the *Lion* man-of-war; who, in his memorable engagement with the *Elizabeth* (for the importance of the service, or the resolution with which it was conducted, inferior to none this age has seen), has given ample proof that a proficiency in the arts I have been here recommending is extremely consistent with the most exemplary bravery, and the most distinguished skill in every function belonging to the duty of a sea-officer. Indeed, when the many branches of science are attended to, of which even the common practice of navigation is composed, and the many improvements which men of skill have

added to this practice within these few years, it would induce one to believe that the advantages of reflection and speculative knowledge were in no profession more eminent than in that of a sea-officer; for, not to mention some expertness in geography, geometry, and astronomy, which it would be dishonourable for him to be without (as his journal and his estimate of the daily position of the ship are founded on particular branches of these arts), it may be well supposed that the management and working of a ship, the discovery of her most eligible position in the water (usually stiled her trim), and the disposition of her sails in the most advantageous manner, are articles wherein the knowledge of mechanicks cannot but be greatly assistant. And perhaps the application of this kind of knowledge to naval subjects may produce as great improvements in sailing and working a ship as it has already done in many other matters conducive to the ease and convenience of human life. Since, when the fabric of a ship and the variety of her sails are considered, together with the artificial contrivances for adapting them to her different motions, as it cannot be doubted but these things have been brought about by more than ordinary sagacity and invention; so neither can it be doubted but that in some conjunctures a speculative and scientific turn of mind may find out the means of directing and disposing this complicated mechanism much more advantageously than can be done by mere habit, or by a servile copying of what others may perhaps have erroneously practised in similar emergencies. But it is time to finish this digression, and to leave the reader to

the perusal of the ensuing work, which, with how little art soever it may be executed, will yet, from the importance of the subject and the utility and excellence of the materials, merit some share of the public attention.

BOOK I

CHAPTER I OF THE EQUIPMENT OF THE SQUADRON: THE INCIDENTS RELATING THERETO, FROM ITS FIRST APPOINTMENT TO ITS SETTING SAIL FROM ST. HELENS

The squadron under the command of Mr. Anson (of which I here propose to recite the most material proceedings) having undergone many changes in its destination, its force, and its equipment, during the ten months between its original appointment and its final sailing from St. Helens; I conceive the history of these alterations is a detail necessary to be made public, both for the honour of those who first planned and promoted this enterprize, and for the justification of those who have been entrusted with its execution. Since it will from hence appear that the accidents the expedition was afterwards exposed to, and which prevented it from producing all the national advantages the strength of the squadron, and the expectation of the public, seemed to presage, were principally owing to a series

of interruptions, which delayed the commander in the course of his preparations, and which it exceeded his utmost industry either to avoid or to get removed.

When, in the latter end of the summer of the year 1739, it was foreseen that a war with Spain was inevitable, it was the opinion of some considerable persons then trusted with the administration of affairs, that the most prudent step the nation could take, on the breaking out of the war, was attacking that crown in her distant settlements; for by this means (as at that time there was the greatest probability of success) it was supposed that we should cut off the principal resources of the enemy, and should reduce them to the necessity of sincerely desiring a peace, as they would hereby be deprived of the returns of that treasure by which alone they could be enabled to carry on a war.

In pursuance of these sentiments, several projects were examined, and several resolutions were taken by the council. And in all these deliberations it was from the first determined that George Anson, Esq., then captain of the *Centurion*, should be employed as commander-in-chief of an expedition of this kind: and he at that time being absent on a cruize, a vessel was dispatched to his station so early as the beginning of September to order him to return with his ship to Portsmouth. And soon after he came there, that is on the 10th of November following, he received a letter from Sir Charles Wager directing him to repair to London, and to attend the Board of Admiralty: where, when he arrived, he was informed by Sir Charles that two squadrons

would be immediately fitted out for two secret expeditions, which, however, would have some connexion with each other; that he, Mr. Anson, was intended to command one of them, and Mr. Cornwall (who hath since lost his life gloriously in the defence of his country's honour) the other; that the squadron under Mr. Anson was to take on board three independent companies of a hundred men each, and Bland's regiment of foot; that Colonel Bland was likewise to embark with his regiment, and to command the land-forces; and that, as soon as this squadron could be fitted for the sea, they were to set sail, with express orders to touch at no place till they came to Java Head in the East Indies; that there they were only to stop to take in water, and thence to proceed directly to the city of Manila, situated on Luconia, one of the Philippine Islands; that the other squadron was to be of equal force with this commanded by Mr. Anson, and was intended to pass round Cape Horn, into the South Seas, to range along that coast; and after cruising upon the enemy in those parts, and attempting their settlements, this squadron in its return was to rendezvous at Manila, there to join the squadron under Mr. Anson, where they were to refresh their men, and refit their ships, and perhaps receive orders for other considerable enterprizes.

This scheme was doubtless extremely well projected, and could not but greatly advance the public service, and the reputation and fortune of those concerned in its execution; for had Mr. Anson proceeded for Manila at the time and in

the manner proposed by Sir Charles Wager, he would, in all probability, have arrived there before they had received any advice of the war between us and Spain, and consequently before they had been in the least prepared for the reception of an enemy, or had any apprehensions of their danger. The city of Manila might be well supposed to have been at that time in the same defenceless condition with all the other Spanish settlements, just at the breaking out of the war; that is to say, their fortifications neglected, and in many places decayed; their cannon dismounted, or rendered useless by the mouldring of their carriages; their magazines, whether of military stores or provision, all empty; their garrisons unpaid, and consequently thin, ill affected, and dispirited; and the royal chests in Peru, whence alone all these disorders could receive their redress, drained to the very bottom; this, from the intercepted letters of their viceroys and governors, it is well known to have been the defenceless state of Panama, and the other Spanish places on the coast of the South Sea, for near a twelvemonth after our declaration of war. And it cannot be supposed that the city of Manila, removed still farther by almost half the circumference of the globe, should have experienced from the Spanish government a greater share of attention and concern for its security than Panama, and the other important ports in Peru and Chili, on which their possession of that immense empire depends. Indeed, it is well known that Manila was at that time incapable of making any considerable defence, and in all probability would have surrendered only on

the appearance of our squadron before it. The consequence of this city, and the island it stands on, may be in some measure estimated, from the known healthiness of its air, the excellency of its port and bay, the number and wealth of its inhabitants, and the very extensive and beneficial commerce which it carries on to the principal ports in the East Indies, and China, and its exclusive trade to Acapulco, the returns for which, being made in silver, are, upon the lowest valuation, not less than three millions of dollars per annum.

On this scheme Sir Charles Wager was so intent that in a few days after this first conference, that is, on November 18, Mr. Anson received an order to take under his command the *Argyle*, *Severn*, *Pearl*, *Wager*, and *Tryal* sloop; and other orders were issued to him in the same month, and in the December following, relating to the victualling of this squadron. But Mr. Anson attending the Admiralty the beginning of January, he was informed by Sir Charles Wager that for reasons with which he, Sir Charles, was not acquainted, the expedition to Manila was laid aside. It may be conceived that Mr. Anson was extremely chagrined at the losing the command of so infallible, so honourable, and in every respect, so desirable an enterprize, especially too as he had already, at a very great expence, made the necessary provision for his own accommodation in this voyage, which he had reason to expect would prove a very long one. However, Sir Charles, to render his disappointment in some degree more tolerable, informed him that the expedition to the

South Seas was still intended, and that he, Mr. Anson, and his squadron, as their first destination was now countermanded, should be employed in that service. And on the 10th of January he received his commission, appointing him commander-in-chief of the forementioned squadron, which (the *Argyle* being in the course of their preparation changed for the *Gloucester*) was the same he sailed with above eight months after from St. Helens. On this change of destination, the equipment of the squadron was still prosecuted with as much vigour as ever, and the victualling, and whatever depended on the commodore, was soon so far advanced that he conceived the ships might be capable of putting to sea the instant he should receive his final orders, of which he was in daily expectation. And at last, on the 28th of June 1740, the Duke of Newcastle, principal Secretary of State, delivered to him his Majesty's instructions, dated January 31, 1739, with an additional instruction from the Lords Justices, dated June 19, 1740. On the receipt of these, Mr. Anson immediately repaired to Spithead, with a resolution to sail with the first fair wind, flattering himself that all his difficulties were now at an end. For though he knew by the musters that his squadron wanted three hundred seamen of their complement (a deficiency which, with all its assiduity, he had not been able to get supplied), yet, as Sir Charles Wager informed him, that an order from the Board of Admiralty was dispatched to Sir John Norris to spare him the numbers which he wanted, he doubted not of its being complied with. But on his arrival at

Portsmouth, he found himself greatly mistaken, and disappointed in this persuasion; for on his application, Sir John Norris told him he could spare him none, for he wanted men for his own fleet. This occasioned an inevitable and a very considerable delay; for it was the end of July before this deficiency was by any means supplied, and all that was then done was extremely short of his necessities and expectation. For Admiral Balchen, who succeeded to the command at Spithead, after Sir John Norris had sailed to the westward, instead of three hundred able sailors, which Mr. Anson wanted of his complement, ordered on board the squadron a hundred and seventy men only; of which thirty-two were from the hospital and sick quarter, thirty-seven from the *Salisbury*, with three officers of Colonel Lowther's regiment, and ninety-eight marines, and these were all that were ever granted to make up the forementioned deficiency.

But the commodore's mortification did not end here. It has been already observed that it was at first intended that Colonel Bland's regiment, and three independent companies of a hundred men each, should embark as land-forces on board the squadron. But this disposition was now changed, and all the land-forces that were to be allowed were five hundred invalids to be collected from the out-pensioners of Chelsea College. As these out-pensioners consist of soldiers who from their age, wounds, or other infirmities, are incapable of service in marching regiments, Mr. Anson was greatly chagrined at having such a decrepid detachment allotted him; for he was fully persuaded

that the greatest part of them would perish long before they arrived at the scene of action, since the delays he had already encountered necessarily confined his passage round Cape Horn to the most rigorous season of the year. Sir Charles Wager too joined in opinion with the commodore, that invalids were no ways proper for this service, and solicited strenuously to have them exchanged: but he was told that persons who were supposed to be better judges of soldiers than he or Mr. Anson, thought them the properest men that could be employed on this occasion. And upon this determination they were ordered on board the squadron on the 5th of August; but instead of five hundred, there came on board no more than two hundred and fifty-nine; for all those who had limbs and strength to walk out of Portsmouth deserted, leaving behind them only such as were literally invalids, most of them being sixty years of age, and some of them upwards of seventy. Indeed it is difficult to conceive a more moving scene than the embarkation of these unhappy veterans: they were themselves extremely averse to the service they were engaged in, and fully apprised of all the disasters they were afterwards exposed to; the apprehensions of which were strongly marked by the concern that appeared in their countenances, which was mixed with no small degree of indignation, to be thus hurried from their repose into a fatiguing employ, to which neither the strength of their bodies, nor the vigour of their minds, were any ways proportioned, and where, without seeing the face of an enemy, or in the least promoting the success of the enterprize,

they would, in all probability, uselessly perish by lingering and painful diseases; and this too after they had spent the activity and strength of their youth in their country's service.

I cannot but observe, on this melancholy incident, how extremely unfortunate it was, both to this aged and diseased detachment, and to the expedition they were employed in, that amongst all the out-pensioners of Chelsea Hospital, which were supposed to amount to two thousand men, the most crazy and infirm only should be culled out for so laborious and perilous an undertaking. For it was well known that however unfit invalids in general might be for this service, yet by a prudent choice there might have been found amongst them five hundred men who had some remains of vigour left: and Mr. Anson fully expected that the best of them would have been allotted him; whereas the whole detachment that was sent to him seemed to be made up of the most decrepid and miserable objects that could be collected out of the whole body; and by the desertion above-mentioned, these were a second time cleared of that little health and strength which were to be found amongst them, and he was to take up with such as were much fitter for an infirmary than for any military duty.

And here it is necessary to mention another material particular in the equipment of this squadron. It was proposed to Mr. Anson, after it was resolved that he should be sent to the South Seas, to take with him two persons under the denomination of Agent Victuallers. Those who were mentioned for this employment

had formerly been in the Spanish West Indies, in the South Sea Company's service, and it was supposed that by their knowledge and intelligence on that coast they might often procure provisions for him by compact with the inhabitants, when it was not to be got by force of arms: these agent victuallers were, for this purpose, to be allowed to carry to the value of £15,000 in merchandize on board the squadron; for they had represented that it would be much easier for them to procure provisions with goods than with the value of the same goods in money. Whatever colours were given to this scheme, it was difficult to persuade the generality of mankind that it was not principally intended for the enrichment of the agents, by the beneficial commerce they proposed to carry on upon that coast. Mr. Anson from the beginning objected both to the appointment of agent victuallers and the allowing them to carry a cargo on board the squadron: for he conceived that in those few amicable ports where the squadron might touch, he needed not their assistance to contract for any provisions the place afforded; and on the enemy's coast, he did not imagine that they could ever procure him the necessaries he should want, unless (which he was resolved not to comply with) the military operations of his squadron were to be regulated by the ridiculous views of their trading projects. All that he thought the government ought to have done on this occasion was to put on board to the value of £2000 or £3000 only of such goods as the Indians or the Spanish planters in the less cultivated part of the coast might be tempted with; since it was in such places only

that he imagined it would be worth while to truck with the enemy for provisions: and in these places it was sufficiently evident a very small cargo would suffice.

But though the commodore objected both to the appointment of these officers and to their project, of the success of which he had no opinion; yet, as they had insinuated that their scheme, besides victualling their squadron, might contribute to settling a trade upon that coast, which might be afterwards carried on without difficulty, and might thereby prove a very considerable national advantage, they were much listened to by some considerable persons: and of the £15,000 which was to be the amount of their cargo, the government agreed to advance them 10,000 upon imprest, and the remaining 5000 they raised on bottomry bonds; and the goods purchased by this sum were all that were taken to sea by the squadron, how much soever the amount of them might be afterwards magnified by common report.

This cargo was at first shipped on board the *Wager* storeship, and one of the victuallers; no part of it being admitted on board the men-of-war. But when the commodore was at St. Catherine's, he considered that in case the squadron should be separated, it might be pretended that some of the ships were disappointed of provisions for want of a cargo to truck with, and therefore he distributed some of the least bulky commodities on board the men-of-war, leaving the remainder principally on board the *Wager*, where it was lost; and more of the goods perishing by

various accidents to be recited hereafter, and no part of them being disposed of upon the coast, the few that came home to England did not produce, when sold, above a fourth part of the original price. So true was the commodore's judgment of the event of this project, which had been by many considered as infallibly productive of immense gains. But to return to the transactions at Portsmouth.

To supply the place of the two hundred and forty invalids which had deserted, as is mentioned above, there were ordered on board two hundred and ten marines detached from different regiments. These were raw and undisciplined men, for they were just raised, and had scarcely anything more of the soldier than their regimentals, none of them having been so far trained as to be permitted to fire. The last detachment of these marines came on board the 8th of August, and on the 10th the squadron sailed from Spithead to St. Helens, there to wait for a wind to proceed on the expedition.

But the delays we had already suffered had not yet spent all their influence, for we were now advanced into a season of the year when the westerly winds are usually very constant, and very violent; and it was thought proper that we should put to sea in company with the fleet commanded by Admiral Balchen, and the expedition under Lord Cathcart. As we made up in all twenty-one men-of-war, and a hundred and twenty-four sail of merchant-men and transports, we had no hopes of getting out of the Channel with so large a number of ships without the

continuance of a fair wind for some considerable time. This was what we had every day less and less reason to expect, as the time of the equinox drew near; so that our golden dreams and our ideal possession of the Peruvian treasures grew each day more faint, and the difficulties and dangers of the passage round Cape Horn in the winter season filled our imaginations in their room. For it was forty days from our arrival at St. Helens, to our final departure from thence: and even then (having orders to proceed without Lord Cathcart) we tided it down the Channel with a contrary wind. But this interval of forty days was not free from the displeasing fatigue of often setting sail, and being as often obliged to return; nor exempt from dangers, greater than have been sometimes undergone in surrounding the globe. For the wind coming fair for the first time, on the 23d of August, we got under sail, and Mr. Balchen shewed himself truly solicitous to have proceeded to sea, but the wind soon returning to its old quarter obliged us to put back to St. Helens, not without considerable hazard, and some damage received by two of the transports, who, in tacking, ran foul of each other. Besides this, we made two or three more attempts to sail, but without any better success. And, on the 6th of September, being returned to an anchor at St. Helens, after one of these fruitless efforts, the wind blew so fresh that the whole fleet struck their yards and topmasts to prevent driving: yet, notwithstanding this precaution, the *Centurion* drove the next evening, and brought both cables ahead, and we were in no small danger of driving foul of the

Prince Frederick, a seventy gun ship, moored at a small distance under our stern; though we happily escaped, by her driving at the same time, and so preserving her distance: but we did not think ourselves secure till we at last let go the sheet-anchor, which fortunately brought us up. However, on the 9th of September, we were in some degree relieved from this lingering vexatious situation, by an order which Mr. Anson received from the Lords Justices, to put to sea the first opportunity with his own squadron only, if Lord Cathcart should not be ready. Being thus freed from the troublesome company of so large a fleet, our commodore resolved to weigh and tide it down the Channel, as soon as the weather should become sufficiently moderate; and this might easily have been done with our own squadron alone full two months sooner, had the orders of the Admiralty, for supplying us with seamen, been punctually complied with, and had we met with none of those other delays mentioned in this narration. It is true, our hopes of a speedy departure were even now somewhat damped by a subsequent order which Mr. Anson received on the 12th of September; for by that he was required to take under his convoy the *St. Albans*, with the Turkey fleet, and to join the *Dragon* and the *Winchester*, with the Streights and the American trade, at Torbay or Plymouth, and to proceed with them to sea as far as their way and ours lay together. This incumbrance of a convoy gave us some uneasiness, as we feared it might prove the means of lengthening our passage to the Maderas. However, Mr. Anson, now having the command himself, resolved to adhere to

his former determination, and to tide it down the Channel with the first moderate weather; and that the junction of his convoy might occasion as little loss of time as possible, he immediately sent directions to Torbay that the fleets he was there to take under his care might be in a readiness to join him instantly on his approach. And at last, on the 18th of September, he weighed from St. Helens; and though the wind was at first contrary, had the good fortune to get clear of the Channel in four days, as will be more particularly related in the ensuing chapter.

Having thus gone through the respective steps taken in the equipment of this squadron, it is sufficiently obvious how different an aspect this expedition bore at its first appointment in the beginning of January, from what it had in the latter end of September, when it left the Channel; and how much its numbers, its strength, and the probability of its success were diminished by the various incidents which took place in that interval. For instead of having all our old and ordinary seamen exchanged for such as were young and able (which the commodore was at first promised) and having our numbers completed to their full complement, we were obliged to retain our first crews, which were very indifferent; and a deficiency of three hundred men in our numbers was no otherwise made up to us than by sending us on board a hundred and seventy men, the greatest part composed of such as were discharged from hospitals, or new-raised marines who had never been at sea before. And in the land-forces allotted to us, the change was still more disadvantageous; for there,

instead of three independent companies of a hundred men each, and Bland's regiment of foot, which was an old one, we had only four hundred and seventy invalids and marines, one part of them incapable of action by their age and infirmities, and the other part useless by their ignorance of their duty. But the diminishing the strength of the squadron was not the greatest inconveniency which attended these alterations; for the contests, representations, and difficulties which they continually produced (as we have above seen, that in these cases the authority of the Admiralty was not always submitted to) occasioned a delay and waste of time, which in its consequences was the source of all the disasters to which this enterprise was afterwards exposed: for by this means we were obliged to make our passage round Cape Horn in the most tempestuous season of the year; whence proceeded the separation of our squadron, the loss of numbers of our men, and the imminent hazard of our total destruction. By this delay, too, the enemy had been so well informed of our designs, that a person who had been employed in the South Sea Company's service, and arrived from Panama three or four days before we left Portsmouth, was able to relate to Mr. Anson most of the particulars of the destination and strength of our squadron, from what he had learnt amongst the Spaniards before he left them. And this was afterwards confirmed by a more extraordinary circumstance: For we shall find that, when the Spaniards (fully satisfied that our expedition was intended for the South Seas) had fitted out a squadron to oppose us, which had

so far got the start of us, as to arrive before us off the island of Madera, the commander of this squadron was so well instructed in the form and make of Mr. Anson's broad pendant, and had imitated it so exactly, that he thereby decoyed the *Pearl*, one of our squadron, within gun-shot of him, before the captain of the *Pearl* was able to discover his mistake.

CHAPTER II

THE PASSAGE FROM ST. HELENS TO THE ISLAND OF MADERA; WITH A SHORT ACCOUNT OF THAT ISLAND, AND OF OUR STAY THERE

On the 18th of September 1740, the squadron, as we have observed in the preceding chapter, weighed from St. Helens with a contrary wind, the commodore proposing to tide it down the Channel, as he dreaded less the inconveniences he should thereby have to struggle with, than the risk he should run of ruining the enterprise by an uncertain, and, in all probability, a tedious attendance for a fair wind.

The squadron allotted to this service consisted of five men-of-war, a sloop of war and two victualling ships. They were the *Centurion* of sixty guns, four hundred men, George Anson, Esq., commander; the *Gloucester* of fifty guns, three hundred men, Richard Norris, commander; the *Severn* of fifty guns, three hundred men, the Honourable Edward Legg, commander; the *Pearl* of forty guns, two hundred and fifty men, Matthew Mitchel, commander; the *Wager* of twenty-eight guns, one hundred and sixty men, Dandy Kidd, commander; and the *Tryal* sloop of eight guns, one hundred men, the Honourable John

Murray, commander; the two victuallers were pinks, the largest of about four hundred, and the other of about two hundred tons burthen. These were to attend us till the provisions we had taken on board were so far consumed as to make room for the additional quantity they carried with them, which, when we had taken into our ships, they were to be discharged. Besides the complement of men borne by the above-mentioned ships as their crews, there were embarked on board the squadron about four hundred and seventy invalids and marines, under the denomination of land forces (as has been particularly mentioned in the preceding chapter) which were commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Cracherode. With this squadron, together with the *St. Albans* and the *Lark*, and the trade under their convoy, Mr. Anson, after weighing from St. Helen's, tided it down the Channel for the first forty-eight hours; and, on the 20th, in the morning, we discovered off the Ram Head the *Dragon*, *Winchester*, *South Sea Castle*, and *Rye*, with a number of merchantmen under their convoy. These we joined about noon the same day, our commodore having orders to see them (together with the *St. Albans* and *Lark*) as far into the sea as their course and ours lay together. When we came in sight of this last mentioned fleet, Mr. Anson first hoisted his broad pennant, and was saluted by all the men-of-war in company.

When we had joined this last convoy, we made up eleven men-of-war, and about one hundred and fifty sail of merchantmen, consisting of the *Turky*, the *Streights*, and the *American trade*.

Mr. Anson, the same day, made a signal for all the captains of the men-of-war to come on board him, where he delivered them their fighting and sailing instructions, and then, with a fair wind, we all stood towards the south-west; and the next day at noon, being the 21st, we had run forty leagues from the Ram Head. Being now clear of the land, our commodore, to render our view more extensive, ordered Captain Mitchel, in the *Pearl*, to make sail two leagues ahead of the fleet every morning, and to repair to his station every evening. Thus we proceeded till the 25th, when the *Winchester* and the American convoy made the concerted signal for leave to separate, which being answered by the commodore, they left us: as the *St. Albans* and the *Dragon*, with the Turkey and Streights convoy, did on the 29th. After which separation, there remained in company only our own squadron and our two victuallers, with which we kept on our course for the island of Madera. But the winds were so contrary that we had the mortification to be forty days in our passage thither from St. Helens, though it is known to be often done in ten or twelve. This delay was a most displeasing circumstance, productive of much discontent and ill-humour amongst our people, of which those only can have a tolerable idea who have had the experience of a like situation. For besides the peevishness and despondency which foul and contrary winds and a lingering voyage never fail to create on all occasions, we, in particular, had very substantial reasons to be greatly alarmed at this unexpected impediment. Since as we had departed from England much later than we ought

to have done, we had placed almost all our hopes of success in the chance of retrieving in some measure at sea the time we had so unhappily wasted at Spithead and St. Helens. However, at last, on Monday, October the 25th, at five in the morning, we, to our great joy, made the land, and in the afternoon came to an anchor in Madera Road, in forty fathom water; the Brazen Head bearing from us E. by S. the Loo N.N.W. and great church N.N.E. We had hardly let go our anchor when an English privateer sloop ran under our stern and saluted the commodore with nine guns, which we returned with five. And, the next day, the consul of the island visiting the commodore, we saluted him with nine guns on his coming on board.

This island of Madera, where we are now arrived, is famous through all our American settlements for its excellent wines, which seem to be designed by Providence for the refreshment of the inhabitants of the torrid zone. It is situated in a fine climate, in the latitude of $32^{\circ} 27'$ north; and in the longitude from London (by our different reckonings) of $18\text{-}\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ to $19\text{-}\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ west, though laid down in the charts in 17° . It is composed of one continued hill, of a considerable height, extending itself from east to west: the declivity of which, on the south side, is cultivated and interspersed with vineyards: and in the midst of this slope the merchants have fixed their country seats, which help to form a very agreeable prospect. There is but one considerable town in the whole island; it is named Fonchiale, and is seated on the south part of the island, at the bottom of a large bay. Towards

the sea, it is defended by a high wall, with a battery of cannon, besides a castle on the Loo, which is a rock standing in the water at a small distance from the shore. Fonchiale is the only place of trade, and indeed the only place where it is possible for a boat to land. And even here the beach is covered with large stones, and a violent surf continually beats upon it; so that the commodore did not care to venture the ships' long-boats to fetch the water off, there was so much danger of their being lost; and therefore ordered the captains of the squadron to employ Portuguese boats on that service.

We continued about a week at this island, watering our ships, and providing the squadron with wine and other refreshments. Here on the 3d of November, Captain Richard Norris signified by a letter to the commodore, his desire to quit his command on board the *Gloucester* in order to return to England for the recovery of his health. This request the commodore complied with; and thereupon was pleased to appoint Captain Matthew Mitchel to command the *Gloucester* in his room, and to remove Captain Kidd from the *Wager* to the *Pearl*, and Captain Murray from the *Tryal* sloop to the *Wager*, giving command of the *Tryal* to Lieutenant Cheap. These promotions being settled, with other changes in the lieutenancies, the commodore, on the following day, gave to the captains their orders, appointing St. Jago, one of the Cape de Verd Islands, to be the first place of rendezvous in case of separation; and directing them, if they did not meet the *Centurion* there, to make the best of their way to the island of St.

Catherine's, on the coast of Brazil. The water for the squadron being the same day compleated, and each ship supplied with as much wine and other refreshments as they could take in, we weighed anchor in the afternoon, and took our leave of the island of Madera. But before I go on with the narration of our own transactions, I think it necessary to give some account of the proceedings of the enemy, and of the measures they had taken to render all our designs abortive.

When Mr. Anson visited the governor of Madera, he received information from him that for three or four days, in the latter end of October, there had appeared to the westward of that island, seven or eight ships of the line, and a patache, which last was sent every day close in to make the land. The governor assured the commodore, upon his honour, that none upon the island had either given them intelligence, or had in any sort communicated with them, but that he believed them to be either French or Spanish, but was rather inclined to think them Spanish. On this intelligence Mr. Anson sent an officer in a clean sloop, eight leagues to the westward, to reconnoitre them, and, if possible, to discover what they were: but the officer returned without being able to get a sight of them, so that we still remained in uncertainty. However, we could not but conjecture that this fleet was intended to put a stop to our expedition, which, had they cruised to the eastward of the island instead of the westward, they could not but have executed with great facility. For as, in that case, they must have certainly fallen in

with us, we should have been obliged to throw overboard vast quantities of provision to clear our ships for an engagement; and this alone, without any regard to the event of the action, would have effectually prevented our progress. This was so obvious a measure that we could not help imagining reasons which might have prevented them from pursuing it. And we therefore supposed that this French or Spanish squadron was sent out, upon advice of our sailing in company with Admiral Balchen and Lord Cathcart's expedition: and thence, from an apprehension of being overmatched, they might not think it adviseable to meet with us till we had parted company, which they might judge would not happen before our arrival at this island. These were our speculations at that time, and from hence we had reason to suppose that we might still fall in with them in our way to the Cape de Verd Islands. We afterwards, in the course of our expedition, were persuaded that this was the Spanish squadron, commanded by Don Joseph Pizarro, which was sent out purposely to traverse the views and enterprizes of our squadron, to which in strength they were greatly superior. As this Spanish armament then was so nearly connected with our expedition, and as the catastrophe it underwent, though not effected by our force, was yet a considerable advantage to this nation, produced in consequence of our equipment, I have, in the following chapter, given a summary account of their proceedings, from their first setting out from Spain in the year 1740, till the *Asia*, the only ship of the whole squadron which

returned to Europe, arrived at the Groyne in the beginning of the year 1746.

CHAPTER III

THE HISTORY OF THE SPANISH SQUADRON COMMANDED BY DON JOSEPH PIZARRO

The squadron fitted out by the court of Spain to attend our motions, and traverse our projects, we supposed to have been the ships seen off Madera, as mentioned in the preceding chapter. As this force was sent out particularly against our expedition, I cannot but imagine that the following history of the casualties it met with, as far as by intercepted letters and other information the same has come to my knowledge, is a very essential part of the present work. For hence it will appear that we were the occasion that a considerable part of the naval power of Spain was diverted from the prosecution of the ambitious views of that court in Europe. And whatever men and ships were lost by the enemy in this undertaking, were lost in consequence of the precautions they took to secure themselves against our enterprizes.

This squadron (besides two ships intended for the West Indies, which did not part company till after they had left the Maderas) was composed of the following men-of-war, commanded by Don Joseph Pizarro: —

The *Asia* of sixty-six guns, and seven hundred men; this was

the admiral's ship.

The *Guipuscoa* of seventy-four guns, and seven hundred men.

The *Hermiona* of fifty-four guns, and five hundred men.

The *Esperanza* of fifty guns, and four hundred and fifty men.

The *St. Estevan* of forty guns, and three hundred and fifty men.

And a patache of twenty guns.

These ships, over and above their complement of sailors and marines, had on board an old Spanish regiment of foot, intended to reinforce the garisons on the coast of the South Seas. When this fleet had cruised for some days to the leeward of the Maderas, as is mentioned in the preceding chapter, they left that station in the beginning of November, and steered for the river of Plate, where they arrived the 5th of January, O.S., and coming to an anchor in the bay of Maldonado, at the mouth of that river, their admiral Pizarro sent immediately to Buenos Ayres for a supply of provisions; for they had departed from Spain with only four months' provisions on board. While they lay here expecting this supply, they received intelligence, by the treachery of the Portuguese governor of St. Catherine's, of Mr. Anson's having arrived at that island on the 21st of December preceding, and of his preparing to put to sea again with the utmost expedition. Pizarro, notwithstanding his superior force, had his reasons (and as some say, his orders, likewise) for avoiding our squadron anywhere short of the South Seas. He was besides extremely desirous of getting round Cape Horn before us, as he imagined that step alone would effectually baffle

all our designs; and therefore, on hearing that we were in his neighbourhood, and that we should soon be ready to proceed for Cape Horn, he weighed anchor with the five large ships (the patache being disabled and condemned, and the men taken out of her), after a stay of seventeen days only, and got under sail without his provisions, which arrived at Maldonado within a day or two after his departure. But notwithstanding the precipitation with which he departed, we put to sea from St. Catherine's four days before him, and in some part of our passage to Cape Horn the two squadrons were so near together that the *Pearl*, one of our ships, being separated from the rest, fell in with the Spanish fleet, and mistaking the *Asia* for the *Centurion*, had got within gun-shot of Pizarro before she discovered her error, and narrowly escaped being taken.

It being the 22d of January when the Spaniards weighed from Maldonado (as has been already mentioned), they could not expect to get into the latitude of Cape Horn before the equinox; and as they had reason to apprehend very tempestuous weather in doubling it at that season, and as the Spanish sailors, being for the most part accustomed to a fair weather country, might be expected to be very averse to so dangerous and fatiguing a navigation, the better to encourage them, some part of their pay was advanced to them in European goods, which they were to be permitted to dispose of in the South Seas, that so the hopes of the great profit each man was to make on his venture might animate him in his duty, and render him less disposed to repine at the

labour, the hardships, and the perils he would in all probability meet with before his arrival on the coast of Peru.

Pizarro with his squadron having, towards the latter end of February, run the length of Cape Horn, he then stood to the westward, in order to double it; but in the night of the last day of February, O.S., while with this view they were turning to windward, the *Guipuscoa*, the *Hermiona*, and the *Esperanza* were separated from the admiral; and, on the 6th of March following, the *Guipuscoa* was separated from the other two; and, on the 7th (being the day after we had passed Streights le Maire), there came on a most furious storm at N.W. which, in despite of all their efforts, drove the whole squadron to the eastward, and after several fruitless attempts, obliged them to bear away for the river of Plate, where Pizarro in the *Asia* arrived about the middle of May, and a few days after him the *Esperanza* and the *Estevan*. The *Hermiona* was supposed to founder at sea, for she was never heard of more; and the *Guipuscoa* was run on shore and sunk on the coast of Brazil. The calamities of all kinds which this squadron underwent in this unsuccessful navigation can only be paralleled by what we ourselves experienced in the same climate, when buffeted by the same storms. There was indeed some diversity in our distresses, which rendered it difficult to decide whose situation was most worthy of commiseration. For to all the misfortunes we had in common with each other, as shattered rigging, leaky ships, and the fatigues and despondency which necessarily attend these disasters, there was superadded on board

our squadron the ravage of a most destructive and incurable disease, and on board the Spanish squadron the devastation of famine.

For this squadron, either from the hurry of their outset, their presumption of a supply at Buenos Ayres, or from other less obvious motives, departed from Spain, as has been already observed, with no more than four months' provision on board, and even that, as it is said, at short allowance only; so that, when by the storms they met with off Cape Horn their continuance at sea was prolonged a month or more beyond their expectation, they were reduced to such infinite distress, that rats, when they could be caught, were sold for four dollars apiece; and a sailor who died on board had his death concealed for some days by his brother, who during that time lay in the same hammock with the corpse, only to receive the dead man's allowance of provisions. In this dreadful situation they were alarmed (if their horrors were capable of augmentation) by the discovery of a conspiracy among the marines on board the *Asia*, the admiral's ship. This had taken its rise chiefly from the miseries they endured: for though no less was proposed by the conspirators than the massacring the officers and the whole crew, yet their motive for this bloody resolution seemed to be no more than their desire of relieving their hunger by appropriating the whole ship's provisions to themselves. But their designs were prevented, when just upon the point of execution, by means of one of their confessors; and three of their ringleaders were immediately put

to death. However, though the conspiracy was suppressed, their other calamities admitted of no alleviation, but grew each day more and more destructive. So that by the complicated distress of fatigue, sickness, and hunger, the three ships which escaped lost the greatest part of their men. The *Asia*, their admiral's ship, arrived at Monte Vedio, in the river of Plate, with half her crew only; the *St. Estevan* had lost, in like manner, half her hands when she anchored in the bay of Barragan; the *Esperanza*, a fifty-gun ship, was still more unfortunate; for of four hundred and fifty hands which she brought from Spain, only fifty-eight remained alive, and the whole regiment of foot perished except sixty men. But to give the reader a more distinct and particular idea of what they underwent upon this occasion, I shall lay before him a short account of the fate of the *Guipuscoa*, extracted from a letter written by Don Joseph Mendinuetta, her captain, to a person of distinction at Lima, a copy of which fell into our hands afterwards in the South Seas.

He mentions that he separated from the *Hermiona* and the *Esperanza* in a fog on the 6th of March, being then, as I suppose, to the S.E. of Staten-land, and plying to the westward; that in the night after it blew a furious storm at N.W. which, at half an hour after ten, split his main-sail, and obliged him to bear away with his fore-sail; that the ship went ten knots an hour with a prodigious sea, and often run her gangway under water; that he likewise sprung his mainmast; and the ship made so much water, that with four pumps and bailing he could not free her.

That on the 9th it was calm, but the sea continued so high that the ship in rolling opened all her upper works and seams, and started the butt ends of her planking, and the greatest part of her top timbers, the bolts being drawn by the violence of her roll: that in this condition, with other additional disasters to the hull and rigging, they continued beating to the westward till the 12th: that they were then in sixty degrees of south latitude, in great want of provisions, numbers every day perishing by the fatigue of pumping, and those who survived being quite dispirited by labour, hunger, and the severity of the weather, they having two spans of snow upon the decks: that then finding the wind fixed in the western quarter, and blowing strong, and consequently their passage to the westward impossible, they resolved to bear away for the river of Plate: that on the 22d they were obliged to throw overboard all the upper-deck guns and an anchor, and to take six turns of the cable round the ship to prevent her opening: that on the 4th of April, it being calm, but a very high sea, the ship rolled so much that the main-mast came by the board, and in a few hours after she lost, in like manner, her fore-mast and her mizen-mast: and that, to accumulate their misfortunes, they were soon obliged to cut away their bowsprit, to diminish, if possible, the leakage at her head; that by this time he had lost two hundred and fifty men by hunger and fatigue; for those who were capable of working at the pumps (at which every officer without exception took his turn) were allowed only an ounce and half of biscuit per diem; and those who were so sick or so weak that they could

not assist in this necessary labour, had no more than an ounce of wheat; so that it was common for the men to fall down dead at the pumps: that, including the officers, they could only muster from eighty to a hundred persons capable of duty: that the south-west winds blew so fresh after they had lost their masts, that they could not immediately set up jury-masts, but were obliged to drive like a wreck, between the latitudes of 32 and 28, till the 24th of April, when they made the coast of Brazil at Rio de Patas, ten leagues to the southward of the island of St. Catherine's; that here they came to an anchor, and that the captain was very desirous of proceeding to St. Catherine's, if possible, in order to save the hull of the ship, and the guns and stores on board her; but the crew instantly left off pumping, and being enraged at the hardships they had suffered, and the numbers they had lost (there being at that time no less than thirty dead bodies lying on the deck), they all with one voice cried out, "On shore, on shore!" and obliged the captain to run the ship in directly for the land, where, the 5th day after, she sunk with her stores and all her furniture on board her; but the remainder of the crew, whom hunger and fatigue had spared, to the number of four hundred, got safe on shore.

From this account of the adventures and catastrophe of the *Guipuscoa* we may form some conjecture of the manner in which the *Hermiona* was lost, and of the distresses endured by the three remaining ships of the squadron, which got into the river of Plate. These last being in great want of masts, yards, rigging, and all kinds of naval stores, and having no supply at Buenos Ayres, nor

in any of their neighbouring settlements, Pizarro dispatched an advice-boat with a letter of credit to Rio Janeiro, to purchase what was wanting from the Portuguese. He, at the same time, sent an express across the continent to St. Jago in Chili, to be thence forwarded to the Viceroy of Peru, informing him of the disasters that had befallen his squadron, and desiring a remittance of 200,000 dollars from the royal chests at Lima, to enable him to victual and refit his remaining ships, that he might be again in a condition to attempt the passage to the South Seas, as soon as the season of the year should be more favourable. It is mentioned by the Spaniards as a most extraordinary circumstance that the Indian charged with this express (though it was then the depth of winter, when the Cordilleras are esteemed impassable on account of the snow) was only thirteen days in his journey from Buenos Ayres to St. Jago in Chili, though these places are distant three hundred Spanish leagues, near forty of which are amongst the snows and precipices of the Cordilleras.

The return to this dispatch of Pizarro's from the Viceroy of Peru was no ways favourable; instead of 200,000 dollars, the sum demanded, the viceroy remitted him only 100,000, telling him that it was with great difficulty he was able to procure him even that: though the inhabitants of Lima, who considered the presence of Pizarro as absolutely necessary to their security, were much discontented at this procedure, and did not fail to assert that it was not the want of money, but the interested views of some of the viceroy's confidants, that prevented Pizarro from

having the whole sum he had asked for.

The advice-boat sent to Rio Janeiro also executed her commission but imperfectly; for though she brought back a considerable quantity of pitch, tar, and cordage, yet she could not procure either masts or yards: and, as an additional misfortune, Pizarro was disappointed of some masts he expected from Paragua; for a carpenter, whom he had entrusted with a large sum of money, and had sent there to cut masts, instead of prosecuting the business he was employed in, had married in the country, and refused to return. However, by removing the masts of the *Esperanza* into the *Asia*, and making use of what spare masts and yards they had on board, they made a shift to refit the *Asia* and the *St. Estevan*. And in the October following, Pizarro was preparing to put to sea with these two ships, in order to attempt the passage round Cape Horn a second time, but the *St. Estevan*, in coming down the river Plate, ran on a shoal, and beat off her rudder, on which and other damages she received she was condemned and broke up, and Pizarro in the *Asia* proceeded to sea without her. Having now the summer before him, and the winds favourable, no doubt was made of his having a fortunate and speedy passage; but being off Cape Horn, and going right before the wind in very moderate weather, though in a swelling sea, by some misconduct of the officer of the watch, the ship rolled away her masts, and was a second time obliged to put back to the river of Plate in great distress.

The *Asia* having considerably suffered in this second

unfortunate expedition, the *Esperanza*, which had been left behind at Monte Vedio, was ordered to be refitted, and the command of her being given to Mindinuetta, who was captain of the *Guipuscoa* when she was lost; he, in the November of the succeeding year, that is, in November 1742, sailed from the river of Plate for the South Seas, and arrived safe on the coast of Chili, where his commodore, Pizarro, passing overland from Buenos Ayres, met him. There were great animosities and contests between these two gentlemen at their meeting, occasioned principally by the claim of Pizarro to command the *Esperanza*, which Mindinuetta had brought round; for Mindinuetta refused to deliver her up to him, insisting that, as he came into the South Seas alone and under no superior, it was not now in the power of Pizarro to resume that authority which he had once parted with. However, the President of Chili interposing, and declaring for Pizarro, Mindinuetta, after a long and obstinate struggle, was obliged to submit.

But Pizarro had not yet compleated the series of his adventures, for when he and Mindinuetta came back by land from Chili to Buenos Ayres, in the year 1745, they found at Monte Vedio the *Asia*, which near three years before they had left there.

This ship they resolved, if possible, to carry to Europe; and with this view they refitted her in the best manner they could; but their great difficulty was to procure a sufficient number of hands to navigate her, for all the remaining sailors of the squadron to be

met with in the neighbourhood of Buenos Ayres did not amount to a hundred men. They endeavoured to supply this defect by pressing many of the inhabitants of Buenos Ayres, and putting on board besides all the English prisoners then in their custody, together with a number of Portuguese smugglers which they had taken at different times, and some of the Indians of the country. Among these last there was a chief and ten of his followers which had been surprised by a party of Spanish soldiers about three months before. The name of this chief was Orellana; he belonged to a very powerful tribe which had committed great ravages in the neighbourhood of Buenos Ayres. With this motley crew (all of them, except the European Spaniards, extremely averse to the voyage) Pizarro set sail from Monte Vedio in the river of Plate, about the beginning of November 1745; and the native Spaniards, being no strangers to the dissatisfaction of their forced men, treated both those, the English prisoners, and the Indians, with great insolence and barbarity, but more particularly the Indians, for it was common for the meanest officers in the ship to beat them most cruelly on the slightest pretences, and oftentimes only to exert their superiority. Orellana and his followers, though in appearance sufficiently patient and submissive, meditated a severe revenge for all these inhumanities. As he conversed very well in Spanish (these Indians having, in time of peace, a great intercourse with Buenos Ayres) he affected to talk with such of the English as understood that language, and seemed very desirous of being informed how many Englishmen there were on

board, and which they were. As he knew that the English were as much enemies to the Spaniards as himself, he had doubtless an intention of disclosing his purposes to them, and making them partners in the scheme he had projected for revenging his wrongs, and recovering his liberty; but having sounded them at a distance, and not finding them so precipitate and vindictive as he expected, he proceeded no further with them, but resolved to trust alone to the resolution of his ten faithful followers. These, it should seem, readily engaged to observe his directions, and to execute whatever commands he gave them; and having agreed on the measures necessary to be taken, they first furnished themselves with Dutch knives sharp at the point, which being common knives used in the ship, they found no difficulty in procuring: besides this, they employed their leisure in secretly cutting out thongs from raw hides, of which there were great numbers on board, and in fixing to each end of these thongs the double-headed shot of the small quarter-deck guns; this, when swung round their heads, according to the practice of their country, was a most mischievous weapon, in the use of which the Indians about Buenos Ayres are trained from their infancy, and consequently are extremely expert. These particulars being in good forwardness, the execution of their scheme was perhaps precipitated by a particular outrage committed on Orellana himself. For one of the officers, who was a very brutal fellow, ordered Orellana aloft, which being what he was incapable of performing, the officer, under pretence of his disobedience, beat

him with such violence, that he left him bleeding on the deck, and stupified for some time with his bruises and wounds. This usage undoubtedly heightened his thirst for revenge, and made him eager and impatient, till the means of executing it were in his power; so that within a day or two after this incident, he and his followers opened their desperate resolves in the ensuing manner.

It was about nine in the evening, when many of the principal officers were on the quarter-deck, indulging in the freshness of the night air; the waste of the ship was filled with live cattle, and the fore-castle was manned with its customary watch. Orellana and his companions, under cover of the night, having prepared their weapons, and thrown off their trousers and the more cumbrous part of their dress, came all together on the quarter-deck, and drew towards the door of the great cabin. The boatswain immediately reprimanded them and ordered them to be gone. On this Orellana spoke to his followers in his native language, when four of them drew off, two towards each gangway, and the chief and the six remaining Indians seemed to be slowly quitting the quarter-deck. When the detached Indians had taken possession of the gangway, Orellana placed his hands hollow to his mouth, and bellowed out the war-cry used by those savages, which is said to be the harshest and most terrifying sound known in nature. This hideous yell was the signal for beginning the massacre: For on this they all drew their knives, and brandished their prepared double-headed shot; and the six with their chief, which remained on the quarter-

deck, immediately fell on the Spaniards who were intermingled with them, and laid near forty of them at their feet, of which above twenty were killed on the spot, and the rest disabled. Many of the officers, in the beginning of the tumult, pushed into the great cabin, where they put out the lights, and barricadoed the door; whilst of the others, who had avoided the first fury of the Indians, some endeavoured to escape along the gangways into the fore-castle, where the Indians, placed on purpose, stabbed the greatest part of them, as they attempted to pass by, or forced them off the gangways into the waste: some threw themselves voluntarily over the barricadoes into the waste, and thought themselves fortunate to lie concealed amongst the cattle. But the greatest part escaped up the main shrouds, and sheltered themselves either in the tops or rigging. And though the Indians attacked only the quarter-deck, yet the watch in the fore-castle finding their communication cut off, and being terrified by the wounds of the few, who, not being killed on the spot, had strength sufficient to force their passage, and not knowing either who their enemies were, or what were their numbers, they likewise gave all over for lost, and in great confusion ran up into the rigging of the fore-mast and bowsprit.

Thus these eleven Indians, with a resolution perhaps without example, possessed themselves almost in an instant of the quarter-deck of a ship mounting sixty-six guns, and man'n'd with near five hundred hands, and continued in peaceable possession of this post a considerable time. For the officers in the great

cabbin (amongst whom were Pizarro and Mindinuetta), the crew between decks, and those who had escaped into the tops and rigging, were only anxious for their own safety, and were for a long time incapable of forming any project for suppressing the insurrection, and recovering the possession of the ship. It is true, the yells of the Indians, the groans of the wounded, and the confused clamours of the crew, all heightened by the obscurity of the night, had at first greatly magnified their danger, and had filled them with the imaginary terrors, which darkness, disorder, and an ignorance of the real strength of an enemy never fail to produce. For as the Spaniards were sensible of the disaffection of their prest hands, and were also conscious of their barbarity to their prisoners, they imagined the conspiracy was general, and considered their own destruction as infallible; so that, it is said, some of them had once taken the resolution of leaping into the sea, but were prevented by their companions.

However, when the Indians had entirely cleared the quarter-deck, the tumult in a great measure subsided, for those who had escaped were kept silent by their fears, and the Indians were incapable of pursuing them to renew the disorder. Orellana, when he saw himself master of the quarter-deck, broke open the arm chest, which, on a slight suspicion of mutiny, had been ordered there a few days before, as to a place of the greatest security. Here he took it for granted he should find cutlasses sufficient for himself and his companions, in the use of which weapon they were all extremely skilful, and with these, it was imagined,

they proposed to have forced the great cabin. But on opening the chest, there appeared nothing but fire-arms, which to them were of no use. There were indeed cutlasses in the chest, but they were hid by the fire-arms being laid over them. This was a sensible disappointment to them, and by this time Pizarro and his companions in the great cabin were capable of conversing aloud through the cabin windows and port-holes with those in the gun-room and between decks, and from thence they learnt that the English (whom they principally suspected) were all safe below, and had not intermeddled in this mutiny; and by other particulars they at last discovered that none were concerned in it but Orellana and his people. On this Pizarro and the officers resolved to attack them on the quarter-deck, before any of the discontented on board should so far recover their first surprize, as to reflect on the facility and certainty of seizing the ship by a junction with the Indians in the present emergency. With this view Pizarro got together what arms were in the cabin, and distributed them to those who were with him. But there were no other fire-arms to be met with but pistols, and for these they had neither powder nor ball. However, having now settled a correspondence with the gun-room, they lowered down a bucket out of the cabin window, into which the gunner, out of one of the gun-room ports, put a quantity of pistol-cartridges. When they had thus procured ammunition, and had loaded their pistols, they set the cabin door partly open, and fired several shots amongst the Indians on the quarter-deck, though at first without

effect. But at last Mindinuetta, whom we have often mentioned, had the good fortune to shoot Orellona dead on the spot; on which his faithful companions, abandoning all thoughts of farther resistance, instantly leaped into the sea, where they every man perished. Thus was this insurrection quelled, and the possession of the quarter-deck regained, after it had been full two hours in the power of this great and daring chief, and his gallant unhappy countrymen.

Pizarro having escaped this imminent peril, steered for Europe, and arrived safe on the coast of Galicia, in the beginning of the year 1746, after having been absent between four and five years, and having, by his attendance on our expedition, diminished the naval power of Spain by above three thousand hands (the flower of their sailors), and by four considerable ships of war and a patache. For we have seen that the *Hermiona* foundered at sea; the *Guipuscoa* was stranded, and sunk on the coast of Brazil; the *St. Estevan* was condemned, and broke up in the river of Plate; and the *Esperanza*, being left in the South Seas, is doubtless by this time incapable of returning to Spain. So that the *Asia*, only, with less than one hundred hands, may be regarded as all the remains of that squadron with which Pizarro first put to sea. And whoever considers the very large proportion, which this squadron bore to the whole navy of Spain, will, I believe, confess, that, had our undertaking been attended with no other advantages than that of ruining so great a part of the sea force of so dangerous an enemy, this alone would be

a sufficient equivalent for our equipment, and an incontestable proof of the service which the nation has thence received. Having thus concluded this summary of Pizarro's adventures, I shall now return again to the narration of our own transactions.

CHAPTER IV

FROM MADERA TO ST. CATHERINE'S

I have already mentioned, that on the 3d of November we weighed from Madera, after orders had been given to the captains to rendezvous at St. Jago, one of the Cape de Verd Islands, in case the squadron was separated. But the next day, when we were got to sea, the commodore considering that the season was far advanced, and that touching at St. Jago would create a new delay, he for this reason thought proper to alter his rendezvous, and to appoint the island of St. Catherine's, on the coast of Brazil, to be the first place to which the ships of the squadron were to repair in case of separation.

In our passage to the island of St. Catherine's, we found the direction of the trade-winds to differ considerably from what we had reason to expect, both from the general histories given of these winds, and the experience of former navigators. For the learned Dr. Halley, in his account of the trade-winds which take place in the Ethiopia and Atlantic Ocean, tells us that from the latitude of 28° N., to the latitude of 10° N., there is generally a fresh gale of N.E. wind, which towards the African side rarely comes to the eastward of E.N.E., or passes to the northward of N.N.E.; but on the American side the wind is somewhat more

easterly, though most commonly even there it is a point or two to the northward of the east. That from 10° N. to 4° N., the calms and tornadoes take place; and from 4° N. to 30° S., the winds are generally and perpetually between the south and the east. This account we expected to have verified by our own experience; but we found considerable variations from it, both in respect to the steadiness of the winds, and the quarter from whence they blew. For though we met with a N.E. wind about the latitude of 28° N., yet from the latitude of 25° to the latitude of 18° N., the wind was never once to the northward of the east, but, on the contrary, almost constantly to the southward of it. However, from thence to the latitude of $6^{\circ} 20'$ N., we had it usually to the northward of the east, though not entirely, it having for a short time changed to E.S.E. From hence, to about $4^{\circ} 46'$ N., the weather was very unsettled; sometimes the wind was N.E. then changed to S.E., and sometimes we had a dead calm attended with small rain and lightning. After this, the wind continued almost invariably between the S. and E., to the latitude of $7^{\circ} 30'$ S.; and then again as invariably between the N. and E., to the latitude of $15^{\circ} 30'$ S.; then E. and S.E., to $21^{\circ} 37'$ S. But after this, even to the latitude of $27^{\circ} 44'$ S., the wind was never once between the S. and the E., though we had it at all times in all the other quarters of the compass. But this last circumstance may be in some measure accounted for from our approach to the main continent of the Brazils. I mention not these particulars with a view of cavilling at the received accounts of these trade-winds, which I doubt

not are in general sufficiently accurate; but I thought it a matter worthy of public notice that such deviations from the established rules do sometimes take place. Besides, this observation may not only be of service to navigators, by putting them on their guard against these hitherto unexpected irregularities, but is a circumstance necessary to be attended to in the solution of that great question about the causes of trade-winds, and monsoons, a question which, in my opinion, has not been hitherto discussed with that clearness and accuracy which its importance (whether it be considered as a naval or philosophical inquiry) seems to demand.

On the 16th of November, one of our victuallers made a signal to speak with the commodore, and we shortened sail for her to come up with us. The master came on board, and acquainted Mr. Anson that he had complied with the terms of his charter-party, and desired to be unloaded and dismissed. Mr. Anson, on consulting the captains of the squadron, found all the ships had still such quantities of provision between their decks, and were withal so deep, that they could not, without great difficulty, take in their several proportions of brandy from the *Industry* pink, one of the victuallers only: consequently he was obliged to continue the other of them, the *Anna* pink, in the service of attending the squadron. This being resolved on, the commodore the next day made a signal for the ships to bring to, and to take on board their shares of the brandy from the *Industry* pink; and in this the long boats of the squadron were employed the three following days,

that is, till the 19th in the evening, when the pink being unloaded, she parted company with us, being bound for Barbadoes, there to take in a freight for England. Most of the officers of the squadron took the opportunity of writing to their friends at home by this ship; but she was afterwards, as I have been since informed, unhappily taken by the Spaniards.

On the 20th of November, the captains of the squadron represented to the commodore that their ships' companies were very sickly, and that it was their own opinion, as well as their surgeons', that it would tend to the preservation of the men to let in more air between decks, but that their ships were so deep they could not possibly open their lower ports. On this representation, the commodore ordered six air scuttles to be cut in each ship, in such places where they would least weaken it.

And on this occasion I cannot but observe, how much it is the duty of all those who either by office or authority have any influence in the direction of our naval affairs, to attend to this important article, the preservation of the lives and health of our seamen. If it could be supposed that the motives of humanity were insufficient for this purpose, yet policy, and a regard to the success of our arms, and the interest and honour of each particular commander, should naturally lead us to a careful and impartial examination of every probable method proposed for maintaining a ship's crew in health and vigour. But hath this been always done? Have the late invented plain and obvious methods of keeping our ships sweet and clean by a

constant supply of fresh air been considered with that candour and temper which the great benefits promised hereby ought naturally to have inspired? On the contrary, have not these salutary schemes been often treated with neglect and contempt? And have not some of those who have been entrusted with experimenting their effects, been guilty of the most indefensible partiality in the accounts they have given of these trials? Indeed, it must be confessed that many distinguished persons, both in the direction and command of our fleets, have exerted themselves on these occasions with a judicious and dispassionate examination becoming the interesting nature of the inquiry; but the wonder is, that any could be found irrational enough to act a contrary part in despite of the strongest dictates of prudence and humanity. I must, however, own that I do not believe this conduct to have arisen from motive so savage as the first reflection thereon does naturally suggest: but I rather impute it to an obstinate, and in some degree, superstitious attachment to such practices as have been long established, and to a settled contempt and hatred of all kinds of innovations, especial such as are projected by landmen and persons residing on shore. But let us return from this, I hope not, impertinent digression.

We crossed the equinoxial with a fine fresh gale at S.E. on Friday the 28th of November, at four in the morning, being then in the longitude of $27^{\circ} 59'$ west from London. And on the 2d of December, in the morning, we saw a sail in the N.W. quarter, and made the *Gloucester's* and *Tryal's* signals to chace, and half

an hour after we let out our reefs and chased with the squadron; and about noon a signal was made for the *Wager* to take our remaining victualler, the *Anna* pink, in tow. But at seven in the evening, finding we did not near the chace, and that the *Wager* was very far astern, we shortened sail, and made a signal for the cruizers to join the squadron. The next day but one we again discovered a sail, which on a nearer approach we judged to be the same vessel. We chased her the whole day, and though we rather gained upon her, yet night came on before we could overtake her, which obliged us to give over the chace, to collect our scattered squadron. We were much chagrined at the escape of this vessel, as we then apprehended her to be an advice-boat sent from Old Spain to Buenos Ayres with notice of our expedition. But we have since learnt that we were deceived in this conjecture, and that it was our East India Company's packet bound to St. Helena.

On the 10th of December, being by our accounts in the latitude of 20° S., and $36^{\circ} 30'$ longitude west from London, the *Tryal* fired a gun to denote soundings. We immediately sounded, and found sixty fathom water, the bottom coarse ground with broken shells. The *Tryal* being ahead of us, had at one time thirty-seven fathom, which afterwards increased to ninety: and then she found no bottom, which happened to us too at our second trial, though we sounded with a hundred and fifty fathom of line. This is the shoal which is laid down in most charts by the name of the Abrollos; and it appeared we were upon the very edge of it; perhaps farther in it may be extremely dangerous.

We were then, by our different accounts, from ninety to sixty leagues east of the coast of Brazil. The next day but one we spoke with a Portuguese brigantine from Rio Janeiro, bound to Bahia del todos Santos, who informed us that we were thirty-four leagues from Cape St. Thomas, and forty leagues from Cape Frio, which last bore from us W.S.W. By our accounts we were near eighty leagues from Cape Frio; and though on the information of this brigantine we altered our course and stood more to the southward, yet by our coming in with the land afterwards, we were fully convinced that our reckoning was much correcter than our Portuguese intelligence. We found a considerable current setting to the southward after we had passed the latitude of 16° S. And the same took place all along the coast of Brazil, and even to the southward of the river of Plate, it amounting sometimes to thirty miles in twenty-four hours, and once to above forty miles.

If this current is occasioned (as it is most probable) by the running off of the water accumulated on the coast of Brazil by the constant sweeping of the eastern trade-wind over the Ethiopic Ocean, then it is most natural to suppose that its general course is determined by the bearings of the adjacent shore. Perhaps too, in almost every other instance of currents, the same may hold true, as I believe no examples occur of considerable currents being observed at any great distance from land. If this then could be laid down for a general principle, it would be always easy to correct the reckoning by the observed latitude. But it were much to be

wished, for the general interests of navigation, that the actual settings of the different currents which are known to take place in various parts of the world were examined more frequently and accurately than hitherto appears to have been done.

We now began to grow impatient for a sight of land, both for the recovery of our sick, and for the refreshment and security of those who as yet continued healthy. When we departed from St. Helens, we were in so good a condition that we lost but two men on board the *Centurion* in our long passage to Madera. But in this present run between Madera and St. Catherine's we were remarkably sickly, so that many died, and great numbers were confined to their hammocks, both in our own ship, and in the rest of the squadron, and several of these past all hopes of recovery. The disorders they in general laboured under were such as are common to the hot climates, and what most ships bound to the southward experience in a greater or less degree. These are those kind of fevers which they usually call calentures: a disease which was not only terrible in its first instance, but even the remains of it often proved fatal to those who considered themselves as recovered from it; for it always left them in a very weak and helpless condition, and usually afflicted either with fluxes or tenesmus's. By our continuance at sea all these complaints were every day increasing, so that it was with great joy we discovered the coast of Brazil on the 16th of December, at seven in the morning.

The coast of Brazil appeared high and mountainous land,

extending from W. to W.S.W., and when we first saw it, it was about seventeen leagues distant. At noon we perceived a low double land bearing W.S.W. about ten leagues distant, which we took to be the island of St. Catherine's. That afternoon and the next morning, the wind being N.N.W., we gained very little to windward, and were apprehensive of being driven to the leeward of the island; but a little before noon the next day the wind came about to the southward, and enabled us to steer in between the north point of St. Catherine's and the neighbouring island of Alvoredo. As we stood in for the land, we had regular soundings, gradually decreasing from thirty-six to twelve fathom, all muddy ground. In this last depth of water we let go our anchor at five o'clock in the evening of the 18th, the north-west point of the island of St. Catherine's bearing S.S.W., distant three miles; and the island Alvoredo N.N.E., distant two leagues. Here we found the tide to set S.S.E. and N.N.W., at the rate of two knots, the tide of flood coming from the southward. We could from our ships observe two fortifications at a considerable distance within us, which seemed designed to prevent the passage of an enemy between the island of St. Catherine's and the main. And we could soon perceive that our squadron had alarmed the coast, for we saw the two forts hoist their colours and fire several guns, which we supposed were signals for assembling the inhabitants. To prevent any confusion, the commodore immediately sent a boat with an officer on shore to compliment the governor, and to desire a pilot to carry us into the road. The governor

returned a very civil answer, and ordered us a pilot. On the morning of the 20th we weighed and stood in, and towards noon the pilot came on board us, who, the same afternoon, brought us to an anchor in five fathom and an half, in a large commodious bay on the continent side, called by the French Bon Port. In standing from our last anchorage to this place we everywhere found an ouzy bottom, with a depth of water first regularly decreasing to five fathom, and then increasing to seven, after which we had six and five fathom alternately. The next morning we weighed again with the squadron, in order to run above the two fortifications we have mentioned, which are called the castles of Santa Cruz and St. Juan. Our soundings now between the island and the main were four, five, and six fathom, with muddy ground. As we passed by the castle of Santa Cruz, we saluted it with eleven guns, and were answered by an equal number; and at one in the afternoon the squadron came to an anchor in five fathom and a half, the governor's island bearing N.N.W., St. Juan's Castle N.E.½E., and the island of St. Antonio south. In this position we moored at the island of St. Catherine's on Sunday the 21st of December, the whole squadron being, as I have already mentioned, sickly, and in great want of refreshments; both which inconveniencies we hoped to have soon removed at this settlement, celebrated by former navigators for its healthiness, and the plenty of its provisions, and for the freedom, indulgence, and friendly assistance there given to the ships of all European nations in amity with the crown of Portugal.

CHAPTER V PROCEEDINGS AT ST. CATHERINE'S, AND A DESCRIPTION OF THE PLACE, WITH A SHORT ACCOUNT OF BRAZIL

Our first care, after having moored our ships, was to get our sick men on shore, preparatory to which, each ship was ordered by the commodore to erect two tents: one of them for the reception of the diseased, and the other for the accommodation of the surgeon and his assistants. We sent about eighty sick from the *Centurion*; and the other ships, I believe, sent nearly as many, in proportion to the number of their hands. As soon as we had performed this necessary duty, we scraped our decks, and gave our ship a thorough cleansing: then smoked it between decks, and after all washed every part well with vinegar. These operations were extremely necessary for correcting the noisome stench on board, and destroying the vermin; for from the number of our men, and the heat of the climate, both these nuisances had increased upon us to a very loathsome degree; and besides being most intolerably offensive, they were doubtless in some sort productive of the sickness we had laboured under for a considerable time before our arrival at this island.

Our next employment was wooding and watering our squadron, caulking our ships' sides and decks, overhauling our rigging, and securing our masts against the tempestuous weather we were, in all probability, to meet with in our passage round Cape Horn in so advanced and inconvenient a season. But before I engage in the particulars of these transactions, it will not be improper to give some account of the present state of this island of St. Catherine's, and of the neighbouring country, both as the circumstances of this place are now greatly changed from what they were in the time of former writers, and as these changes laid us under many more difficulties and perplexities than we had reason to expect, or than other British ships, hereafter bound to the South Seas, may perhaps think it prudent to struggle with.

This island is esteemed by the natives to be nowhere above two leagues in breadth, though about nine in length; it lies in $49^{\circ} 45'$ of west longitude of London, and extends from the south latitude of $27^{\circ} 35'$, to that of 28° . Although it be of a considerable height, yet it is scarce discernible at the distance of ten leagues, being then obscured under the continent of Brazil, whose mountains are exceeding high; but on a nearer approach it is easy to be distinguished, and may be readily known by a number of small islands lying at each end, and scattered along the east side of it. Frazier has given a draught of the island of St. Catherine's, and of the neighbouring coast, and the minuter isles adjacent; but he has, by mistake, called the island of Alvoredo the Isle de Gal, whereas the true Isle de Gal lies seven or eight miles to the north-

westward of it, and is much smaller. He has also called an island to the southward of St. Catherine's Alvoredo, and has omitted the island Masapura; in other respects his plan is sufficiently exact.

The north entrance of the harbour is in breadth about five miles, and the distance from thence to the island of St. Antonio is eight miles, and the course from the entrance to St. Antonio is S.S.W.½W. About the middle of the island the harbour is contracted by two points of land to a narrow channel no more than a quarter of a mile broad; and to defend this passage, a battery was erecting on the point of land on the island side. But this seems to be a very useless work, as the channel has no more than two fathom water, and consequently is navigable only for barks and boats, and therefore seems to be a passage that an enemy could have no inducement to attempt, especially as the common passage at the north end of the island is so broad and safe that no squadron can be prevented from coming in by any of their fortifications when the sea breeze is made. However, the Brigadier Don Jose Sylva de Paz, the governor of this settlement, is deemed an expert engineer, and he doubtless understands one branch of his business very well, which is the advantages which new works bring to those who are entrusted with the care of erecting them; for besides the battery mentioned above, there are three other forts carrying on for the defence of the harbour, none of which are yet completed. The first of these, called St. Juan, is built on a point of St. Catherine's, near Parrot Island; the second, in form of a half-moon, is on the island of St. Antonio; and the

third, which seems to be the chief, and has some appearance of a regular fortification, is on an island near the continent, where the governor resides.

The soil of the island is truly luxuriant, producing fruits of many kinds spontaneously; and the ground is covered over with one continued forest of trees of a perpetual verdure, which, from the exuberance of the soil, are so entangled with briars, thorns, and underwood, as to form a thicket absolutely impenetrable, except by some narrow pathways which the inhabitants have made for their own convenience. These, with a few spots cleared for plantations along the shore facing the continent, are the only uncovered parts of the island. The woods are extremely fragrant, from the many aromatic trees and shrubs with which they abound, and the fruits and vegetables of all climates thrive here, almost without culture, and are to be procured in great plenty, so that here is no want of pine-apples, peaches, grapes, oranges, lemons, citrons, melons, apricots, nor plantains. There are besides great abundance of two other productions of no small consideration for a sea-store, I mean onions and potatoes. The flesh provisions are, however, much inferior to the vegetables. There are indeed small wild cattle to be purchased, somewhat like buffaloes, but these are very indifferent food, their flesh being of a loose contexture, and generally of a disagreeable flavour, which is probably owing to the wild calabash on which they feed. There are likewise great plenty of pheasants, but they are not to be compared in taste to those we have in England. The

other provisions of the place are monkeys, parrots, and, above all, fish of various sorts; these abound in the harbour, are exceeding good, and are easily caught, for there are a great number of small sandy bays very convenient for haling the Seyne.

The water both on the island and the opposite continent is excellent, and preserves at sea as well as that of the Thames. For after it has been in the cask a day or two it begins to purge itself, and stinks most intolerably, and is soon covered over with a green scum. But this, in a few days, subsides to the bottom, and leaves the water as clear as chrystal, and perfectly sweet. The French (who, during their South Sea trade in Queen Anne's reign, first brought this place into repute) usually wooded and watered in Bon Port, on the continent side, where they anchored with great safety in six fathom water; and this is doubtless the most commodious road for such ships as intend to make only a short stay. But we watered on the St. Catherine's side, at a plantation opposite the island of St. Antonio.

These are the advantages of this island of St. Catherine's; but there are many inconveniencies attending it, partly from its climate, but more from its new regulations, and the late form of government established there. With regard to the climate, it must be remembered that the woods and hills which surround the harbour prevent a free circulation of the air. And the vigorous vegetation which constantly takes place there, furnishes such a prodigious quantity of vapour that all the night, and great part of the morning, a thick fog covers the whole country, and continues

till either the sun gathers strength to dissipate it, or it is dispersed by a brisk sea-breeze. This renders the place close and humid, and probably occasioned the many fevers and fluxes we were there afflicted with. To these exceptions I must not omit to add, that all the day we were pestered with great numbers of muscatos, which are not much unlike the gnats in England, but more venomous in their stings. And at sunset, when the muscatos retired, they were succeeded by an infinity of sand-flies, which, though scarce discernible to the naked eye, make a mighty buzzing, and, wherever they bite, raise a small bump in the flesh which is soon attended with a painful itching, like that arising from the bite of an English harvest bug. But as the only light in which this place deserves our consideration is its favourable situation for supplying and refreshing our cruisers intended for the South Seas, in this view its greatest inconveniences remain still to be related. And to do this more distinctly, it will not be amiss to consider the changes which it has lately undergone, both in its inhabitants, its police, and its governor.

In the time of Frazier and Shelvocke, this place served only as a retreat to vagabonds and outlaws, who fled thither from all parts of Brazil. They did indeed acknowledge a subjection to the crown of Portugal, and had a person among them whom they called their captain, who was considered in some sort as their governor; but both their allegiance to their king, and their obedience to their captain, seemed to be little more than verbal. For as they had plenty of provisions, but no money, they were in a condition to

support themselves without the assistance of any neighbouring settlements, and had not amongst them the means of tempting any adjacent governor to busy his authority about them. In this situation they were extremely hospitable and friendly to such foreign ships as came amongst them. For these ships wanting only provisions, of which the natives had great store; and the natives wanting clothes (for they often despised money, and refused to take it), which the ships furnished them with in exchange for their provisions, both sides found their account in this traffick; and their captain or governor had neither power nor interest to restrain it, or to tax it. But of late (for reasons which shall be hereafter mentioned) these honest vagabonds have been obliged to receive amongst them a new colony, and to submit to new laws and new forms of government. Instead of their former ragged bare-legged captain (whom, however, they took care to keep innocent), they have now the honour to be governed by Don Jose Sylva de Paz, a brigadier of the armies of Portugal. This gentleman has with him a garrison of soldiers, and has consequently a more extensive and a better supported power than any of his predecessors; and as he wears better clothes, and lives more splendidly, and has besides a much better knowledge of the importance of money than they could ever pretend to, so he puts in practice certain methods of procuring it, with which they were utterly unacquainted. But it may be much doubted if the inhabitants consider these methods as tending to promote either their interests or that of their sovereign the

King of Portugal. This is certain, that his behaviour cannot but be extremely embarrassing to such British ships as touch there in their way to the South Seas. For one of his practices was placing centinels at all the avenues, to prevent the people from selling us any refreshments, except at such exorbitant rates as we could not afford to give. His pretence for this extraordinary stretch of power was, that he was obliged to preserve their provisions for upwards of an hundred families, which they daily expected to reinforce their colony. Hence he appears to be no novice in his profession, by his readiness at inventing a plausible pretence for his interested management. However, this, though sufficiently provoking, was far from being the most exceptionable part of his conduct. For by the neighbourhood of the river Plate, a considerable smuggling traffick is carried on between the Portuguese and the Spaniards, especially in the exchanging gold for silver, by which both princes are defrauded of their fifths; and in this prohibited commerce, Don Jose was so deeply engaged, that in order to ingratiate himself with his Spanish correspondents (for no other reason can be given for his procedure) he treacherously dispatched an express to Buenos Ayres, in the river of Plate, where Pizarro then lay, with an account of our arrival, and of the strength of our squadron; particularly mentioning the number of ships, guns, and men, and every circumstance which he could suppose our enemy desirous of being acquainted with. And the same perfidy every British cruiser may expect who touches at St. Catherine's while it is

under the government of Don Jose Sylva de Paz.

Thus much, with what we shall be necessitated to relate in the course of our own proceedings, may suffice as to the present state of St. Catherine's, and the character of its governor. But as the reader may be desirous of knowing to what causes the late new modelling of this settlement is owing; to satisfy him in this particular, it will be necessary to give a short account of the adjacent continent of Brazil, and of the wonderful discoveries which have been made there within these last forty years, which, from a country of but mean estimation, has rendered it now perhaps the most considerable colony on the face of the globe.

This country was first discovered by Americus Vesputio, a Florentine, who had the good fortune to be honoured with giving his name to the immense continent, some time before found out by Columbus. Vesputio being in the service of the Portuguese, it was settled and planted by that nation, and, with the other dominions of Portugal, devolved to the crown of Spain when that kingdom became subject to it. During the long war between Spain and the States of Holland, the Dutch possessed themselves of the northermost part of Brazil, and were masters of it for some years. But when the Portuguese revolted from the Spanish Government, this country took part in the revolt, and soon re-possessed themselves of the places the Dutch had taken; since which time it has continued without interruption under the crown of Portugal, being, till the beginning of the present century, only productive of sugar and tobacco, and a few other commodities

of very little account.

But this country, which for many years was only considered for the produce of its plantations, has been lately discovered to abound with the two minerals which mankind hold in the greatest esteem, and which they exert their utmost art and industry in acquiring, I mean gold and diamonds. Gold was first found in the mountains which lie adjacent to the city of Rio Janeiro. The occasion of its discovery is variously related, but the most common account is, that the Indians lying on the back of the Portuguese settlements, were observed by the soldiers employed in an expedition against them, to make use of this metal for their fish-hooks, and their manner of procuring it being enquired into, it appeared that great quantities of it were annually washed from the hills, and left amongst the sand and gravel, which remained in the vallies after the running off, or evaporation of the water. It is now little more than forty years since any quantities of gold worth notice have been imported to Europe from Brazil, but since that time the annual imports from thence have been continually augmented by the discovery of places in other provinces, where it is to be met with as plentifully as at first about Rio Janeiro. And it is now said that there is a small slender vein of it spread through all the country at about twenty-four feet from the surface, but that this vein is too thin and poor to answer the expence of digging; however, where the rivers or rains have had any course for a considerable time, there gold is always to be collected, the water having separated the metal from the earth, and deposited it b

the sands, thereby saving the expences of digging: so that it is esteemed an infallible gain to be able to divert a stream from its channel, and to ransack its bed. From this account of gathering this metal, it should follow that there are properly no gold mines in Brazil; and this the governor of Rio Grande (who being at St. Catherine's, frequently visited Mr. Anson) did most confidently affirm, assuring us that the gold was all collected either from rivers, or from the beds of torrents after floods. It is indeed asserted, that in the mountains large rocks are found abounding with this metal, and I myself have seen the fragment of one of these rocks, with a considerable lump of gold intangled in it; but even in this case the workmen break off the rocks, and do not properly mine into them, and the great expence in subsisting among these mountains, and afterwards in separating the metal from the stone, makes this method of procuring gold to be but rarely put in practice.

The examining the bottoms of rivers and the gullies of torrents, and the washing the gold found therein from the sand and dirt with which it is always mixed, are works performed by slaves, who are principally negroes, kept in great numbers by the Portuguese for these purposes. The regulation of the duty of these slaves is singular, for they are each of them obliged to furnish their master with the eighth part of an ounce of gold per diem; and if they are either so fortunate or industrious as to collect a greater quantity, the surplus is considered as their own property, and they have the liberty of disposing of it as they think

fit. So that it is said, some negroes who have accidentally fallen upon rich washing places have themselves purchased slaves, and have lived afterwards in great splendour, their original master having no other demand on them than the daily supply of the forementioned eighth, which, as the Portuguese ounce is somewhat lighter than our troy ounce, may amount to about nine shillings sterling.

The quantity of gold thus collected in the Brazils, and returned annually to Lisbon, may be in some degree estimated from the amount of the king's fifth. This hath of late been esteemed, one year with another, to be one hundred and fifty arroves of 32 lb. Portuguese weight each, which at £4 the troy ounce, makes very near £300,000 sterling, and consequently the capital, of which this is the fifth, is about a million and a half sterling. It is obvious that the annual return of gold to Lisbon cannot be less than this, though it be difficult to determine how much it exceeds it; perhaps we may not be very much mistaken in our conjecture, if we suppose the gold exchanged for silver with the Spaniards at Buenos Ayres, and what is brought privily to Europe and escapes the duty, amounts to near half a million more, which will make the whole annual produce of the Brazilian gold near two millions sterling, a prodigious sum to be found in a country which a few years since was not known to furnish a single grain.

I have already mentioned that besides gold this country does likewise produce diamonds. The discovery of these valuable stones is much more recent than that of gold, it being as yet

scarce 20 years since the first were brought to Europe. They are found in the same manner as the gold, in the gullies of torrents and beds of rivers, but only in particular places, and not so universally spread through the country. They were often found in washing the gold before they were known to be diamonds, and were consequently thrown away with the sand and gravel separated from it; and it is very well remembered that numbers of very large stones, which would have made the fortunes of the possessors, have passed unregarded through the hands of those who now with impatience support the mortifying reflection. However, about twenty years since a person acquainted with the appearance of rough diamonds conceived that these pebbles, as they were then esteemed, were of the same kind: but it is said that there was a considerable interval between the first starting of this opinion and the confirmation of it by proper trials and examination, it proving difficult to persuade the inhabitants that what they had been long accustomed to despise could be of the importance represented by this discovery, and I have been informed that in this interval a governor of one of their places procured a good number of these stones, which he pretended to make use of at cards to mark with instead of counters. But it was at last confirmed by skilful jewellers in Europe, consulted on this occasion, that the stones thus found in Brazil were truly diamonds, many of which were not inferior, either in lustre, or any other quality, to those of the East Indies. On this determination, the Portuguese, in the neighbourhood of those

places where they had first been observed, set themselves to search for them with great assiduity. And they were not without great hopes of discovering considerable masses of them, as they found large rocks of chrystal in many of the mountains, from whence the streams came which washed down the diamonds.

But it was soon represented to the King of Portugal that if such plenty of diamonds should be met with, as their sanguine conjectures seemed to indicate, this would so debase their value and diminish their estimation, that besides ruining all the Europeans who had any quantity of Indian diamonds in their possession, it would render the discovery itself of no importance, and would prevent his majesty from receiving any advantages from it, and on these considerations his majesty has thought proper to restrain the general search of diamonds, and has erected a diamond company for that purpose, with an exclusive charter. This company, in consideration of a sum paid to the king, is vested with the property of all diamonds found in Brazil: but to hinder their collecting too large quantities, and thereby reducing their value, they are prohibited from employing above eight hundred slaves in searching after them. And to prevent any of his other subjects from acting the same part, and likewise to secure the company from being defrauded by the interfering of interlopers in their trade and property, he has depopulated a large town and a considerable district round it, and has obliged the inhabitants, who are said to amount to six thousand, to remove to another part of the country; for this town being in

the neighbourhood of the diamonds, it was thought impossible to prevent such a number of people who were on the spot from frequently smuggling.

In consequence of these important discoveries in Brazil, new laws, new governments, and new regulations have been established in many parts of the country. For not long since a considerable tract, possessed by a set of inhabitants who from their principal settlement were called Paulists, was almost independent of the crown of Portugal, to which it scarcely acknowledged more than a nominal allegiance. These Paulists are said to be descendants of those Portuguese who retired from the northern part of Brazil when it was invaded and possessed by the Dutch. As from the confusion of the times they were long neglected by their superiors, and were obliged to provide for their own security and defence, the necessity of their affairs produced a kind of government amongst them which they found sufficient for the confined manner of life to which they were inured. And being thus habituated to their own regulations, they at length grew fond of their independency: so that rejecting and despising the mandates of the court of Lisbon, they were often engaged in a state of downright rebellion, and the mountains surrounding their country, and the difficulty of clearing the few passages that open into it, generally put it in their power to make their own terms before they submitted. But as gold was found to abound in this country of the Paulists, the present King of Portugal (during whose reign almost the whole discoveries I have

mentioned were begun and compleated) thought it incumbent on him to reduce this province, which now became of great consequence, to the same dependency and obedience with the rest of the country, which, I am told, he has at last, though with great difficulty, happily effected. And the same motives which induced his Majesty to undertake the reduction of the Paulists has also occasioned the changes I have mentioned to have taken place at the island of St. Catherine's. For the governor of Rio Grande, of whom I have already spoken, assured us that in the neighbourhood of this island there were considerable rivers which were found to be extremely rich, and that this was the reason that a garrison, a military governor, and a new colony was settled there. And as the harbour at this island is by much the securest and the most capacious of any on the coast, it is not improbable, if the riches of the neighbourhood answer their expectation, but it may become in time the principal settlement in Brazil, and the most considerable port in all South America.

Thus much I have thought necessary to insert in relation to the present state of Brazil, and of the island of St. Catherine's. For as this last place has been generally recommended as the most eligible port for our cruisers to refresh at, which are bound to the South Seas, I believed it to be my duty to instruct my countrymen in the hitherto unsuspected inconveniencies which attend that place; and as the Brazilian gold and diamonds are subjects about which, from their novelty, very few particulars have been hitherto published, I conceived this account I had collected of them

would appear to the reader to be neither a trifling nor a useless digression. These subjects being thus dispatched, I shall now return to the series of our own proceedings.

When we first arrived at St. Catherine's we were employed in refreshing our sick on shore, in wooding and watering the squadron, cleansing our ships, and examining and securing our masts and rigging, as I have already observed in the foregoing chapter. At the same time Mr. Anson gave directions that the ships' companies should be supplied with fresh meat, and that they should be victualled with whole allowance of all the kinds of provision. In consequence of these orders, we had fresh beef sent on board us continually for our daily expence, and what was wanting to make up our allowance we received from our victualler the *Anna* pink, in order to preserve the provisions on board our squadron entire for our future service. The season of the year growing each day less favourable for our passage round Cape Horn, Mr. Anson was very desirous of leaving this place as soon as possible, and we were at first in hopes that our whole business would be done and we should be in a readiness to sail in about a fortnight from our arrival; but, on examining the *Tryal's* masts, we, to our no small vexation, found inevitable employment for twice that time. For, on a survey, it was found that the main-mast was sprung at the upper wounding, though it was thought capable of being secured by a couple of fishes; but the fore-mast was reported to be unfit for service, and thereupon the carpenters were sent into the woods to endeavour to find a

stick proper for a fore-mast. But after a search of four days they returned without having been able to meet with any tree fit for the purpose. This obliged them to come to a second consultation about the old fore-mast, when it was agreed to endeavour to secure it by casing it with three fishes, and in this work the carpenters were employed till within a day or two of our sailing. In the meantime, the commodore, thinking it necessary to have a clean vessel on our arrival in the South Seas, ordered the *Tryal* to be hove down, as this would not occasion any loss of time, but might be compleated while the carpenters were refitting her masts, which was done on shore.

On the 27th of December we discovered a sail in the offing, and not knowing but she might be a Spaniard, the eighteen-oared boat was manned and armed, and sent under the command of our second lieutenant, to examine her before she arrived within the protection of the forts. She proved to be a Portuguese brigantine from Rio Grande; and though our officer, as it appeared on inquiry, had behaved with the utmost civility to the master, and had refused to accept a calf which the master would have forced on him as a present, yet the governor took great offence at our sending our boat, and talked of it in a high strain as a violation of the peace subsisting between the crowns of Great Britain and Portugal. We at first imputed this ridiculous blustering to no deeper a cause than Don Jose's insolence; but as we found he proceeded so far as to charge our officer with behaving rudely, and opening letters, and particularly with an attempt to take out

of the vessel by violence the very calf which we knew he had refused to receive as a present (a circumstance which we were satisfied the governor was well acquainted with), we had thence reason to suspect that he purposely sought this quarrel, and had more important motives for engaging in it than the mere captious bias of his temper. What these motives were it was not so easy for us to determine at that time; but as we afterwards found by letters which fell into our hands in the South Seas that he had dispatched an express to Buenos Ayres, where Pizarro then lay, with an account of our squadron's arrival at St. Catherine's, together with the most ample and circumstantial intelligence of our force and condition, we thence conjectured that Don Jose had raised this groundless clamour only to prevent our visiting the brigantine when she should put to sea again, lest we might there find proofs of his perfidious behaviour, and perhaps, at the same time, discover the secret of his smuggling correspondence with his neighbouring governors, and the Spaniards at Buenos Ayres. But to proceed.

It was near a month before the *Tryal* was refitted; for not only her lower masts were defective, as hath been already mentioned, but her main top-mast and fore-yard were likewise decayed and rotten. While this work was carrying on, the other ships of the squadron fixed new standing rigging, and set up a sufficient number of preventer shrouds to each mast, to secure them in the most effectual manner. And in order to render the ships stiffer and to enable them to carry more sail abroad, and to prevent their

straining their upper works in hard gales of wind, each captain had orders given him to strike down some of their great guns into the hold. These precautions being complied with, and each ship having taken in as much wood and water as there was room for, the *Tryal* was at last compleated, and the whole squadron was ready for the sea: on which the tents on shore were struck, and all the sick were received on board. And here we had a melancholy proof how much the healthiness of this place had been over-rated by former writers, for we found that though the *Centurion* alone had buried no less than twenty-eight men since our arrival, yet the number of her sick was in the same interval increased from eighty to ninety-six. When our crews were embarked, and everything was prepared for our departure, the commodore made a signal for all captains, and delivered them their orders, containing the successive place of rendezvous from hence to the coast of China. And then, on the next day, being the 18th of January, the signal was made for weighing, and the squadron put to sea, leaving without regret this island of St. Catherine's, where we had been so extremely disappointed in our refreshments, in our accommodations, and in the humane and friendly offices which we had been taught to expect in a place which hath been so much celebrated for its hospitality, freedom, and conveniency.

CHAPTER VI

THE RUN FROM ST. CATHERINE'S TO PORT ST. JULIAN, WITH SOME ACCOUNT OF THAT PORT, AND OF THE COUNTRY TO THE SOUTHWARD OF THE RIVER OF PLATE

In leaving St. Catherine's, we left the last amicable port we proposed to touch at, and were now proceeding to an hostile, or at best, a desert and inhospitable coast. And as we were to expect a more boisterous climate to the southward than any we had yet experienced, not only our danger of separation would by this means be much greater than it had been hitherto, but other accidents of a more mischievous nature were likewise to be apprehended, and as much as possible to be provided against. Mr. Anson, therefore, in appointing the various stations at which the ships of the squadron were to rendezvous, had considered that it was possible his own ship might be disabled from getting round Cape Horn, or might be lost, and had given proper direction, that even in that case the expedition should not be abandoned. For the orders delivered to the captains, the day before we sailed from St. Catherine's, were, that in case of separation, which they

were with the utmost care to endeavour to avoid, the first place of rendezvous should be the bay of port St. Julian; describing the place from Sir John Narborough's account of it. There they were to supply themselves with as much salt as they could take in, both for their own use and for the use of the squadron; and if, after a stay of ten days, they were not joined by the commodore, they were then to proceed through Streights le Maire round Cape Horn into the South Seas, where the next place of rendezvous was to be the island of Nostra Senora del Socoro, in the latitude of 45° south, and longitude from the Lizard $71^{\circ} 12'$ west. They were to bring this island to bear E.N.E. and to cruize from five to twelve leagues distance from it as long as their store of wood and water would permit, both which they were to expend with the utmost frugality. And when they were under an absolute necessity of a fresh supply, they were to stand in, and endeavour to find out an anchoring place; and in case they could not, and the weather made it dangerous to supply their ships by standing off and on, they were then to make the best of their way to the island of Juan Fernandes, in the latitude of $33^{\circ} 37'$ south. At this island, as soon as they had recruited their wood and water, they were to continue cruizing off the anchoring place for fifty-six days; in which time, if they were not joined by the commodore, they might conclude that some accident had befallen him, and they were forthwith to put themselves under the command of the senior officer, who was to use his utmost endeavours to annoy the enemy both by sea and land. With these views their new commodore was to continue

in those seas as long as his provisions lasted, or as long as they were recruited by what he should take from the enemy, reserving only a sufficient quantity to carry him and the ships under his command to Macao, at the entrance of the river of Canton on the coast of China, where, having supplied himself with a new stock of provisions, he was thence, without delay, to make the best of his way to England. And as it was found impossible as yet to unload our victualler, the *Anna* pink, the commodore gave the master of her the same rendezvous, and the same orders to put himself under the command of the remaining senior officer.

Under these orders the squadron sailed from St. Catherine's on Sunday the 18th of January, as hath been already mentioned in the preceding chapter. The next day we had very squally weather, attended with rain, lightning, and thunder, but it soon became fair again with light breezes, and continued thus till Wednesday evening, when it blew fresh again; and increasing all night, by eight the next morning it became a most violent storm, and we had with it so thick a fog, that it was impossible to see the distance of two ships' length, so that the whole squadron disappeared. On this a signal was made, by firing guns, to bring to with the larboard tacks, the wind being then due east. We ourselves immediately handed the top-sails, bunted the main-sail, and lay to under a reefed mizen till noon, when the fog dispersed, and we soon discovered all the ships of the squadron, except the *Pearl*, who did not join us till near a month afterwards. Indeed the *Tryal* sloop was a great way to the leeward, having

lost her main-mast in the squall, and having been obliged, for fear of bilging, to cut away the raft. We therefore bore down with the squadron to her relief, and the *Gloucester* was ordered to take her in tow, for the weather did not entirely abate till the day after, and even then a great swell continued from the eastward in consequence of the preceding storm.

After this accident we stood to the southward with little interruption, and here we experienced the same setting of the current which we had observed before our arrival at St. Catherine's; that is, we generally found ourselves to the southward of our reckoning by about twenty miles each day. This deviation, with a little inequality, lasted till we had passed the latitude of the river of Plate; and even then we discovered that the same current, however difficult to be accounted for, did yet undoubtedly take place; for we were not satisfied in deducing it from the error in our reckoning, but we actually tried it more than once when a calm made it practicable.

As soon as we had passed the latitude of the river of Plate, we had soundings which continued all along the coast of Patagonia. These soundings, when well ascertained, being of great use in determining the position of the ships, and we having tried them more frequently, and in greater depths, and with more attention than, I believe, hath been done before us, I shall recite our observations as succinctly as I can. In the latitude of $36^{\circ} 52'$ we had sixty fathom of water, with a bottom of fine black and grey sand; from thence to $39^{\circ} 55'$ we varied our depths from fifty

to eighty fathom, though we had constantly the same bottom as before; between the last mentioned latitude and $43^{\circ} 16'$ we had only fine grey sand, with the same variation of depths, except that we once or twice lessened our water to forty fathom. After this, we continued in forty fathom for about half a degree, having a bottom of coarse sand and broken shells, at which time we were in sight of land, and not above seven leagues from it. As we edged from the land, we met with variety of soundings; first black sand, then muddy, and soon after rough ground with stones; but when we had increased our water to forty-eight fathom we had a muddy bottom to the latitude of $46^{\circ} 10'$. Hence, drawing towards the shore, we had first thirty-six fathom, and still kept shoaling our water, till at length we came into twelve fathom, having constantly small stones and pebbles at the bottom. Part of this time we had a view of Cape Blanco, which lies in about the latitude of $47^{\circ} 10'$, and longitude west from London 69° . This is the most remarkable land upon the coast. Steering from hence S. by E. nearly, we, in a run of about thirty leagues, deepned our water to fifty fathom without once altering the bottom: and then drawing towards the shore with a S.W. course, varying rather to the westward, we had constantly a sandy bottom till our coming into thirty fathom, where we had again a sight of land distant from us about eight leagues lying in the latitudes of $48^{\circ} 31'$. We made this land on the 17th of February, and at five that afternoon we came to an anchor, having the same soundings as before, in the latitude of $48^{\circ} 58'$, the souther-most land then in view bearing

S.S.W., the northermost N.½E., a small island N.W., and the westernmost hummock W.S.W. In this station we found the tide to set S. by W.; and weighing again at five the next morning, we an hour afterwards discovered a sail, upon which the *Severn* and *Gloucester* were both directed to give chase; but we soon perceived it to be the *Pearl*, which separated from us a few days after we left St. Catherine's, and on this we made a signal for the *Severn* to rejoin the squadron, leaving the *Gloucester* alone in the pursuit. And now we were surprised to see that on the *Gloucester's* approach the people on board the *Pearl* increased their sail, and stood from her. However, the *Gloucester* came up with them, but found them with their hammocks in their nettings, and every thing ready for an engagement. At two in the afternoon the *Pearl* joined us, and running up under our stern, Lieutenant Salt hailed the commodore, and acquainted him that Captain Kidd died on the 31st of January. He likewise informed us that he had seen five large ships the 10th instant, which he for some time imagined to be our squadron: so that he suffered the commanding ship, which wore a red broad pendant exactly resembling that of the commodore at the main top-mast head, to come within gun-shot of him before he discovered his mistake; but then, finding it not to be the *Centurion*, he hailed close upon the wind, and crowded from them with all his sail, and standing cross a ripling, where they hesitated to follow him, he happily escaped. He made them to be five Spanish men-of-war, one of them exceedingly like the *Gloucester*, which was the occasion

of his apprehensions when the *Gloucester* chaced him. By their appearance he thought they consisted of two ships of seventy guns, two of fifty, and one of forty guns. It seems the whole squadron continued in chace of him all that day, but at night, finding they could not get near him, they gave over the chace, and directed their course to the southward.

Had it not been for the necessity we were under of refitting the *Tryal*, this piece of intelligence would have prevented our making any stay at St. Julian's; but as it was impossible for that sloop to proceed round the Cape in her present condition, some stay there was inevitable, and therefore the same evening we came to an anchor again in twenty-five fathom water; the bottom a mixture of mud and sand, and the high hummock bearing S. W. by W. And weighing at nine in the morning, we sent the two cutters belonging to the *Centurion* and *Severn* in shore to discover the harbour of St. Julian, while the ships kept standing along the coast, about the distance of a league from the land. At six o'clock we anchored in the bay of St. Julian in nineteen fathom, the bottom muddy ground with sand, the northermost land in sight bearing N. and by E., the southermost S. - $\frac{1}{2}$ E., and the high hummock, to which Sir John Narborough formerly gave the name of Wood's Mount, W.S.W. Soon after, the cutter returned on board, having discovered the harbour, which did not appear to us in our situation, the northermost point shutting in upon the southermost, and in appearance closing the entrance.

Being come to an anchor in this bay of St. Julian, principally

with a view of refitting the *Tryal*, the carpenters were immediately employed in that business, and continued so during our whole stay at the place. The *Tryal's* main-mast having been carried away about twelve feet below the cap, they contrived to make the remaining part of the mast serve again; and the *Wager* was ordered to supply her with a spare main top-mast, which the carpenters converted into a new fore-mast. And I cannot help observing that this accident to the *Tryal's* mast, which gave us so much uneasiness at that time, on account of the delay it occasioned, was, in all probability, the means of preserving the sloop, and all her crew. For before this, her masts, how well soever proportioned to a better climate, were much too lofty for these high southern latitudes, so that had they weathered the preceding storm, it would have been impossible for them to have stood against those seas and tempests we afterwards encountered in passing round Cape Horn, and the loss of masts in that boisterous climate would scarcely have been attended with less than the loss of the vessel and of every man on board her, since it would have been impracticable for the other ships to have given them any relief during the continuance of those impetuous storms.

Whilst we stayed at this place, the commodore appointed the Honourable Captain Murray to succeed to the *Pearl*, and Captain Cheap to the *Wager*, and he promoted Mr. Charles Saunders, his first lieutenant, to the command of the *Tryal* sloop. But Captain Saunders lying dangerously ill of a fever on board the *Centurion*,

and it being the opinion of the surgeons that the removing him on board his own ship in his present condition might tend to the hazard of his life, Mr. Anson gave an order to Mr. Saumarez, first lieutenant of the *Centurion*, to act as master and commander of the *Tryal* during the illness of Captain Saunders.

Here the commodore, too, in order to ease the expedition of all unnecessary expence, held a farther consultation with his captains about unloading and discharging the *Anna* pink; but they represented to him that they were so far from being in a condition of taking any part of her loading on board, that they had still great quantities of provisions in the way of their guns between decks, and that their ships were withal so very deep that they were not fit for action without being cleared. This put the commodore under a necessity of retaining the pink in the service; and as it was apprehended we should certainly meet with the Spanish squadron in passing the Cape, Mr. Anson thought it adviseable to give orders to the captains to put all their provisions which were in the way of their guns on board the *Anna* pink, and to remount such of their guns as had formerly, for the ease of their ships, been ordered into the hold.

This bay of St. Julian, where we are now at anchor, being a convenient rendezvous, in case of separation, for all cruizers bound to the southward, and the whole coast of Patagonia, from the river of Plate to the Streights of Magellan, lying nearly parallel to their usual route, a short account of the singularity of this country, with a particular description of port St. Julian, may,

perhaps, be neither unacceptable to the curious, nor unworthy the attention of future navigators, as some of them, by unforeseen accidents, may be obliged to run in with the land, and to make some stay on this coast, in which case the knowledge of the country, its produce and inhabitants, cannot but be of the utmost consequence to them.

To begin then with the tract of country usually styled Patagonia. This is the name often given to the southermost part of South America, which is unpossessed by the Spaniards, extending from their settlements to the Streights of Magellan. This country on the east side is extremely remarkable for a peculiarity not to be paralleled in any other known part of the globe, for though the whole territory to the northward of the river of Plate is full of wood, and stored with immense quantities of large timber trees, yet to the southward of the river no trees of any kind are to be met with except a few peach trees, first planted and cultivated by the Spaniards in the neighbourhood of Buenos Ayres. So that on the whole eastern coast of Patagonia, extending near four hundred leagues in length, and reaching as far back as any discoveries have yet been made, no other wood has been found than a few insignificant shrubs. Sir John Narborough in particular, who was sent out by King Charles the Second expressly to examine this country and the Streights of Magellan, and who, in pursuance of his orders, wintered upon this coast in Port St. Julian and Port Desire, in the year 1670; Sir John Narborough, I say, tells us that he never saw a stick of wood

in the country large enough to make the handle of an hatchet.

But though the country be so destitute of wood, it abounds with pasture. For the land appears in general to be made up of downs, of a light dry gravelly soil, and produces great quantities of long coarse grass, which grows in tufts, interspersed with large barren spots of gravel between them. This grass, in many places, feeds immense herds of cattle, for the Spaniards at Buenos Ayres having, soon after their first settling there, brought over a few black cattle from Europe, they have thriven prodigiously by the plenty of herbage which they everywhere met with, and are now increased to that degree, and are extended so far into different parts of Patagonia, that they are not considered as private property; but many thousands at a time are slaughtered every year by the hunters, only for their hides and tallow. The manner of killing these cattle, being a practice peculiar to that part of the world, merits a more circumstantial description. The hunters employed on this occasion, being all of them mounted on horseback (and both the Spaniards and Indians in that part of the world are usually most excellent horsemen), they arm themselves with a kind of a spear, which, at its end, instead of a blade fixed in the same line with the wood in the usual manner, has its blade fixed across. With this instrument they ride at a beast, and surround him, when the hunter that comes behind him hamstring him, and as after this operation the beast soon tumbles, without being able to raise himself again, they leave him on the ground and pursue others, whom they serve in the

same manner. Sometimes there is a second party, who attend the hunters to skin the cattle as they fall, but it is said that at other times the hunters chuse to let them languish in torment till the next day, from an opinion that the anguish, which the animal in the meantime endures, may burst the lymphatics, and thereby facilitate the separation of the skin from the carcass; and though their priests have loudly condemned this most barbarous practice, and have gone so far, if my memory does not fail me, as to excommunicate those who follow it, yet all their efforts to put an entire stop to it have hitherto proved ineffectual.

Besides the numbers of cattle which are every year slaughtered for their hides and tallow, in the manner already described, it is often necessary for the uses of agriculture, and for other purposes, to take them alive without wounding them. This is performed with a most wonderful and almost incredible dexterity, and principally by the use of a machine which the English who have resided at Buenos Ayres generally denominate a lash. It is made of a thong of several fathoms in length, and very strong, with a running noose at one end of it. This the hunters (who in this case are also mounted on horseback) take in their right hands, it being first properly coiled up, and having its end opposite to the noose fastened to the saddle; and thus prepared they ride at a herd of cattle. When they arrive within a certain distance of a beast, they throw their thong at him with such exactness that they never fail of fixing the noose about his horns. The beast, when he finds himself entangled, generally

runs, but the horse, being swifter, attends him, and prevents the thong from being too much strained, till a second hunter, who follows the game, throws another noose about one of its hind legs; and this being done, both horses (for they are trained to this practice) instantly turn different ways, in order to strain the two thongs in contrary directions, on which the beast, by their opposite pulls, is presently overthrown, and then the horses stop, keeping the thongs still upon the stretch. Being thus on the ground, and incapable of resistance (for he is extended between the two horses), the hunters alight, and secure him in such a manner that they afterwards easily convey him to whatever place they please. They in like manner noose horses, and, as it is said, even tigers; and however strange this last circumstance may appear, there are not wanting persons of credit who assert it. Indeed, it must be owned, that the address both of the Spaniards and Indians in that part of the world in the use of this lash or noose, and the certainty with which they throw it, and fix it on any intended part of the beast at a considerable distance, are matters only to be believed from the repeated and concurrent testimony of all who have frequented that country, and might reasonably be questioned, did it rely on a single report, or had it been ever contradicted or denied by any one who had resided at Buenos Ayres.

The cattle which are killed in the manner I have already observed are slaughtered only for their hides and tallow, to which sometimes are added their tongues, but the rest of their flesh is

left to putrify, or to be devoured by the birds and wild beasts. The greatest part of this carrion falls to the share of the wild dogs, of which there are immense numbers to be found in that country.

These are supposed to have been originally produced by Spanish dogs from Buenos Ayres, who, allured by the great quantity of carrion, and the facility they had by that means of subsisting, left their masters, and ran wild amongst the cattle; for they are plainly of the breed of European dogs, an animal not originally found in America. But though these dogs are said to be some thousands in a company, they hitherto neither diminish nor prevent the increase of the cattle, not daring to attack the herds, by reason of the numbers, which constantly feed together; but contenting themselves with the carrion left them by the hunters, and perhaps now and then with a few stragglers, who, by accidents, are separated from the main body they belong to.

Besides the wild cattle which have spread themselves in such vast herds from Buenos Ayres towards the southward, the same country is in like manner furnished with horses. These too were first brought from Spain, and are also prodigiously increased, and run wild to a much greater distance than the black cattle; and though many of them are excellent, yet their number makes them of very little value, the best of them being often sold in the neighbouring settlements, where money is plenty and commodities very dear, for not more than a dollar a-piece. It is not as yet certain how far to the southward these herds of wild cattle and horses have extended themselves, but there is some

reason to conjecture that stragglers of both kinds are to be met with very near the Streights of Magellan; and they will in time doubtless fill all the southern part of this continent with their breed, which cannot fail of proving of considerable advantage to such ships as may touch upon the coast, for the horses themselves are said to be very good eating, and, as such, are preferred by some of the Indians even before the black cattle. But whatever plenty of flesh provisions may be hereafter found here, there is one material refreshment which this eastern side of Patagonia seems to be very defective in, and that is fresh water, for the land being generally of a nitrous and saline nature, the ponds and streams are frequently brackish. However, as good water has been found there, though in small quantities, it is not improbable, but on a further search, this inconvenience may be removed.

To the account already given, I must add that there are in all parts of this country a good number of vicunnas or Peruvian sheep; but these, by reason of their shyness and swiftness, are killed with difficulty. On the eastern coast, too, there are found immense quantities of seals, and a vast variety of sea-fowl, amongst which the most remarkable are the penguins. They are in size and shape like a goose, but instead of wings, they have short stumps like fins, which are of no use to them, except in the water. Their bills are narrow, like that of an albitross, and they stand and walk in an erect posture. From this and their white bellies, Sir John Narborough has whimsically likened them to little children standing up in white aprons.

The inhabitants of this eastern coast (to which I have all along hitherto confined my relation) appear to be but few, and have rarely been seen more than two or three at a time by any ships that have touched here. We, during our stay at the port of St. Julian, saw none. However, towards Buenos Ayres they are sufficiently numerous, and oftentimes very troublesome to the Spaniards, but there the greater breadth and variety of the country, and a milder climate, yield them a better protection, for in that place the continent is between three and four hundred leagues in breadth, whereas at Port St. Julian it is little more than a hundred; so that I conceive the same Indians who frequent the western coast of Patagonia and the Streights of Magellan often ramble to this side. As the Indians near Buenos Ayres exceed these southern Indians in number, so they greatly surpass them in activity and spirit, and seem in their manners to be nearly allied to those gallant Chilian Indians who have long set the whole Spanish power at defiance, have often ravaged their country, and remain to this hour independent. For the Indians about Buenos Ayres have learnt to be excellent horsemen, and are extremely expert in the management of all cutting weapons, though ignorant of the use of firearms, which the Spaniards are very solicitous to keep out of their hands. And of the vigour and resolution of these Indians, the behaviour of Orellana and his followers, whom we have formerly mentioned, is a memorable instance. Indeed were we disposed to aim at the utter subversion of the Spanish power in America, no means seem more probable to effect it than due

encouragement and assistance given to these Indians and those of Chili.

Thus much may suffice in relation to the eastern coast of Patagonia. The western coast is of less extent, and by reason of the Andes which skirt it, and stretch quite down to the water, is a very rocky and dangerous shore. However, I shall be hereafter necessitated to make further mention of it, and therefore shall not enlarge thereon at this time, but shall conclude this account with a short description of the harbour of St. Julian.

We, on our first arrival here, sent an officer on shore to the salt pond in order to procure a quantity of salt for the use of the squadron, Sir John Narborough having observed when he was here that the salt produced in that place was very white and good, and that in February there was enough of it to fill a thousand ships; but our officer returned with a sample which was very bad, and he told us that even of this there was but little to be got. I suppose the weather had been more rainy than ordinary, and had destroyed it.

CHAPTER VII

DEPARTURE FROM THE BAY OF ST. JULIAN, AND THE PASSAGE FROM THENCE TO STREIGHTS LE MAIRE

The *Tryal* being nearly refitted, which was our principal occupation at this bay of St. Julian, and the sole occasion of our stay, the commodore thought it necessary, as we were now directly bound for the South Seas and the enemy's coasts, to fix the plan of his first operations; and, therefore, on the 24th of February, a signal was made for all captains, and a council of war was held on board the *Centurion*, at which were present the Honourable Edward Legg, Captain Matthew Mitchell, the Honourable George Murray, Captain David Cheap, together with Colonel Mordaunt Cracherode, commander of the land-forces. At this council Mr. Anson proposed that their first attempt, after their arrival in the South Seas, should be the attack of the town and harbour of Baldivia, the principal frontier of the district of Chili; Mr. Anson informing them, at the same time, that it was an article contained in his Majesty's instructions to him to endeavour to secure some port in the South Seas where the ships of the squadron might be careened and refitted. To this

proposition made by the commodore, the council unanimously and readily agreed, and, in consequence of this resolution, new instructions were given to the captains of the squadron, by which, though they were still directed, in case of separation, to make the best of their way to the island of Nuestra Senora del Socoro (yet notwithstanding the orders they had formerly given them at St. Catherine's) they were to cruise off that island only ten days; from whence, if not joined by the commodore, they were to proceed and cruise off the harbour of Baldivia, making the land between the latitudes of 40° and $40^{\circ} 30'$, and taking care to keep to the southward of the port; and if in fourteen days they were not joined by the rest of the squadron, they were then to quit this station, and to direct their course to the island of Juan Fernandes, after which they were to regulate their further proceedings by their former orders. The same directions were also given to the master of the *Anna* pink, who was not to fail in answering the signals made by any ship of the squadron, and was to be very careful to destroy his papers and orders if he should be so unfortunate as to fall into the hands of the enemy. And as the separation of the squadron might prove of the utmost prejudice to his Majesty's service, each captain was ordered to give it in charge to the respective officers of the watch not to keep their ship at a greater distance from the *Centurion* than two miles, as they would answer it at their peril; and if any captain should find his ship beyond the distance specified, he was to acquaint the commodore with the name of the officer who had thus neglected

his duty.

These necessary regulations being established, and the *Tryal* sloop completed, the squadron weighed on Friday the 27th of February, at seven in the morning, and stood to the sea; the *Gloucester* indeed found a difficulty in purchasing her anchor, and was left a considerable way a-stern, so that in the night we fired several guns as a signal to her captain to make sail, but he did not come up to us till the next morning, when we found that they had been obliged to cut their cable, and leave their best bower behind them. At ten in the morning, the day after our departure, Wood's Mount, the high land over St. Julian, bore from us N. by W. distant ten leagues, and we had fifty-two fathom of water. And now standing to the southward, we had great expectation of falling in with Pizarro's squadron; for, during our stay at Port St. Julian, there had generally been hard gales between the W.N.W. and S.W., so that we had reason to conclude the Spaniards had gained no ground upon us in that interval. Indeed it was the prospect of meeting with them that had occasioned our commodore to be so very solicitous to prevent the separation of our ships, for had we been solely intent upon getting round Cape Horn in the shortest time, the properest method for this purpose would have been to have ordered each ship to have made the best of her way to the rendezvous without waiting for the rest.

From our departure from St. Julian to the 4th of March we had little wind, with thick hazy weather and some rain; and

our soundings were generally from forty to fifty fathom, with a bottom of black and grey sand, sometimes intermixed with pebble stones. On the 4th of March we were in sight of Cape Virgin Mary, and not more than six or seven leagues distant from it. This cape is the northern boundary of the entrance of the Straights of Magellan; it lies in the latitude of $52^{\circ} 21'$ south, and longitude from London $71^{\circ} 44'$ west, and seems to be a low flat land, ending in a point. Off this cape our depth of water was from thirty-five to forty-eight fathom. The afternoon of this day was very bright and clear, with small breezes of wind, inclinable to a calm, and most of the captains took the opportunity of this favourable weather to pay a visit to the commodore; but while they were in company together, they were all greatly alarmed by a sudden flame which burst out on board the *Gloucester*, and which was succeeded by a cloud of smoke. However, they were soon relieved from their apprehensions by receiving information that the blast was occasioned by a spark of fire from the forge lighting on some gunpowder and other combustibles which an officer on board was preparing for use, in case we should fall in with the Spanish fleet, and that it had been extinguished without any damage to the ship.

We here found what was constantly verified by all our observations in these high latitudes, that fair weather was always of an exceeding short duration, and that when it was remarkably fine it was a certain presage of a succeeding storm, for the calm and sunshine of our afternoon ended in a most turbulent night,

the wind freshning from the S.W. as the night came on, and increasing its violence continually till nine in the morning the next day, when it blew so hard that we were obliged to bring-to with the squadron, and to continue under a reefed mizen till eleven at night, having in that time from forty-three to fifty-seven fathom water, with black sand and gravel; and by an observation we had at noon, we concluded a current had set us twelve miles to the southward of our reckoning. Towards midnight, the wind abating, we made sail again, and steering south, we discovered in the morning, for the first time, the land called Terra del Fuego, stretching from the S. by W., to the S.E- $\frac{1}{2}$ E. This indeed afforded us but a very uncomfortable prospect, it appearing of a stupendous height, covered everywhere with snow. The dreariness of this scene can be but imperfectly represented by any drawing. We steered along this shore all day, having soundings from forty to fifty fathom, with stones and gravel. And as we intended to pass through Streights Le Maire next day, we lay-to at night, that we might not overshoot them, and took this opportunity to prepare ourselves for the tempestuous climate we were soon to be engaged in; with which view we employed ourselves good part of the night in bending an entire new suit of sails to the yards. At four the next morning, being the 7th of March, we made sail, and at eight saw the land, and soon after we began to open the streights, at which time Cape St. James bore from us E.S.E., Cape St. Vincent S.E. $\frac{1}{2}$ E., the middlemost of the Three Brothers S. and by W., Montegorda south, and Cape

St. Bartholomew, which is the souther-most point of Staten-land, E.S.E. And here I must observe, that though Frezier has given us a very correct prospect of the part of Terra del Fuego which borders on the streights, yet he has omitted that of Staten-land, which forms the opposite shore: hence we found it difficult to determine exactly where the streights lay, till they began to open to our view; and for want of this, if we had not happened to have coasted a considerable way along shore, we might have missed the streights, and have got to the eastward of Staten-land before we knew it. This is an accident that has happened to many ships, particularly, as Frezier mentions, to the *Incarnation* and *Concord*, who intending to pass through Streights Le Maire, were deceived by three hills on Staten-land like the Three Brothers, and some creeks resembling those of Terra del Fuego, and thereby overshot the streights.

And on occasion of the prospect of Staten-land, I cannot but remark, that though Terra del Fuego had an aspect extremely barren and desolate, yet this island of Staten-land far surpasses it in the wildness and horror of its appearance, it seeming to be entirely composed of inaccessible rocks, without the least mixture of earth or mold between them. These rocks terminate in a vast number of ragged points, which spire up to a prodigious height, and are all of them covered with everlasting snow; the points themselves are on every side surrounded with frightful precipices, and often overhang in a most astonishing manner, and the hills which bear them are generally separated from

each other by narrow clefts which appear as if the country had been frequently rent by earthquakes; for these chasms are nearly perpendicular, and extend through the substance of the main rocks, almost to their very bottoms: so that nothing can be imagined more savage and gloomy than the whole aspect of this coast. But to proceed.

I have above mentioned, that on the 7th of March, in the morning, we opened Streights Le Maire, and soon after, or about ten o'clock, the *Pearl* and the *Tryal* being ordered to keep ahead of the squadron, we entered them with fair weather and a brisk gale, and were hurried through by the rapidity of the tide in about two hours, though they are between seven and eight leagues in length. As these Streights are often esteemed to be the boundary between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and as we presumed we had nothing before us from hence but an open sea, till we arrived on those opulent coasts where all our hopes and wishes centered, we could not help perswading ourselves that the greatest difficulty of our voyage was now at an end, and that our most sanguine dreams were upon the point of being realised; and hence we indulged our imaginations in those romantic schemes which the fancied possession of the Chilian gold and Peruvian silver might be conceived to inspire. These joyous ideas were considerably heightened by the brightness of the sky and serenity of the weather, which was indeed most remarkably pleasing; for though the winter was now advancing apace, yet the morning of this day, in its brilliancy and mildness, gave place to none we

had seen since our departure from England. Thus animated by these flattering delusions, we passed those memorable Streights, ignorant of the dreadful calamities which were then impending, and just ready to break upon us; ignorant that the time drew near when the squadron would be separated never to unite again, and that this day of our passage was the last chearful day that the greatest part of us would ever live to enjoy.

CHAPTER VIII

FROM STREIGHTS LE MAIRE TO CAPE NOIR

We had scarcely reached the southern extremity of the Streights Le Maire, when our flattering hopes were instantly lost in the apprehensions of immediate destruction: for before the sternmost ships of the squadron were clear of the streights, the serenity of the sky was suddenly obscured, and we observed all the presages of an impending storm; and presently the wind shifted to the southward, and blew in such violent squalls that we were obliged to hand our topsails, and reef our main-sail; whilst the tide, too, which had hitherto favoured us, at once turned furiously against us, and drove us to the eastward with prodigious rapidity, so that we were in great anxiety for the *Wager* and the *Anna* pink, the two sternmost vessels, fearing they would be dashed to pieces against the shore of Staten-land: nor were our apprehensions without foundation, for it was with the utmost difficulty they escaped. And now the whole squadron, instead of pursuing their intended course to the S.W., were driven to the eastward by the united force of the storm and of the currents; so that next day in the morning we found ourselves near seven leagues to the eastward of Streights Le Maire, which then bore from us N.W. The violence of the current, which had set us

with so much precipitation to the eastward, together with the fierceness and constancy of the westerly winds, soon taught us to consider the doubling of Cape Horn as an enterprize that might prove too mighty for our efforts, though some amongst us had lately treated the difficulties which former voyagers were said to have met with in this undertaking as little better than chimerical, and had supposed them to arise rather from timidity and unskilfulness than from the real embarrassments of the winds and seas: but we were now severely convinced that these censures were rash and ill-grounded, for the distresses with which we struggled, during the three succeeding months, will not easily be paralleled in the relation of any former naval expedition. This will, I doubt not, be readily allowed by those who shall carefully peruse the ensuing narration.

From the storm which came on before we had well got clear of Streights Le Maire, we had a continual succession of such tempestuous weather as surprized the oldest and most experienced mariners on board, and obliged them to confess that what they had hitherto called storms were inconsiderable gales compared with the violence of these winds, which raised such short, and at the same time such mountainous waves, as greatly surpassed in danger all seas known in any other part of the globe: and it was not without great reason that this unusual appearance filled us with continual terror; for, had any one of these waves broke fairly over us, it must, in all probability, have sent us to the bottom. Nor did we escape with terror only; for

the ship rolling incessantly gunwale to, gave us such quick and violent motions that the men were in perpetual danger of being dashed to pieces against the decks or sides of the ship. And though we were extremely careful to secure ourselves from these shocks by grasping some fixed body, yet many of our people were forced from their hold, some of whom were killed, and others greatly injured; in particular, one of our best seamen was canted overboard and drowned, another dislocated his neck, a third was thrown into the main hold and broke his thigh, and one of our boatswain's mates broke his collar-bone twice; not to mention many other accidents of the same kind. These tempests, so dreadful in themselves, though unattended by any other unfavourable circumstance, were yet rendered more mischievous to us by their inequality, and the deceitful intervals which they at sometimes afforded; for though we were oftentimes obliged to lie-to, for days together, under a reefed mizen, and were frequently reduced to lie at the mercy of the waves under our bare poles, yet now and then we ventured to make sail with our courses double reefed; and the weather proving more tolerable, would perhaps encourage us to set our top-sails; after which, the wind, without any previous notice, would return upon us with redoubled force, and would in an instant tear our sails from the yards. And that no circumstance might be wanting which could aggrandize our distress, these blasts generally brought with them a great quantity of snow and sleet, which cased our rigging, and froze our sails, thereby rendering them and our cordage brittle,

and apt to snap upon the slightest strain, adding great difficulty and labour to the working of the ship, benumbing the limbs of our people, and making them incapable of exerting themselves with their usual activity, and even disabling many of them by mortifying their toes and fingers. It were indeed endless to enumerate the various disasters of different kinds which befel us; and I shall only mention the most material, which will sufficiently evince the calamitous condition of the whole squadron during the course of this navigation.

It was on the 7th of March, as hath been already observed, that we passed Streights Le Maire, and were immediately afterwards driven to the eastward by a violent storm, and the force of the current which set that way. For the four or five succeeding days we had hard gales of wind from the same quarter, with a most prodigious swell; so that though we stood, during all that time, towards the S.W., yet we had no reason to imagine we had made any way to the westward. In this interval we had frequent squalls of rain and snow, and shipped great quantities of water; after which, for three or four days, though the seas ran mountains high, yet the weather was rather more moderate: but on the 18th, we had again strong gales of wind, with extreme cold, and at midnight the main top-sail split, and one of the straps of the main dead-eyes broke. From hence to the 23d, the weather was more favourable, though often intermixed with rain and sleet, and some hard gales; but as the waves did not subside, the ship, by labouring in this lofty sea, was now grown so loose in her

upper works that she let in the water at every seam, so that every part within board was constantly exposed to the sea-water, and scarcely any of the officers ever lay in dry beds. Indeed it was very rare that two nights ever passed without many of them being driven from their beds by the deluge of water that came in upon them.

On the 23d, we had a most violent storm of wind, hail, and rain, with a very great sea; and though we handed the main top-sail before the height of the squall, yet we found the yard sprung; and soon after the foot rope of the main-sail breaking, the main-sail itself split instantly to rags, and, in spite of our endeavours to save it, much the greater part of it was blown overboard. On this, the commodore made the signal for the squadron to bring-to; and the storm at length flattening to a calm, we had an opportunity of getting down our main top-sail yard to put the carpenters to work upon it, and of repairing our rigging; after which, having bent a new main-sail, we got under sail again with a moderate breeze; but in less than twenty-four hours we were attacked by another storm still more furious than the former; for it proved a perfect hurricane, and reduced us to the necessity of lying-to under our bare poles. As our ship kept the wind better than any of the rest, we were obliged, in the afternoon, to wear ship, in order to join the squadron to the leeward, which otherwise we should have been in danger of losing in the night: and as we dared not venture any sail abroad, we were obliged to make use of an expedient which answered our purpose; this was putting the helm a weather,

and manning the fore-shrouds: but though this method proved successful for the end intended, yet in the execution of it one of our ablest seamen was canted overboard; we perceived that, notwithstanding the prodigious agitation of the waves, he swam very strong, and it was with the utmost concern that we found ourselves incapable of assisting him; indeed we were the more grieved at his unhappy fate, as we lost sight of him struggling with the waves, and conceived from the manner in which he swam that he might continue sensible, for a considerable time longer, of the horror attending his irretrievable situation.

Before this last-mentioned storm was quite abated, we found two of our main-shrouds and one mizen-shroud broke, all which we knotted, and set up immediately. From hence we had an interval of three or four days less tempestuous than usual, but accompanied with a thick fog, in which we were obliged to fire guns almost every half-hour, to keep our squadron together. On the 31st, we were alarmed by a gun fired from the *Gloucester*, and a signal made by her to speak with the commodore; we immediately bore down to her, and were prepared to hear of some terrible disaster; but we were apprized of it before we joined her, for we saw that her main-yard was broke in the slings. This was a grievous misfortune to us all at this juncture, as it was obvious it would prove an hindrance to our sailing, and would detain us the longer in these inhospitable latitudes. But our future success and safety was not to be promoted by repining, but by resolution and activity; and therefore that this unhappy incident

might delay us as little as possible, the commodore ordered several carpenters to be put on board the *Gloucester* from the other ships of the squadron, in order to repair her damage with the utmost expedition. And the captain of the *Tryal* complaining at the same time that his pumps were so bad, and the sloop made so great a quantity of water, that he was scarcely able to keep her free, the commodore ordered him a pump ready fitted from his own ship. It was very fortunate for the *Gloucester* and the *Tryal* that the weather proved more favourable this day than for many days, both before and after; since by this means they were enabled to receive the assistance which seemed essential to their preservation, and which they could scarcely have had at any other time, as it would have been extremely hazardous to have ventured a boat on board.

The next day, that is, on the 1st of April, the weather returned again to its customary bias, the sky looked dark and gloomy, and the wind began to freshen and to blow in squalls; however, it was not yet so boisterous as to prevent our carrying our top-sails close reefed; but its appearance was such as plainly prognosticated that a still severer tempest was at hand: and accordingly, on the 3d of April, there came on a storm which both in its violence and continuation (for it lasted three days) exceeded all that we had hitherto encountered. In its first onset we received a furious shock from a sea which broke upon our larboard quarter, where it stove in the quarter gallery, and rushed into the ship like a deluge; our rigging too suffered extremely from the blow; amongst the

rest, one of the straps of the main dead-eyes was broke, as was also a main-shroud and puttock-shroud, so that to ease the stress upon the masts and shrouds, we lowered both our main and fore-yards, and furled all our sails, and in this posture we lay-to for three days, when the storm somewhat abating, we ventured to make sail under our courses only; but even this we could not do long; for the next day, which was the 7th, we had another hard gale of wind, with lightening and rain, which obliged us to lie-to again till night. It was wonderful that notwithstanding the hard weather we had endured, no extraordinary accident had happened to any of the squadron since the breaking of the *Gloucester's* main-yard: but this good fortune now no longer attended us; for at three the next morning, several guns were fired to leeward as signals of distress: and the commodore making a signal for the squadron to bring-to, we, at daybreak, saw the *Wager* a considerable way to leeward of any of the other ships; and we soon perceived that she had lost her mizen-mast and main top-sail yard. We immediately bore down to her, and found this disaster had arisen from the badness of her iron work; for all the chain-plates to windward had given way, upon the ship's fetching a deep roll. This proved the more unfortunate to the *Wager*, as her carpenter had been on board the *Gloucester* ever since the 31st of March, and the weather was now too severe to permit him to return. Nor was the *Wager* the only ship of the squadron that suffered in this tempest; for the next day a signal of distress was made by the *Anna* pink, and, upon speaking with the master, we

learnt that they had broke their fore-stay and the gammon of the bowsprit, and were in no small danger of having all their masts come by the board; so that we were obliged to bear away until they had made all fast, after which we haled upon a wind again.

And now after all our sollicitude, and the numerous ills of every kind to which we had been incessantly exposed for near forty days, we had great consolation in the flattering hopes we entertained that our fatigues were drawing to a period, and that we should soon arrive in a more hospitable climate, where we should be amply repayed for all our past sufferings. For, towards the latter end of March, we were advanced, by our reckoning, near 10° to the westward of the westernmost point of Terra del Fuego, and this allowance being double what former navigators have thought necessary to be taken, in order to compensate the drift of the western current, we esteemed ourselves to be well advanced within the limits of the southern ocean, and had therefore been ever since standing to the northward with as much expedition as the turbulence of the weather and our frequent disasters permitted. And, on the 13th of April, we were but a degree in latitude to the southward of the west entrance of the Streights of Magellan; so that we fully expected, in a very few days, to have experienced the celebrated tranquillity of the Pacifick Ocean.

But these were delusions which only served to render our disappointment more terrible; for the next morning, between one and two, as we were standing to the northward, and the weather,

which had till then been hazy, accidentally cleared up, the pink made a signal for seeing land right ahead; and it being but two miles distant, we were all under the most dreadful apprehensions of running on shore, which, had either the wind blown from its usual quarter with its wonted vigour, or had not the moon suddenly shone out, not a ship amongst us could possibly have avoided: but the wind, which some few hours before blew in squalls from the S.W., having fortunately shifted to W.N.W., we were enabled to stand to the southward, and to clear ourselves of this unexpected danger, and were fortunate enough by noon to have gained an offing of near twenty leagues.

By the latitude of this land we fell in with, it was agreed to be a part of Terra del Fuego, near the southern outlet described in Frezier's chart of the Straights of Magellan, and was supposed to be that point called by him Cape Noir. It was indeed most wonderful that the currents should have driven us to the eastward with such strength; for the whole squadron esteemed themselves upwards of ten degrees more westerly than this land, so that in running down, by our account, about nineteen degrees of longitude, we had not really advanced half that distance. And now, instead of having our labours and anxieties relieved by approaching a warmer climate and more tranquil seas, we were to steer again to the southward, and were again to combat those western blasts which had so often terrified us; and this too when we were greatly enfeebled by our men falling sick, and dying apace, and when our spirits, dejected by a long continuance at

sea, and by our late disappointment, were much less capable of supporting us in the various difficulties which we could not but expect in this new undertaking. Add to all this, too, the discouragement we received by the diminution of the strength of the squadron; for, three days before this, we lost sight of the *Severn* and the *Pearl* in the morning, and though we spread our ships, and beat about for them some time, yet we never saw them more; whence we had apprehensions that they too might have fallen in with this land in the night, and by being less favoured by the wind and the moon than we were, might have run on shore and have perished. Full of these desponding thoughts and gloomy presages, we stood away to the S.W., prepared by our late disaster to suspect that how large soever an allowance we made in our westing for the drift of the western current, we might still, upon a second trial, perhaps find it insufficient.

CHAPTER IX OBSERVATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FACILITATING THE PASSAGE OF OUR FUTURE CRUISERS ROUND CAPE HORN

The improper season of the year in which we attempted to double Cape Horn, and to which is to be imputed the disappointment (recited in the foregoing chapter) of falling in with Terra del Fuego, when we reckoned ourselves above a hundred leagues to the westward of that whole coast, and consequently well advanced into the Pacifick Ocean; this unseasonable navigation, I say, to which we were necessitated by our too late departure from England, was the fatal source of all the misfortunes we afterwards encountered. For from hence proceeded the separation of our ships, the destruction of our people, the ruin of our project on Baldivia, and of all our other views on the Spanish places, and the reduction of our squadron from the formidable condition in which it passed Streights Le Maire to a couple of shattered half-manned cruisers and a sloop, so far disabled that in many climates they scarcely durst have put to sea. To prevent, therefore, as much as in me lies, all ships hereafter bound to the South Seas from suffering the same

calamities, I think it my duty to insert in this place such directions and observations as either my own experience and reflection, or the conversation of the most skilful navigators on board the squadron, could furnish me with, in relation to the most eligible manner of doubling Cape Horn, whether in regard to the season of the year, the course proper to be steered, or the places of refreshment both on the east and west side of South America.

And first, with regard to the proper place for refreshment on the east side of South America. For this purpose the island of St. Catherine's has been usually recommended by former writers, and on their faith we put in there, as has been formerly mentioned. But the treatment we met with, and the small store of refreshments we could procure there, are sufficient reasons to render all ships for the future cautious how they trust themselves in the government of Don Jose Sylva de Paz, for they may certainly depend on having their strength, condition, and designs betrayed to the Spaniards, as far as the knowledge the governor can procure of these particulars will give him leave. And as this treacherous conduct is inspired by the views of private gain in the illicit commerce carried on to the river of Plate, rather than by any national affection which the Portuguese bear the Spaniards, the same perfidy may perhaps be expected from most of the governors of the Brazil coast, since these smuggling engagements are doubtless very extensive and general. And though the governors should themselves detest so faithless a procedure, yet as ships are perpetually passing from some or

other of the Brazil ports to the river of Plate, the Spaniards could scarcely fail of receiving, by this means, casual intelligence of any British ships upon the coast, which, however imperfect such intelligence might be, would prove of dangerous import to the views and interests of those cruisers who were thus discovered.

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